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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Is moral responsibility compatible with the truth of causal determinism? One of the most 
influential arguments that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism is the so-
called ‘Direct Argument,’ developed by Peter van Inwagen in his An Essay on Free Will.  
Informally put, the Direct Argument goes as follows: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events 
in the remote past.  But we are not responsible for what went on before we were born, 
and neither are we responsible for what the laws of nature are.  Therefore, we are not 
responsible for the consequences of these things (including our present acts). 
 
The Direct Argument is highly significant.  If it is successful, we have an argument for 
incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism that does not make use of two 
controversial claims typically invoked by incompatibilists: (i) a person is morally responsible for 
what she has done only if she could have done otherwise, and (ii) if the person’s action is 
causally determined, then she could not have done otherwise.  Since compatibilists typically 
deny one or the other of these claims, the Direct Argument offers an intriguing way to argue for 
incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism that sidesteps many of the traditional 
battlegrounds between compatibilists and incompatibilists. 
 The Direct Argument relies on two rules of inference, both of which have been 
questioned by the Argument’s opponents.  In my dissertation, I defend the Direct Argument from 
some of the most pressing recent attacks against these rules.  But, there is a further objection, an 
objection called the No Past Objection, that I argue successfully undermines the Direct 
Argument.  So, I go on to revise the Direct Argument in light of the No Past Objection, and I do 
so in a way gets around this objection without sacrificing the Argument’s inference rules, or the 
 
 
 v 
spirit of its metaphysical assumptions.  The result, what I call the Direct Argument*, is a 
successful argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
In Defense of the Direct Argument for Incompatibilism 
 
 
 
Is moral responsibility compatible with the truth of causal determinism?1  One of the 
most influential arguments that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism is 
the so-called ‘Direct Argument,’ developed by Peter van Inwagen (1983).  The Direct Argument 
rests on the following two rules of inference (where, ‘☐’ stands for broadly logical necessity; ‘⊃’ 
stands for material implication; and ‘NRp’ stands for ‘p and no-one is now or ever has been even 
partly morally responsible for p’): 
 Rule A:  From ☐p, we may infer NRp 
 
 Rule B:  From NRp and NR(p ⊃ q), we may infer NRq 
 To illustrate the Direct Argument, consider an individual, Colin, who decides to donate 
some money to charity.  Van Inwagen argues that, with these two rules of inference in hand and 
two very plausible premises, we can show that if Colin’s decision to donate to charity is causally 
determined, then it’s not something for which he can be morally responsible.  Here are the details 
of his argument.  Assume, for conditional proof, that causal determinism is true.  From this 
assumption, we can reason as follows (where ‘C’ stands for Colin’s decision to donate money, 
‘P’ labels a complete description of the world prior to the existence of any human person, and 
‘L’ stands for a conjunction of the laws of nature): 
(1) ☐ (P & L ⊃ C)  By definition of ‘determinism’  
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  1	  Here,	  and	  throughout,	  I’ll	  understand	  these	  terms	  to	  mean	  the	  following:	  
	  
Moral	  responsibility:	  	  Praiseworthiness	  or	  blameworthiness	  for	  some	  morally	  significant	  action,	  A.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Causal	  Determinism:	  	  The	  thesis	  that	  there	  is	  at	  any	  instant	  exactly	  one	  physically	  possible	  future.	  (van	  
Inwagen,	  1983,	  p.	  3)	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 (2) ☐ (P ⊃ (L ⊃ C))  1, and logic 
 
 (3) NR (P ⊃ (L ⊃ C))  2, and Rule A 
 
 (4)  NR P              Premise 
 
 (5)  NR (L ⊃ C)  From 3, 4, and Rule B 
 
 (6)  NR L   Premise 
 
 (7)  NR C   From 5, 6, and Rule B 
  
 In other words, if Colin’s decision to donate to charity is causally determined, then the 
past and the laws of nature jointly entail Colin’s decision at that time.  But since Colin is not 
morally responsible for the past prior to the existence of any human person and since he is not 
morally responsible for the laws of nature, then—with Rules A and B in hand—we can conclude 
that he is not morally responsible for his present decision to donate to charity. 
 The Direct Argument is highly significant.  If it is successful, we have an argument for 
incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism that does not make use of two 
controversial claims typically invoked by incompatibilists: (i) a person is morally responsible for 
what she has done only if she could have done otherwise, and (ii) if the person’s action is 
causally determined, then she could not have done otherwise.  Since compatibilists typically 
deny one or the other of these claims, the Direct Argument offers an intriguing way to argue for 
incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism that sidesteps many of the traditional 
battlegrounds between compatibilists and incompatibilists.   
 In recent years, the Direct Argument has received a lot of critical attention, most of it 
paying special attention to the Argument’s inference rules, as well as some key metaphysical 
assumptions.  In particular, Rule B has come under the most fire from compatibilists wishing to 
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disarm the Direct Argument.  This has happened in (at least) two ways.  First, and most 
prominently, compatibilists have leveled alleged counterexamples to Rule B in an attempt to 
show that the rule is invalid.  Second, compatibilists have leveled charges of dialectical 
impropriety with respect to Rule B: they’ve either said that the rule is straightforwardly question-
begging or, more subtly, that it lacks any non-question-begging antecedent support.   
 Rule A, too, is not without its detractors.  Though most philosophers agree with van 
Inwagen that the validity of Rule A is “beyond dispute” (1983, p. 184), there is some recent 
literature that tries to argue that someone is (or could be) morally responsible for a necessary 
truth.  And if this sort of objection to Rule A is successful, then (obviously enough) Rule A is 
invalid and the Direct Argument fails. 
 I think, then, that the recent challenges to Rules A and B lead to at least two important 
questions that must be answered by the incompatibilist.  (i) are the inference rules, upon which 
the Direct Argument rests, valid?  And, (ii) are the inference rules, upon which the Direct 
Argument rests, admissible in the relevant dialectical context?  A negative answer to either (i) or 
(ii) undermines the Direct Argument more generally. 
 Finally, there is the recent, so-called, No Past Objection to the Direct Argument.2  The 
upshot of the No Past Objection is that a remote past isn’t a necessary condition of the 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  2	  To	  be	  clear,	  the	  No	  Past	  Objection	  is	  raised,	  in	  particular,	  against	  the	  so-­‐called	  Consequence	  Argument,	  an	  
indirect	  argument	  for	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  determinism.	  	  Van	  Inwagen	  (1983,	  p.	  94),	  puts	  
the	  argument	  (or,	  more	  exactly,	  argument	  form)	  as	  follows.	  	  Assume	  the	  following	  two	  principles:	  
	  
	   Rule	  α:	  	  ☐p	  ├	  Np,	  and	  
	  
	   Rule	  β:	  	  Np,	  N(p	  ⊃	  q)	  ├	  Nq,	  then	  
	  
where	  ‘N’	  is	  a	  modal	  operator	  that	  means	  ‘it	  is	  not	  now,	  nor	  has	  it	  ever	  been	  within	  anyone’s	  power	  to	  render	  it	  
false	  that’,	  and	  ‘p’	  and	  ‘q’	  are	  any	  propositions	  whatever,	  what	  follows	  is	  that,	  if	  determinism	  is	  true,	  then	  
	   	  
(1*)	  	  ☐	  (P	  &	  L	  ⊃	  p)	   By	  definition	  of	  ‘determinism’	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‘determinism’ thesis.  And since the premises of the Direct Argument aren’t necessary truths—
for, the Direct Argument asserts that, if determinism is true, then, necessarily, any proposition 
about the remote past, conjoined with the laws of nature, entails a unique future—the Direct 
Argument fails to support incompatibilism since incompatibilism, if true, is necessarily true.  Or, 
another way to think about the No Past Objection is this.  The No Past Objection’s proponent 
points out that, at best, the Direct Argument can establish only this: necessarily, no deterministic 
universe with a remote past contains morally responsible agents.  But that thesis leave open the 
following thesis:  possibly, some deterministic universe that lacks a remote past contains morally 
responsible agents.  And if this last thesis is true, then compatibilism is true.  So, even if the 
Direct Argument is sound, it does not rule out compatibilism, and so is not a valid argument for 
incompatibilism.  What is important about this objection is that it grants the truth of the 
inference rules upon which the Direct Argument rests, so even if the incompatibilist can answer 
(i) – (ii) in the affirmative, this will have no effect on the No Past Objection.  Thus, the No Past 
Objection generates yet another important question that the incompatibilist must answer:  (iii) if 
there needn’t be a remote past, and there are possible universes that lack a remote past but 
                                                                                                                                                       
	   (2*)	  	  ☐	  (P	  ⊃	  (L	  ⊃	  p))	   1*,	  and	  logic	  
	  
	   (3*)	  	  N(P	  ⊃	  (L	  ⊃	  p))	   2*,	  Rule	  α	  
	  
	   (4*)	  	  NP	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  one	  (ever)	  has	  the	  power	  to	  render	  it	  false	  that	  P	  
	  
	   (5*)	  	  N	  (L	  ⊃	  p)	   	   3*,	  4*,	  Rule	  β	  
	  
	   (6*)	  	  NL	   	   	   No	  one	  (ever)	  has	  the	  power	  to	  render	  it	  false	  that	  L	  
	  
	   (7*)	  Np	   	   	   5*,	  6*,	  Rule	  β	  
	  
As	  with	  the	  Direct	  Argument,	  let	  ‘P’	  stand	  for	  ‘the	  remote	  past’	  and	  ‘L’	  stand	  for	  ‘the	  laws	  of	  nature,	  and	  ‘p’	  stand	  
for	  any	  proposition	  whatever.	  	  What	  follows,	  if	  the	  argument	  is	  successful,	  is	  that,	  if	  determinism	  is	  true,	  then	  no	  
one	  has	  any	  choice	  about	  anything.	  	  	  
	   Now,	  what’s	  important	  to	  notice	  about	  the	  Consequence	  Argument	  is	  that	  it	  has	  the	  same	  first	  premise,	  
and	  (basically,	  though	  the	  operator	  is	  different)	  same	  fourth	  premise.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  premises—in	  either	  
argument—rely	  on	  there	  being	  a	  remote	  past.	  	  And	  this	  is	  what	  the	  No	  Past	  Objection	  aims	  to	  undermine.	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include morally responsible agents, then doesn’t the Direct Argument fail as an argument for 
incompatibilism? 
 Thus, there seem to me to be three crucial questions that an incompatibilist must answer.  
A negative answer to any of the three will prove to be fatal for the Direct Argument.3 
 
II.  Why This is Important 
 
The overarching issue of my dissertation is whether or not moral responsibility is 
compatible with causal determinism.  But, before I go into more details as to why this is 
important, let me address a key worry someone might raise here.  Perhaps someone might object 
to this issue by arguing that it’s just obvious that we’re morally responsible for some stuff 
whether or not causal determinism is true.  So, what’s all the fuss about?   
In reply, let me first say what I mean by moral responsibility.  I don’t mean whether we 
have moral responsibilities—clearly we can have moral responsibilities whether or not causal 
determinism is true.  Instead, by ‘being morally responsible for some stuff’ I mean ‘being 
blameworthy or praiseworthy for what one does’.  But even with this in hand, the critic might 
still say, “isn’t it just obvious that we're sometimes blameworthy or praiseworthy for what we do, 
and this is the case whether or not causal determinism is true?”  In reply, I think the critic is 
making a clear mistake.  What is obvious is that we do sometimes regard one another as 
praiseworthy or blameworthy for what we do.  This much, I grant, is true.  But of course, it’s one 
thing to regard or take someone to be praiseworthy or blameworthy; it’s another thing 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  3	  One	  might	  wonder	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  successful	  No	  Past	  Objection	  really	  would	  be	  fatal	  to	  the	  Direct	  Argument.	  	  
After	  all,	  even	  if	  the	  No	  Past	  Objection	  is	  successful,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  a	  sound	  Direct	  Argument	  shows	  what	  
incompatibilists	  generally	  want,	  anyway,	  viz.,	  the	  conclusion	  that	  in	  worlds	  like	  ours	  causal	  determinism	  rules	  out	  
moral	  responsibility.	  	  Fair	  enough.	  	  But,	  the	  stronger	  view	  (i.e.	  the	  view	  that	  says	  incompatibilism	  is	  necessarily	  true	  
if	  true	  at	  all),	  I	  take	  it,	  is	  the	  classical	  incompatibilist	  view.	  	  And,	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  was	  launched	  in	  
an	  effort	  to	  argue	  for	  this	  claim,	  a	  negative	  answer	  to	  (iii)	  will	  prove	  fatal.	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  invite	  the	  reader	  to	  skip	  
chapter	  five	  if	  he/she	  doesn’t	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  modally	  strong	  incompatibilist	  claim.	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entirely for them to actually be praiseworthy or blameworthy.  And, pace the critic, it’s not at all 
obvious that people are in fact blameworthy or praiseworthy whether or not causal determinism 
is true.  In fact, there are some well-known skeptical arguments that purport to show that if 
determinism is true, then people can’t be morally responsible (e.g. the Consequence Argument, 
and the Direct Argument).  Moreover, there are also some well-known arguments that purport to 
show that if determinism is false then people can’t be morally responsible (e.g., the so-called 
‘luck objection’, and the so-called ‘Mind’ argument).  My dissertation is a critical examination of 
one of the arguments—the Direct Argument—that purports to show that if determinism is true, 
then people are not morally responsible for anything they do. 
 
III.  In it to Win it  
 
 My aim in this dissertation, then, is to demonstrate (minimally) these three things:  (a) 
that the inference rules upon which the Direct Argument rests are both valid and permissible in 
the relevant dialectical context; (b) that the No Past Objection really does undermine the Direct 
Argument as it is currently stated, but that it does not undermine the revised version of the Direct 
Argument that I’ll present; and (c) that the success of the revised Direct Argument provides 
clarity for moving forward in the relevant and related debates.  Thus, the central purpose of this 
dissertation is to defend the inference rules of the Direct Argument in light of recent objections, 
and moreover, to revise the Direct Argument in light of the No Past Objection.   
 To demonstrate (a), I intend to defend Rules A and B from various recent objections.  In 
particular, I intend to defend Rule B’s validity from alleged counterexamples offered in the 
recent literature by philosophers such as John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaque Haji, 
Seth Shabo, and David Widerker and Ira Schnall.  I’ll do this in chapter two where each alleged 
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counterexample will be taken in turn, each being shown to fail outright, or to be inconclusive and 
so of no help to the Rule B opponent. 
Moreover, in chapter three, I intend to defend Rule B’s propriety within the relevant 
dialectical context from recent objections to the contrary by Fischer, and Michael McKenna.  
Thus, chapters two and three will conclude that Rule B is safe from counterexample and that it is 
dialectically appropriate, respectively.   
Lastly, I will defend Rule A’s validity from recent objections made by Stephen Kearns.  
While most philosophers think it’s obviously true that no one is (or can be) morally responsible 
for a necessary truth—which is just what Rule A says—Kearns has recently raised an objection 
to the contrary.  So, the central aim of chapter four, then, is to analyze, and argue against, 
Kearns’s attempts to provide a counterexample to Rule A.  Put another way, in chapter four I 
will show that contra Kearns, nobody is (or can be) morally responsible for a necessary truth; 
thus, Rule A is valid.  What’s more, given that chapters two and three will have successfully 
defended Rule B from salient objections, chapter four will conclude that the key inference rules 
upon which the Direct Argument rests are both valid. 
 To demonstrate (b), I will, in chapter five, show that the No Past Objection, as recently 
raised by Joseph Keim Campbell, is successful at undermining the Direct Argument as it is 
currently stated.  Even so, I intend to argue that there is a way to revise the Direct Argument in 
light of the No Past Objection; a way that is consistent with my defenses of the Direct 
Argument’s key inference rules, and is such that it not only circumvents the No Past Objection, it 
also rules out the possibility of any relevantly similar objections.   
 After due reflection on the success of the revised version of the Direct Argument that I’ll 
offer, we’ll see that (c) is true.  That is, we’ll see that a successfully revised Direct Argument 
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will provide a guiding light into the future of the discussion(s) surrounding moral responsibility 
and free will.  I will discuss this much, in chapter six.  But this is only part of what I’ll do in 
chapter six.  In the main, I argue that by reflecting on the nature of truth, we can see that 
counterexamples to Rule B are impossible.  This conclusion, of course, strengthens my defense 
of Rule B in chapter two.     
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CHAPTER TWO:   
Criticisms of Rule B (I): Alleged Counterexamples 
 
The subject of this project is the Direct Argument, which goes as follows.  Assume the 
following two principles 
Rule A: ☐p	 ├	 NRp, and 
 Rule B:  NR (p ⊃ q), NRp ├ NRq,4 
 
where ‘NR’ is an operator that means ‘nobody is now, or ever has been, even partly morally 
responsible for the fact that,’ and ‘p’ and ‘q’ are any propositions whatever.  With these two 
rules in hand, proponents of the Direct Argument argue that if determinism is true, then (where 
‘P’ stands for ‘the remote past’, ‘L’ for the ‘laws of nature’, and ‘p’ for ‘any true proposition 
whatever’)  
(1) 	 ☐	 (P & L	 ⊃ p)  By definition of ‘determinism’ 	 
	 	 
	 (2) 	 ☐	 (P	 ⊃ (L	 ⊃	 p)) 1, exportation	 
	 
	 (3)  NR (P	 ⊃ (L	 ⊃	 p)) 2, Rule A	 
	 
	 (4)  NR P        NR for what went on in the remote past 
 
 (5)  NR (L	 ⊃ p)  3, 4, Rule B	 
	 
	 (6)  NR L   NR for the laws of nature 
 
 (7) NRp   5, 6, Rule B. 
 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  Originally	  from	  Peter	  van	  Inwagen’s	  An	  Essay	  on	  Free	  Will	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1983),	  p.	  184.	  	  The	  
operator	  in	  the	  original	  is	  ‘N’.	  	  However,	  it’s	  become	  standard	  parlance	  to	  express	  the	  operator	  in	  this	  argument	  as	  
‘NR’,	  as	  above.	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The upshot of the Direct Argument is that, if determinism is true, then nobody is now, or ever 
has been even partly morally responsible for any fact whatever (including, of course, facts about 
our behavior).  If so, then moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible. 
Now, incompatibilists take it that Rule B is a valid rule of inference—at any rate, Rule B 
is prima facie valid.  And Rule A seems to be an undeniable truth.5  Compatibilists, then, 
generally pick up their fight with the Direct Argument at Rule B, usually by attempting to offer a 
counterexample.  Thus, the central point of this chapter: to investigate alleged counterexamples 
to Rule B.     
There are two ways in which a compatibilist might try to call Rule B into question.  She 
can try either to “produce some set of propositions intuitively more plausible than the validity of 
[Rule B]…or [come up with] a counterexample [to Rule B] that can be evaluated independently 
of the question whether moral responsibility and determinism are compatible” (van Inwagen, 
1983, p. 188).  In this chapter, I deal only with the second option, viz., attempts to construct 
counterexamples to Rule B.  Thus, in this chapter, I will defend Rule B from some of the most 
recent and forceful of these attempts.  
 
II.  Fischer and Ravizza’s Alleged Counterexample to Rule B 
	 
 In chapter six of their influential book Responsibility and Control (1998), John Martin 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza set out to show that the Direct Argument fails.  In particular, Fischer 
and Ravizza set out to show that the Direct Argument’s Rule B is invalid.  They do this by 
positing certain Frankfurt-style thought experiments,6 thought experiments in which an outcome 
is, in some sense, overdetermined, i.e., is such that if the outcome was not brought about by the 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  5	  But	  see	  Stephen	  Kearns’s	  “Responsibility	  for	  Necessities,”	  Philosophical	  Studies	  155	  (2011),	  307	  –	  324.	  	  I	  deal	  
with	  Kearns’s	  objection	  to	  Rule	  A	  in	  chapter	  four.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  These	  types	  of	  thought	  experiments	  find	  their	  origin	  in	  Harry	  Frankfurt’s	  (1969).	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agent herself, then it would be brought about by some other fact.  And it’s these thought 
experiments that they allege are counterexamples to Rule B.  I think their allegations are 
mistaken; their proposed counterexamples to Rule B are not counterexamples at all.  In what 
follows, I intend to show why I think this is the case.   
 In order to see how my objections to Fischer and Ravizza’s counterexamples will go, let 
me first restate their case and present their proposed counterexamples to Rule B.  Consider: 
Erosion:  Imagine that Betty [a soldier charged with destroying an enemy fortress] plants 
her explosives in the crevices of the glacier and detonates the charge at T1, causing an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at T3.  Unbeknownst to Betty and her 
commanding officers, however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and eroding. 
Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken 
free at T2, starting a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy camp at T3. 
(Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, p. 157) 
 
Erosion is alleged to be a counterexample to Rule B because 
 
1. The glacier is eroding and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the 
fact that it is eroding; and 
 
2. If the glacier is eroding, then there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, 
and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for this fact; 
 
But, given Betty’s responsibility [for the avalanche crushing the enemy base at T3], it is  
not true that 
 
3. There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, and no one is, or ever has 
been, even partly responsible for this fact. (Ibid., my insertion) 
 
So, it appears that Rule B is invalid.  For, there are two paths that suffice for the enemy camp’s 
having been crushed by the glacier: one that in fact obtains; the other counterfactual since that 
path didn’t obtain (though it would have).  But, since this counterfactual natural intervener—the 
erosion of the glacier—does not actually cause the avalanche, it does not remove Betty’s moral 
responsibility for the enemy camp’s having been crushed by the glacier.  So, even though the 
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enemy camp’s being crushed by the glacier is inevitable, given the circumstances, it doesn’t 
follow that Betty isn’t morally responsible for its having been so crushed.  Rule B is invalid. 
 To put the point a bit more clearly, notice that Erosion contains two paths.  The first path 
passes through Betty, a normally functioning agent. The second path, however, does not pass 
through Betty (or any other normally functioning agent).  The second path is merely a 
counterfactual path that Fischer and Ravizza call the ‘Ensuring Path’.  The Ensuring Path, 
obviously enough, ensures that the consequence—in this case, the enemy’s being crushed by the 
glacier—obtains.  So, even though, 
4. There is some Ensuring Path leading to a particular outcome and no one is, or ever 
has been, even partly responsible for this fact; 
 
and 
 
5. if there is this Ensuring Path, then the outcome is reached, and no one is, or ever has 
been, even partly responsible for this fact; 
 
it is false that 
 
6. the outcome is reached and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for 
this fact. 
 
6 is false because, since the outcome (the camp’s being destroyed by the avalanche) was not 
caused by the natural intervention of ice and rocks breaking free (but, rather, by Betty’s placing 
the dynamite), Betty is responsible for the enemy camp’s having been crushed by the glacier 
even though this would have happened even if she had never detonated her explosives at T1.  
Rule B is invalid. 
 But I think that this argument fails, for 6 isn’t clearly false.  There are two reasons I think 
this.  First, there might be a plausible way in which a proponent of Rule B could modify the rule 
so that the spirit of Rule B is weaker than what Fischer and Ravizza give it credit.  This is the 
move that Michael McKenna (2008) suggests for the Direct Argument’s proponent.  Second—
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and I think this is the stronger of the two reasons—I think Erosion simply misses the salient sort 
of responsibility that Rule B addresses, namely, direct responsibility; and any successful 
counterexample to Rule B will have to include an instance of direct moral responsibility.7  I’ll 
now defend these two reasons for thinking that 6 isn’t clearly false.   
 McKenna argues that Frankfurt-style counterexamples (such as Erosion) do, technically 
speaking, undermine Rule B.  But that’s only if we read Rule B as Fischer and Ravizza read it.  
They read it as follows: 
 Transfer of Non-responsibility (TNR):   
 
i. p, and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the fact that 
p.   
 
ii. If p, then q, and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the 
fact that if p, then q.   
 
iii. Therefore, no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the fact 
that q. 
 
If TNR is left as is, it’s easy to see why Fischer and Ravizza think a case like Erosion 
undermines Rule B.  But McKenna thinks that such an objection doesn’t get at the heart of the 
Direct Argument; that is, such a counterexample doesn’t get at the heart of Rule B.  Rule B, and, 
so, the Direct Argument, can be saved from a case like Erosion if we simply amend Rule B to 
read as follows: 
 Transfer NR** (TNR**): 
 
i*.  p at time T1, and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the   
      fact that p; 
 
ii**.  a.  p is part of the actual sequence of events E that gives rise to q at T2  
              (where T2 is later than T1); 
         b.  p is causally sufficient for the obtaining of q at T2, and any other part of   
              E that is causally sufficient for q either causes or is caused by p; 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  7	  What	  is	  ‘direct	  responsibility’?	  And	  why	  must	  we	  understand	  Rule	  B	  in	  terms	  of	  such	  responsibility?	  	  I	  answer	  
these	  questions	  below	  (pp.	  16	  –	  17).	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         c.  no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for ii**.a. and ii**.b.; 
 
iii**.  Therefore, no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the fact  
           that q obtains at T2. (McKenna, 2008, p. 364) 
 
The advantage of TNR** is that it rules out cases like Erosion; for, it rules out two-path cases.  
 
McKenna’s “central objection” to Fischer and Ravizza’s use of two-path cases like 
Erosion is that 
the manner in which the source incompatibilist [that is, one who holds the view that for 
an agent to be morally responsible for her actions, she must be the ultimate source of her 
actions, and that this sort of ‘sourcehood’ is incompatible with the truth of causal 
determinism] takes determinism to rule out moral responsibility and the manner in which 
the Direct Argument can be employed on behalf of the source incompatibilist  is not 
relevantly like a two-path case of the sort Fischer and Ravizza enlist to reject [TNR].  If 
determinism is true, it is not as if there is one path to a certain result in virtue of which 
determinism is true, and then there is some other distinct path, unhinged from the former, 
that a morally responsible agent initiates so that he or she bears responsibility for the 
object of responsibility in question…The facts settled by the truth of determinism include 
the facts pertaining to the “action path” in virtue of which the agent is alleged to be 
responsible.8 (Ibid., my insertions) 
 
This certainly seems plausible to me.  Fischer and Ravizza argue that  
3. There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, and no one is, or ever has 
been, even partly responsible for this fact 
 
does not follow from   
1. The glacier is eroding and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the 
fact that it is eroding; and 
 
2. If the glacier is eroding, then there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, 
and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for this fact. 
 
But, how are 1 and 2, in actual fact, related to 3?  As Erosion tells the story, 1 and 2 are only 
counterfactually related; that is, the actual facts do not include the facts pertaining to the 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  8	  Here,	  McKenna’s	  central	  objection	  to	  Fischer	  and	  Ravizza	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  reply	  on	  offer	  is	  available	  
only	  to	  source	  incompatibilists.	  	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  envisaged	  reply	  is	  available	  to	  
incompatibilists	  generally,	  or	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  thinks	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  is	  an	  argument	  for	  source	  
incompatibilism,	  but	  not	  incompatibilism	  generally.	  	  For	  what	  it	  is	  worth,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  is	  silent	  
on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  a	  ‘sourcehood’	  requirement	  on	  moral	  responsibility.	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avalanche’s crushing the enemy base.  But, according to source incompatibilism, if determinism 
is true and the past and laws are such and so, in order for Betty to be morally responsible for the 
destruction of the enemy base, 1 and 2 must be such that they include the action path containing 
Betty’s having planted the dynamite in the crevices of the glacier given that the past and the laws 
are such and so.  To suppose that the erosion would, counterfactually, result in 3 from an, as a 
matter of fact, unrelated 1 and 2 is to replace 3 with some other event that does not include the 
aforementioned action path, and to replace p (where ‘p’ is Betty’s having planted the dynamite in 
the crevices of the glacier) with some, as a matter of fact, unrelated r.  And what the Direct 
Argument is concerned with is whether or not anybody is, or could be, responsible for q when p 
implies q (where ‘p’ is Betty’s having planted the dynamite in the crevices of the glacier).  The 
Direct Argument (and its proponent) isn’t concerned with counterfactual two-path scenarios.   
 But is limiting the Direct Argument’s ‘punch’ to one-path scenarios really all that 
defensible?  Perhaps not.  I said, above, that 3 in actual fact doesn’t (indeed, if determinism is 
true and the past and laws are such and so, 3 can’t) follow from 1 and 2 because it’s not related 
to 1 and 2 in any relevant way.  But if not, this must mean that 3 can only follow—indeed, 3 
necessarily follows—from: 
1*.  The past is such that it includes Betty’s planting dynamite in the crevices of a glacier 
above the enemy’s base at T1, and the laws are such and so, and no one is, or ever has 
been, even partly responsible for the fact that the past is such that it includes Betty’s 
planting dynamite in the crevices of a glacier above the enemy’s base at T1, and the laws 
are such and so; and, 
 
2*.  If the past is such that it includes Betty’s planting dynamite in the crevices of a 
glacier above the enemy’s camp, and the laws are such and so at T1, then there is an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, and no one is, or ever has been, even partly 
responsible for this fact. 
  
But 1* and 2* are straightforwardly question begging against the compatibilist, the opponent of 
the Direct Argument.  1* and 2* are question begging because they assume that no one is, or 
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ever has been, responsible for the fact that the past includes Betty’s having planted dynamite in 
the crevices of a glacier above the enemy’s base camp.  But why should the compatibilist agree 
to a thing like that?  Of course the compatibilist will not agree with such a thing.  She won’t 
agree because whether or not Betty is responsible for her having so acted is exactly what’s at 
issue.  So, limiting Rule B to one-path cases seems, at least in cases like a modified Erosion, to 
beg the question.   
 Now it looks as if Erosion is either a counterexample to Rule B, or it generates a need to 
revise Rule B (that is, to read it as TNR**) in a way that ends up begging the question.  What’s a 
proponent of the Direct Argument to do? 
 It seems to me that the proponent of the Direct Argument ought to agree with McKenna 
that cases like Erosion miss the point of the Direct Argument, but for different reasons than what 
McKenna gives.  To see what I mean, notice that Erosion would have us believe that what’s at 
issue is whether or not Betty is responsible for  
3’.  There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3. 
 
But I think the proponent of the Direct Argument should deny that what’s at issue in Erosion is 
whether or not Betty is responsible for 3’ since all should agree that 3’ isn’t something Betty 
could be directly morally responsible for.  And it’s precisely direct moral responsibility that is 
the relevant sort of responsibility to which Rule B refers.9  Following David Widerker, we can 
think of direct moral responsibility in this way: “S is directly responsible for p just in case S is 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  9	  This	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  what	  van	  Inwagen	  is	  gesturing	  at	  in	  the	  long	  parenthetical	  remark	  straddling	  pages	  161	  
–	  162	  of	  An	  Essay	  on	  Free	  Will.	  	  And	  since	  the	  discussion,	  there,	  is	  leading	  into	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  Direct	  
Argument	  (starting	  at	  page	  182),	  I	  think	  we	  should	  read	  ‘NR’	  in	  the	  Direct	  Argument’s	  inference	  rules	  as	  follows:	  
	  
	   ‘NRp’	  means	  p	  is	  true	  and	  no	  one	  is	  even	  partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  p.	  	  	  
	  
David	  Widerker	  (2002)	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  since	  Rule	  B’s	  conclusion	  (where	  Rule	  B	  is	  viewed	  as	  an	  argument	  
form)	  is	  with	  respect	  to	  direct	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  And	  if	  Rule	  B’s	  conclusion	  is	  with	  respect	  to	  direct	  moral	  
responsibility,	  it	  must	  be	  that	  its	  premises	  are	  with	  respect	  to	  direct	  moral	  responsibility.	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responsible for p, but not in virtue of being responsible for some other fact” (2002, pp. 118 – 
119).  In other words, direct moral responsibility—the relevant sort of responsibility to which 
Rule B applies—is the sort of responsibility one bears for the truth of some morally significant 
fact, but not because one bears responsibility for it in virtue of some other fact.  Thus, even if 
Betty is directly responsible for causing the avalanche, she is not directly responsible for 3’.  But, 
since Erosion needs Betty to be directly responsible for 3’, Erosion fails as a counterexample to 
Rule B.  
If I’m right about this, then I think Fischer and Ravizza are faced with a dilemma:  Given 
Erosion, either Betty is directly morally responsible for something or she isn’t.  If she is directly 
morally responsible for something, then, at most, what she’s directly morally responsible for is 
causing the avalanche,10 something that is compatible with Rule B.  If she’s not directly morally 
responsible for something, then Rule B is confirmed, not refuted.  To be clear, this dilemma 
defeats Fischer and Ravizza’s alleged counterexample as follows:  if Betty is directly morally 
responsible for something, then she’s directly responsible for:  
3’’. Betty causes there to be an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3. 
But, if 3’’ is what Betty is directly morally responsible for, then Erosion fails as a 
counterexample to Rule B since 3’’ doesn’t follow from 1 and 2.  Moreover, if Betty is not 
directly morally responsible for something, then that’s just what Rule B says.  
 Now, Fischer and Ravizza might object that, even if we should narrow the scope of 3’ to 
include Betty’s having caused, it still follows that 3’ is entailed by any such narrowing.  And if 
so, it’s still true that Betty is directly morally responsible for 3’.  But in order for an objection 
like this to go through, the following prima facie plausible principle has to be true: 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  10	  I	  say	  “at	  most.”	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  however,	  I	  think	  that	  if	  there	  is	  anything	  for	  which	  Betty	  is	  directly	  morally	  
responsible,	  it’s	  her	  intention	  to	  destroy	  the	  enemy	  base.	  	  So,	  really,	  I	  think	  it’s	  highly	  dubious	  that	  Betty	  could	  be	  
directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  causing	  the	  avalanche.	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ER:  If S is directly morally responsible for p, and p ⊃ q, then S is directly morally 
responsible for q. 
 
To be clear, the envisaged objection relies on ER because the claim is that since 3’’ entails 3’, 
and Betty is directly morally responsible for the truth of 3’’, she’s also directly morally 
responsible for the truth of 3’.   
But this objection fails because ER is false.  To see why ER is false, consider the 
following.  Butch Jones is (we may assume) directly morally responsible for the fact that he is 
the head football coach at the University of Tennessee.  But Butch Jones’s being directly morally 
responsible for his being the head football coach at the University of Tennessee implies that 
there is such a place as the University of Tennessee.  Even so, it’s obvious that, even if Butch 
Jones is directly morally responsible for his being the football coach at the University of 
Tennessee, he is not responsible (directly or otherwise) for the fact that there is such a place as 
the University of Tennessee.  So, ER is false.   
Now, if I’m right about the need to narrow the scope of 3’ (to 3’’, or something like it), 
then from 
1**.  The past and the laws are such and so, and no one is, or ever has been, even partly 
morally responsible for the fact that the past and the laws are such and so; and, 
 
2**.  If the past and the laws are such and so, then Betty will plant dynamite in the 
crevices of a glacier above the enemy’s base at T1 and this will cause an avalanche to 
crush said base at T3, and no one is, or ever has been, even partly morally responsible for 
this fact;  
 
it follows that 
 
3**.  Betty will plant dynamite in the crevices of a glacier above the enemy’s base at T1 
and this will cause an avalanche to crush said base at T3, and no one is, or ever has been, 
even partly morally responsible for this fact. 
 
And if so, then we can see that there’s a problem with 4 – 6: there is an equivocation on  
 
‘outcome’.  Recall 4 – 6: 
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4. There is some Ensuring Path leading to a particular outcome and no one is, or ever 
has been, even partly responsible for this fact; 
 
and 
 
5. if there is this Ensuring Path, then the outcome is reached, and no one is, or ever has  
been, even partly responsible for this fact; 
 
but it is allegedly false that 
 
6.  the outcome is reached and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for this  
     fact.  
 
But it seems to me that, in 4 and 5, ‘outcome’ means something like 3’.  In 6, however, 
‘outcome’ means something like 3’’.  Clearly, the Ensuring Path cannot ensure that 3’’ is 
reached; only the past and the laws being such and so can do that.  So 4 – 6, which is supposed to 
follow from Erosion, does not undermine Rule B.  For, if the past and the laws being such that 
they are entail that 3’’, and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for this fact, it 
seems that 3** is true.  And this is just what the Direct Argument says.  So, it looks as if Rule B 
is safe from Fischer and Ravizza’s objections, and their alleged counterexample is just that: 
alleged. 
 
III.  Widerker’s (2002) Attempt at a Counterexample to Rule B 
 
 While Widerker agrees that Fischer and Ravizza’s Erosion case fails as a counterexample 
to Rule B, he thinks that there is such a counterexample in the offing.  Consider the following 
case from Widerker: 
Fate:  Suppose that Jones murders Smith at T0 for some selfish reason, and that later on 
he murders another person, Green, at T3.  Suppose also that the second murder is made 
possible by the first murder.  That is, in the circumstances, the second murder requires the 
first murder as a causally necessary condition.  Finally, suppose that Jones could have 
avoided murdering both Smith and Green, and believed that he could have avoided so to 
act. (Widerker, 2002, p. 319) 
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Now, given Fate, assume that it is T1 (where T1 is earlier than T3 but later than T0).  Widerker 
thinks that Fate generates the following invalid substitution instance of Rule B: 
A. NR (Jones murders Green at T3) 
 
B. NR (Jones murders Green at T3 ⊃ Jones murders Smith at T0) 
 
C. Therefore, NR (Jones murders Smith at T0) 
 
If A and B are true while C is false, then Rule B is false.  Widerker thinks that A and B are true, 
but that C is false for the following reasons. 
Premise [A] is true, since no one is now (=T1), or ever has been, directly morally 
responsible for a murder that has not been committed yet.  And since we assumed that 
Jones’s murdering Smith at T0 is a causally necessary condition of his murdering Green 
at T3, [B] is true as well.  But notice that the conclusion is false, since we assumed that 
Jones could have avoided killing Smith. (Ibid., p. 320)  
 
So, the idea is that A – C provides a counterexample to Rule B because, assuming the time is T1, 
Jones’s murdering of Green hasn’t happened yet.  And since Widerker thinks that moral 
responsibility is “a backward-looking notion” (Ibid., p. 320, footnote 8),11 it’s not possible to be 
morally responsible for something that hasn’t happened yet.  Thus, A is true.  But if A is true, 
then B must be true as well since there doesn’t seem to be any plausible way to be responsible 
now for some future fact’s implying some past fact.  Thus, by modus ponens, C is true.  But, C is 
false; so, Rule B is invalid. 
 But I don’t think that Fate provides a successful counterexample to Rule B.  To see why 
not, I am going to borrow a move from a later paper by Widerker with Ira M. Schnall (Widerker 
and Schall, forthcoming).  Here’s how the move goes.  Grant, with Widerker, that A is true; that 
is, that no one now is (at T1), or ever has been, even partly directly morally responsible for the 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  11	  Widerker	  doesn’t	  say	  in	  the	  text	  what,	  exactly,	  he	  means	  by	  moral	  responsibility’s	  being	  a	  ‘backward-­‐looking	  
notion’.	  	  But,	  I	  think	  that	  he	  must	  mean	  something	  like	  this.	  	  ‘Being	  morally	  responsible	  for’	  is	  an	  attribute	  (or	  a	  
relation?)	  one	  has	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  action	  that	  one	  has	  done.	  	  That	  is,	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  only	  attributable	  to	  
an	  agent	  after	  she	  acts.	  	  Thus,	  it’s	  by	  ‘looking	  back’,	  as	  it	  were,	  on	  an	  action	  that’s	  occurred	  that	  we	  can	  see	  
whether	  or	  not	  an	  agent	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  action.	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fact that Jones murders Green at T3.  Now, notice that we can restate the conditional fact 
expressed in B can as follows: 
 B*.  ~ (Jones murders Green at T3) v (Jones murders Smith at T0) 
 
But since the first disjunct of B* is, ex hypothesi, false, what makes B* true is its second 
disjunct.  That is, B* is true because Jones murders Smith at T0.  Thus, Jones is at least partly 
directly morally responsible for B*.  Moreover, B* reveals what I think is a plausible principle 
about moral responsibility: 
Truth DependenceMORAL [TDM]: For all agents, S, and all propositions, p, if S is 
directly morally responsible for that which p’s truth depends on (in the sense of ‘depends 
on’ in which truth depends on the world), then S is at least partly directly morally 
responsible for p’s truth.12 
 
If TDM is true, then it follows not only that Jones is at least partly directly morally 
responsible for B*; it also follows that he’s at least partly directly morally responsible for the 
conditional fact expressed in B of the argument generated by Fate.  And if so, then Fate is no 
counterexample to Rule B.  I think TDM is true; thus, I conclude that Fate is no counterexample 
to Rule B.13 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  12	  I	  have	  essentially	  taken	  TDM	  from	  Trenton	  Merricks	  (2011,	  p.	  66)	  and	  his	  notion	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  ‘have	  a	  
choice	  about’	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  proposition.	  	  Very	  briefly,	  what	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  say	  (as	  I	  do	  in	  TDM)	  that	  truth	  ‘depends	  
on	  the	  world’	  is	  just	  the	  trivial	  notion	  that	  truth	  depends	  on	  the	  way	  things	  are	  and	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	  It’s	  
true,	  for	  example,	  that	  dogs	  bark	  because	  dogs	  bark.	  	  It’s	  true	  that	  there	  are	  no	  hobbits	  because	  there	  are	  no	  
hobbits.	  	  And	  so	  on.	  	  This	  is	  what	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  say	  that	  ‘truth	  depends	  on	  the	  world’;	  I	  mean	  it	  in	  just	  this	  trivial	  
way,	  setting	  aside	  questions	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  are	  more	  substantive	  things	  to	  say	  about	  how	  truth	  
depends	  on	  (or	  is	  otherwise	  related	  to)	  the	  world.	  	  More	  about	  this	  in	  chapter	  six	  where	  I	  give	  sustained	  
motivation	  for,	  and	  a	  defense	  of,	  TDM.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  13	  Objection:	  	  TDM	  isn’t	  obviously	  true.	  	  A	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  it’s	  not	  obviously	  true	  is	  because—granting	  what	  
you’ve	  said—it	  entails	  that	  Jones	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  conditional	  fact	  expressed	  in	  B,	  i.e.,	  that	  he’s	  responsible	  for	  
the	  fact	  that	  (If	  Jones	  murders	  Green	  at	  T3	  ⊃	  Jones	  murders	  Smith	  at	  T0).	  	  And	  this	  is	  surely	  unintuitive.	  	  The	  
upshot,	  then,	  is	  this:	  isn’t	  the	  seeming	  truth	  of	  B	  in	  Widerker’s	  argument—that	  NR	  (If	  Jones	  murders	  Green	  at	  T3	  ⊃	  
Jones	  murders	  Smith	  at	  T0)—a	  counterexample	  to	  TDM?	  
	  
Reply:	  	  This	  objection	  is	  a	  concern	  only	  if	  it’s	  true	  that	  NR	  (If	  Jones	  murders	  Green	  at	  T3	  ⊃	  Jones	  murders	  Smith	  at	  
T0),	  but	  it	  isn’t.	  	  As	  I	  argue	  above,	  and	  following	  Widerker	  and	  Schnall	  (forthcoming),	  since	  B*	  is	  true	  just	  in	  virtue	  
of	  the	  fact	  that	  Jones	  murders	  Smith	  when	  he	  does,	  Jones	  is	  at	  least	  partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  B*.	  	  That	  
is,	  Jones	  is	  at	  least	  partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  conditional	  fact	  housed	  under	  the	  ‘NR’	  operator	  in	  B	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IV.  Haji’s (2008) Attempt at a Counterexample to Rule B14 
 
Here is how any counterexample to Rule B will have to work.  Rule B, as I’ve stated it, is 
a kind of argument form; so, what we’ll need from a potential counterexample to Rule B is to be 
given substitution instances of ‘p’ and ‘q’ in the premises of Rule B such that they render both of 
the premises true, but the conclusion false.  I think Haji’s (2008) attempt to do this fails because 
the argument Haji offers on the basis of his alleged counterexample is question begging.  It’s 
question begging, so I say, because it presupposes that compatibilism is true.  Or, even if it 
doesn’t, strictly speaking, beg the question, a more generous way to put the problem is this: I 
think that Haji’s alleged counterexample to Rule B is dialectically unhelpful.  In this section, 
then, I’ll attempt to show why I say this.  
To help us get clear on how his alleged counterexample to Rule B is going to work, Haji 
does a little stage setting.  Among the requirements for moral responsibility, he thinks, are a 
freedom requirement (i.e. free will is required for moral responsibility), and an epistemic 
requirement.  He thinks the requisite epistemic requirement might, plausibly, go like this: 
ECONDITION-2 [EC2]:  Agent, S, is morally blameworthy for action, A, only if S does 
A at least partly on the basis of the belief that A is morally wrong; and S is praiseworthy 
for A only if S does A at least partly on the basis of the belief that A is morally obligatory 
or permissible (Haji, 2008, p. 13). 
 
According to Haji, EC2 entails that 
blameworthiness requires, loosely, only belief in what is wrong and not…that the object 
for which one is blameworthy is in fact wrong.  Analogously, this condition implies that 
praiseworthiness requires only belief in what is obligatory or permissible (Ibid.). 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
because	  he	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  consequent	  of	  that	  conditional.	  	  So,	  B	  is	  false.	  	  Because	  B	  is	  false,	  its	  
seeming	  truth	  is	  no	  counterexample	  to	  TDM.	  	  Indeed,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  reason	  B	  is	  false	  (and	  that	  Jones	  is	  at	  least	  
partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  B*)	  reveals	  TDM.	  	  (Thanks	  to	  David	  Palmer	  for	  the	  objection.)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  14	  To	  be	  clear,	  Haji’s	  (2008)	  counterexample	  to	  Rule	  B	  also	  appears	  in	  his	  (2009).	  	  Even	  so,	  I’ve	  chosen	  to	  deal	  
with	  the	  version	  that	  appears	  in	  his	  (2008),	  so	  any	  citations	  will	  be	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  piece.	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There is also, thinks Haji, a plausible condition concerning the moral status of actions, one that 
isn’t entailed by EC2, but can be consistently endorsed by one who thinks that EC2 is a 
necessary condition for moral responsibility.  This plausible condition is  
 ACTION-STATUS [AS]:  Agent, S, is morally blameworthy for action, A, only if A is  
morally wrong; and S is praiseworthy for A only if A is morally obligatory or permissible 
(Ibid.). 
 
So, we have two plausibly necessary conditions for an agent S’s being morally responsible for an 
action A.   
 In order to meet the necessary conditions for praiseworthiness or blameworthiness laid 
out in either EC2 or AS, an agent must be obliged to act, it must be permissible for an agent to 
act, or an agent must be obliged to refrain from acting, in the way for which she’s allegedly 
praiseworthy or blameworthy.  But these requirements on praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, 
according to Haji, come with a requirement for alternative possibilities.  Why think alternative 
possibilities are required for obligation (to act, or refrain from acting), in particular?  Haji thinks 
the following two principles help to illuminate the reasons why. 
(K):  If it is overall obligatory for one to do something, then one can do it, and if it is 
(overall) obligatory for one to refrain from doing something, then one can refrain from 
doing it [i.e. ‘ought’ implies ‘can’]. 
 
(OW):  It is (overall) obligatory for one to do something if and only if it is (overall) 
wrong for one to refrain from doing it.  (Ibid., p. 14. My insertion.) 
 
Haji thinks that the conjunction of K and OW entails “that an agent can do moral wrong only if  
 
the agent had an alternative” (Ibid.). In other words, the conjunction of K and OW entails 
 
 (WAP):  If it is wrong for one to do something, then one can refrain from doing it (Ibid.). 
 
So, according to WAP, an agent can do moral wrong only if said agent had an alternative.  
What’s more, there is an analogue of K that bears the idea that ‘wrong’ implies ‘can’ (where K is 
the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’).  And if so, thinks Haji, then there’s a straightforward 
 
 
 24 
argument to the conclusion that moral obligation requires alternative possibilities.  The argument 
goes as follows: 
 (P1)  If it is obligatory for one to refrain from doing A, then it is wrong for one to do A.  
[From OW] 
 
 (P2)  If it is wrong for one to do A, then one can do A. [From ‘wrong’ implies ‘can’  
analogue of K] 
 
(C1) Therefore, if it is obligatory for one to refrain from doing A, then one can do A 
(Ibid.).15 
 
Thus, the argument that moral obligation requires alternative possibilities.  
	   What’s needed, now, is an argument whose conclusion is such that moral rightness (as 
opposed to obligation) requires alternative possibilities.  That is, we need an argument from  
(P1*) If it is permissible (i.e. morally right) for one to do A, then one can refrain from  
doing A, 
 
to 
 
(C1*) Therefore, if it is permissible (i.e. morally right) for one to do A, then one can do  
A. 
 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  15	  For	  what	  it’s	  worth,	  though	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  argument—i.e.,	  I	  think	  it’s	  true	  that	  ‘ought’	  
implies	  ‘can’—I	  think	  that	  this	  argument	  fails	  to	  show	  such	  a	  conclusion.	  	  For,	  I	  think	  that	  P2	  is	  false.	  	  Haji,	  here,	  
and	  in	  his	  (2012)	  seems	  simply	  to	  assert	  that	  moral	  obligation	  and	  moral	  rightness/wrongness	  are	  equivalent.	  	  That	  
is,	  morally	  obligatory	  actions	  just	  are	  morally	  right	  actions.	  	  Though	  I	  agree	  that	  an	  action’s	  being	  morally	  
obligatory	  implies	  that	  the	  action	  is	  morally	  right,	  I	  deny	  that	  the	  implication	  works	  the	  other	  way.	  	  That	  is,	  I	  deny	  
that	  what	  is	  morally	  right	  is	  thereby	  morally	  obligatory.	  	  	  
To	  begin	  to	  see	  why	  I	  say	  this,	  note	  that,	  and	  as	  I’ll	  describe	  below,	  Haji	  thinks	  that’s	  what’s	  morally	  
obligatory,	  permissible	  (i.e.	  morally	  right),	  or	  impermissible	  (i.e.	  morally	  wrong)	  partly	  depends	  on	  what	  possible	  
worlds	  are	  ‘accessible’	  for	  one.	  	  I	  am	  happy	  to	  grant	  this	  with	  respect	  to	  moral	  obligation	  (though,	  I	  have	  my	  
doubts),	  but	  I	  think	  that	  this	  must	  be	  false	  with	  respect	  to	  moral	  rightness	  or	  wrongness.	  	  Here	  is	  why:	  if	  moral	  
rightness	  or	  wrongness—i.e.,	  the	  notions	  of	  ‘moral’	  or	  ‘immoral’—are	  partially	  dependent	  on	  the	  worlds	  that	  are	  
accessible	  to	  an	  agent,	  then	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  what’s	  moral	  or	  immoral	  partially	  depends	  on	  the	  agent	  and	  her	  
circumstances.	  	  But	  this	  is	  just	  a	  version	  of	  moral	  relativism.	  	  This	  view	  implies	  that,	  if	  the	  only	  worlds	  accessible	  to	  
me	  are	  worlds	  in	  which	  I	  torture	  a	  little	  baby	  for	  fun,	  then	  torturing	  a	  little	  baby	  for	  fun	  isn’t	  immoral.	  	  But	  I	  think	  
that	  whether	  or	  not	  it’s	  immoral	  to	  torture	  a	  little	  baby	  for	  fun	  doesn’t	  at	  all	  depend	  on	  me	  or	  my	  situation;	  rather,	  
I	  think	  it’s	  necessarily	  true	  that	  it’s	  immoral	  to	  torture	  a	  little	  baby	  for	  fun.	  	  And	  this	  is	  because	  I	  think	  that	  morality	  
isn’t	  relative	  to	  anything	  about	  me	  or	  any	  other	  agent,	  which	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  morality	  isn’t	  relative.	  	  But	  this	  
argument	  for	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’	  relies	  on	  such	  a	  notion.	  	  Since	  I	  think	  that	  such	  a	  notion	  is	  false,	  I	  think	  that	  P2	  is	  
false,	  and	  the	  argument	  fails.	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Initially, Haji claims that we cannot give such an argument because “[t]here is no similar way 
[i.e. no argument like P1 – C1] to derive the proposition that rightness, likewise, requires 
alternative possibilities.  This is because even if it is agreed that ‘right’ implies ‘can’, there is no 
principle like (OW) that will allow us to infer ‘right’ implies ‘can refrain’” (Haji, 2008, p.14).  
“Nevertheless,” he says, “it is very plausible that ‘right’ does imply ‘can refrain’” (Ibid.).  It’s 
“very plausible” that ‘right’ implies ‘can refrain’, thinks Haji, because, if we think about a 
typical Frankfurt-style situation, we can see that there are only two plausible moral judgments 
that we can make with respect to the situation-relevant agent.  The agent’s action is either amoral 
(i.e. neither being right, nor wrong, nor obligatory), or it is morally permissible.  For, suppose 
that Jones is in a typical Frankfurt-style situation in which he kills Smith but couldn’t refrain 
from doing so because Black was waiting in the wings to ‘make’ him do it.  Either Jones’s 
killing Smith is amoral for Jones, or it’s permissible.  But it’s not plausible that Jones’s killing 
Smith is permissible, so it must be amoral for Jones.  Thus, Haji concludes that moral rightness 
(or permissibility) requires alternative possibilities. 
 In his most recent work, however, Haji (2012) gives reason to think that we can give an 
argument that goes from P1* to C1*.  Assuming that moral responsibility requires ‘can’ (and I 
am happy to assume this),  
[o]ne is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy (whatever the case may be) for doing 
something only if one could have done it.  This principle highlights a link between moral 
responsibility and freedom that holds of conceptual necessity.  Again, the link is simply 
that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness both require control [i.e. both require a ‘can’ 
condition].  Furthermore, if we think that praiseworthiness requires a certain variety of 
control, then without good reason to believe the contrary, blameworthiness, also requires 
this variety of control.  Similarly, it would seem that control or freedom requirements of 
moral obligation, unless we have strong reason to think otherwise (and I know of no such 
reason), should also be the very ones of moral wrong and moral right.  If [K] expresses 
just one more incarnation of the association between morality and freedom, then, again, 
in the absence of special reason to believe otherwise, it should also be the case that the 
principle that each of “wrong” and “right” implies “can” expresses two other instance of 
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this association.  In brief, if obligation requires control, so do right and wrong; and if 
obligation requires a certain sort of control—that we can do the things we are obligated to 
do—right and wrong require this sort of control as well. (Haji, 2012, pp. 25 – 26, my 
insertions) 
 
So, the idea is that [K] shows us that morality and freedom (‘freedom’ in the sense of ‘can’) are 
closely associated.  And if we accept that OW is true, then unless we have some special reason to 
deny that moral obligation and rightness (or wrongness) come apart, then we should conclude 
that moral rightness (and wrongness) are subject to a ‘can’ condition.  Thus, if ought implies can, 
then moral rightness implies can. 
 Haji gives further motivation for this belief that there is a symmetrical relationship 
between the freedom requirements on moral oughts and the freedom requirements on moral 
rightness (and moral ought nots and moral wrongness).  Following the work of Fred Feldman 
(1986) and Michael Zimmerman (1996; 2008), he thinks of moral obligations as resulting from 
the possible worlds that are “accessible” to one.  The idea, here, is that “a possible world is 
accessible to a person at a time if and only if it is still possible, at that time, for the person to see 
to the world is actual” (Haji, 2012, p. 27).  Here’s an illustration.  Suppose that, right now, I 
can’t, alone, get to my doctor’s appointment on time, but I could if you were to give me a lift in 
your car.  If, right now, I can call you on the phone and convince you to give me a ride to my 
doctor’s office, then there is a world accessible to me in which I make it to my doctor’s 
appointment on time.   
 On such an analysis of accessible possible worlds, an agent’s moral obligations turn out 
to depend on which worlds are accessible to that agent.  And each accessible world is given a 
sort of deontic ‘ranking’, a “deontic value” (Ibid.).  This suggests the following principle: 
(MO): A person, S, ought, as of, t, to see to the occurrence of a state of affairs, p, if and 
only if p occurs in some world, w, accessible to S at t, and it’s not the case that p’s 
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negation (not-p) occurs in any accessible world deontically as good as or as deontically 
better than w. (Ibid.)16 
 
For Haji, MO results in the following definitions: 
 
Morally obligatory: A is morally obligatory for S, at t, if and only if S can do A, and A 
occurs in all the best worlds accessible to S at t. 
 
 Morally permissible (i.e. morally right): A is morally permissible for S, at t, if and only  
if S can do A and A occurs in some but not all of the best worlds accessible to S at t. 
 
 Morally impermissible (i.e. morally right): A is morally impermissible for S, at t, if and  
only if S can do A and A does not occur in any of the best worlds accessible to S at t.17  
 
So, what is morally obligatory, morally right, or morally wrong for an agent to do depends on the 
situation in which she finds herself; that is, these things depend on which possible worlds are 
open to her at a time, t.  Thus, since what is morally obligatory, morally right, or morally wrong 
for an agent depends on what an agent can do, it follows trivially that what is morally obligatory 
implies ‘can’. 	  	  
 That’s the set up.  Now, the alleged counterexample. 
 
Hal’s Creation(1):  Consider…Hal, who creates a best world.  Hal cannot do otherwise 
than create this world, W1, owing to an unknown (to Hal) condition of his brain…He has 
no alternative possibilities to his actual conduct.  Hence, given the principle that 
obligation, right, and wrong require alternative possibilities, Hal’s act of creating W1 
does not violate a moral obligation of his; nor is this creative act right or obligatory.  
Suppose, also, that Hal is an amoral agent as he lacks any understanding of moral right, 
wrong, and obligation…If praiseworthiness requires only belief in what is obligatory or 
right…then again Hal is not praiseworthy for his creative act because Hal is amoral: 
being amoral he does not create W1 on the basis of the belief that he is doing something 
morally obligatory or right.  Now imagine that Hal creates a deterministic world in which 
a person, Michael performs an act [at time t]—Michael eats noodles.  And suppose that 
Michael’s doing so is [the sort of act for which free agents are] morally praiseworthy 
(Ibid., p. 15). 
 
From Hal’s Creation(1), Haji generates the following argument which he thinks impugns Rule B,  
 
call it ‘Hal’s Argument(1)’.   
                                                	  	  	  	  	  16	  But	  see,	  initially,	  (Feldman,	  1986,	  p.	  37).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  See	  (Haji,	  2012,	  p.	  28).	  	  	  
 
 
 28 
 
 Hal’s Argument(1):  (1H):  NR (Hal creates W1) 
         
           (2H):  NR (Hal creates W1 ⊃ Michael decides, at ts, to eat noodles) 
         
 (3H):  Therefore, NR (Michael decides, at ts, to eat noodles) (Ibid., 
p. 16) 
 
Where ‘ts’ is sometime prior to t, Hal’s Argument(1) impugns Rule B because “there is nothing 
in Hal’s Creation[(1)] to preclude its being true that Michael’s decision, at ts, to eat noodles is 
free in the compatibilist sense of ‘free’…[u]nless the proponent of the Direct Argument assumes 
the falsity of compatibilism” (Ibid, p. 17).  So, 3H is either false—given the truth of 
compatibilism—or the proponent of Rule B confronted with Hal’s Argument(1) presupposes that 
compatibilism is false; and that’s question-begging.   
What’s more, on a compatibilist notion of freedom, both 1H and 2H could be true while 
3H is false.  1H is true, thinks Haji, for one or both of the following reasons.  First, if AS is true, 
then it follows that if we conjoin AS with the fact that Hal’s creative act is amoral, Hal is not 
morally responsible for his creative act.  Second, if EC2 is true, then it follows that Hal is not 
morally responsible for his creative act since he, ex hypothesi, lacks any understanding of right, 
wrong, or moral obligation.   
2H is true because, according to EC2, if Michael is to be responsible for the truth of the 
material conditional portion of 2H, he’d have to at least believe that it’s permissible or obligatory 
to make it the case that (Hal creates ⊃ Michael decides, at ts, to eat noodles).  But, of course, 
how could Michael be expected to believe a thing like that?  So, Haji concludes that Hal’s 
Creation(1) is a counterexample to Rule B. 
 But I think that Hal’s Creation(1) fails as a counterexample to Rule B because I think that 
Haji’s set-up of the case has begged the question against the incompatibilist.  Or, more 
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generously, I think that Hal’s Creation(1) proves to be dialectically unhelpful given the context 
of the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists.  
To see why I say that Hal’s Creation(1) begs the question, recall Hal’s Argument(1).  
Haji thinks that Hal’s Argument(1) tells against Rule B.  But why think a thing like that since 
Haji thinks that 3H just straightforwardly begs the question against the compatibilist?  For, Haji 
thinks that “compatibilists are well within their rights to claim that, at W1, when Michael eats 
noodles, he is praiseworthy for doing so” (Ibid., p. 17).  Exactly what rights are those to which 
Haji refers?  The answer to this question isn’t at all clear to me.  Indeed, I doubt the answer is 
clear at all.  Whatever the answer, it can’t be anything like  
Non-starter:  Take Michael’s eating noodles at t.  Obviously, we compatibilists think 
that he does this freely; and, moreover, our compatibilist theory is a highly plausible, 
well-motivated theory, that’s backed by many great historical and contemporary 
philosophers.  So, put the sort of action that our plausible theory suggests is consistent 
with moral responsibility—like Michael’s eating noodles at t, for example—in the 
conclusion of the argument generated by Rule B, and Rule B will be false. 
 
The answer can’t be anything like Non-starter, because Non-starter is a non-starter; it begs the 
question against Rule B’s proponent.  The point of a principle like Rule B is that its prima facie 
validity is enough to show that Michael’s eating noodles, at t (for example), to be something he’s 
not morally responsible for.18  And this because it follows necessarily from the conjunction of 
the past and the laws of nature.  So, if Rule B is prima facie valid, then (unless we’re given some 
argument as to why we should think that Rule B is false) in order to conclude that Michael is 
directly morally responsible for his eating noodles at t, we have to assume that incompatibilism 
is false (i.e. that compatibilism is true).  Thus, Hal’s Creation(1) begs the question.   
                                                	  	  	  	  	  18	  A	  similar	  point	  about	  Rule	  B’s	  prima	  facie	  validity	  is	  made	  by	  Schnall	  and	  Widerker	  (2012,	  and	  forthcoming).	  	  I	  
say	  more	  about	  this	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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What the Rule B proponent demands from the compatibilist is a counterexample that 
shows why she should think Michael is morally responsible for his having eaten the noodles 
when he did.  And the counterexample cannot presuppose the truth of compatibilism.19  Hal’s 
Creation(1) fails to do any such thing.  I conclude, then, that Haji’s (2008) attempt at a 
counterexample to Rule B fails. 
An objector, though, might think I’ve been too harsh.  I’ve been too harsh, the objector 
might claim, because  
if a compatibilist has good reasons she believes she can marshal for why an agent is free 
and responsible in acting as she does, then she is entitled to call attention to those and ask 
an interlocutor to weigh those as reasons against an opposing thesis.  Since the 
incompatibilist is the one advancing an argument here with the Direct Argument, and she 
wishes to say that it follows from her principles that a person like Michael is not 
responsible, the compatibilist should not be prohibited from just offering the reasons 
underwriting her theory for the opposite thesis.20 
 
So, according to the envisaged objector, Hal’s Creation(1) doesn’t beg the question; for, Haji is 
within his rights to put forth his well-motivated compatibilist theory as a reason to think the 
Direct Argument fails; thus, Hal’s Creation(1) doesn’t beg the question against the Direct 
Argument’s proponent.  
 Let’s grant that this is so: Hal’s Creation(1) doesn’t, strictly speaking, beg the question.  
Even if we concede that this is true, there is still reason to think that Hal’s Creation(1) fails to 
provide a convincing counterexample to Rule B, and here is why.  In order to accept that Hal’s 
Creation(1) is a legitimate counterexample to Rule B, one has to be antecedently committed to 
the truth of compatibilism.  It would be a far more effective strategy for undermining Rule B—
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  19	  Note:	  I	  do	  not	  say	  that	  this	  counterexample	  depends	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  compatibilism.	  	  I	  only	  say	  that	  it,	  in	  fact,	  
presupposes	  the	  truth	  of	  compatibilism,	  given	  its	  setup.	  	  If	  this	  counterexample	  is	  set	  in	  an	  indeterministic	  context,	  
then	  it	  will	  fall,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  to	  what	  I	  say	  about	  the	  counterexample	  under	  consideration	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  20	  Thanks	  to	  a	  referee	  from	  Philosophical	  Explorations	  for	  raising	  this	  objection.	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and with it the Direct Argument—if one could find counterexamples that would be appealing to 
fair and neutral-minded inquirers.  If this is true, then it is be better not to make use of examples 
at all in which determinism is assumed, and the putative counterexample to Rule B gets its force 
simply by appealing to an agent who would satisfy relevant compatibilist conditions of freedom 
and responsibility.  But Hal’s Creation(1) fails to do any such thing; so, I conclude that Hal’s 
Creation(1) fails to provide a convincing counterexample to Rule B.21   
 
V.  Haji’s (2010) Attempt at a Counterexample to Rule B 
  
In this section, we’ll turn to Haji’s (2010) attempt at a counterexample to Rule B.  But, 
before we do, I wish to note this bit of curiosity.  Both of Haji’s alleged counterexamples, as 
we’re about to see, go by the name ‘Hal’s Creation’; yet, they’re different thought experiments.  
This is curious because Haji, in his (2010) doesn’t mention his (2008) attempt at a 
counterexample.  Even so, there are crucial differences between Haji’s two recent attempts at 
providing a counterexample to Rule B.  The most salient difference, it seems to me, is that the 
moral agent in Haji’s (2010) is free in the libertarian sense whereas the moral agent in his (2008) 
is free in the compatibilist sense.   This difference, I think, makes his (2010) a more formidable 
challenge to the Rule B proponent.22   
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  21	  Thanks	  to	  a	  referee	  from	  Philosophical	  Explorations	  for	  help	  on	  this	  point.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  I	  think	  it’s	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  Haji’s	  (2010)	  attempt	  at	  a	  counterexample	  is	  a	  more	  formidable	  opponent	  
(than	  his	  (2008))	  for	  the	  Rule	  B	  proponent	  only	  if	  Rule	  B	  is	  as	  I	  have	  it	  in	  the	  paper.	  	  But,	  Rule	  B	  might	  be	  better	  
stated	  in	  a	  way	  that	  mirrors	  Ted	  Warfield’s	  (1996)	  reconstruction	  of	  Rule	  β	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Consequence	  
Argument.	  	  Where	  Rule	  β	  has	  the	  modal	  operator	  ‘N’	  that	  means	  ‘it	  is	  not	  now,	  nor	  has	  it	  ever	  been,	  within	  
anyone’s	  power	  to	  render	  it	  false	  that’,	  it	  goes	  as	  follows:	  
	  
	   Rule	  β:	  	  N(p),	  N(p⊃q)	  ├	  Nq.	  
	  
Warfield’s	  reconstruction,	  however,	  went	  like	  so:	  
	  
	   Rule	  (β☐):	  N(p),	  ☐(p⊃q)	  ├	  Nq.	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Here, then, is Haji’s (2010) attempt at a counterexample to Rule B.  Consider: 
Hal’s Creation(2):  Hal-2 [an essentially omniscient, sempiternal, amoral—that is, lacks 
knowledge of moral right, wrong, or obligatory—being] has the ability to create (or 
actualize) any one of an infinite number of possible worlds…Suppose Hal-2 creates a 
world, W1, in which, after due reflection, Yasmin [in a libertarianly free way] donates a 
large sum of money (at some time, ts) to a credible charity, UNICEF.  Yasmin really 
cares about the plight of the needy children; she donates because she wishes to help the 
kids and not, for instance, because she wants a big tax break. We safely suppose that she 
is morally praiseworthy for her bountiful donation.  Under appropriate circumstances 
normal agents would be deserving of praise for such an act (Haji, 2010, p. 125, my 
insertions). 
 
Given Hal’s Creation(2), Haji generates the following argument: 
 
 Hal’s Argument(2): 
 
 (4H):  NR (Hal-2 creates W1). 
 
 (5H):  NR (Hal-2 creates W1	 ⊃	 Yasmin donates (at ts in W1)).	 
	 
	 (6H):  Therefore, NR (Yasmin donates (at ts in W1) (Ibid.). 
 
The upshot of Hal’s Argument(2) is that, since Hal is an amoral agent, 4H is true because neither 
he nor anyone else is morally responsible for the creation of W1, 6H is false because, ex 
hypothesi, Yasmin (libertarianly) freely donates the money at ts in W1 in the right sort of way for 
moral responsibility, but 5H is true because neither Hal nor Yasmin is morally responsible for 
the fact that (Hal-2 creates W1 ⊃	 Yasmin donates (at ts in W1)). 	 	 
	 Of course, one might object that Yasmin is morally responsible for the truth of 5H.  But, 
if so, then Yasmin would have to be morally responsible for  
                                                                                                                                                       
So,	  suppose	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  is	  better	  developed	  with	  the	  following	  principle	  in	  place	  of	  Rule	  B:	  
	  
	   Rule	  (B☐):	  NR(p),	  ☐(p⊃q)	  ├	  NRq.	  
	  
Where	  q	  occurs	  later	  than	  p	  (since	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  is	  concerned	  with	  past	  to	  future	  determinism),	  if	  the	  Direct	  
Argument	  is	  better	  developed	  with	  Rule	  (B☐),	  then	  Haji’s	  (2010)	  attempt	  at	  a	  counterexample	  doesn’t	  even	  get	  off	  
the	  ground.	  	  It	  doesn’t	  get	  off	  the	  ground	  because	  it’s	  not	  possible	  for	  a	  thought	  experiment	  set	  in	  an	  
indeterministic	  world	  (which	  Haji’s	  (2010)	  is)	  to	  be	  a	  substitution	  instance	  of	  Rule	  (B☐).	  	  Also,	  see	  Thomas	  Crisp	  and	  
Ted	  Warfield’s	  (2000).	  	  Thanks	  to	  E.	  J.	  Coffman	  for	  the	  pointer.	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 YC:  Hal-2 creates W1	 ⊃	 at ts Yasmin donates to UNICEF (Ibid., p. 127). 
 
But, thinks Haji, for Yasmin to be morally responsible for YC, she’d have to meet the following  
 
epistemic condition on moral responsibility, namely: 
 
E3:  S is morally praiseworthy [blameworthy] for seeing to the occurrence of state of 
affairs, a, only if S morally ought to have known or believed that a is morally obligatory 
[morally wrong] or, as some might prefer, morally good [morally bad] (in some specified 
sense of ‘good’ [‘bad’] (Ibid.).23 
 
And how could Yasmin be expected to meet an epistemic condition like E3 with respect to YC?  
Indeed, “there are no compelling grounds to require that in Hal’s creation, Yasmin ought to have 
known or believed that YC is obligatory or morally good” (Ibid.).  So, Yasmin is not morally 
responsible for YC even though she’s responsible for donating, at ts, to UNICEF.  But, since Hal 
isn’t responsible for YC either, 5H is true.  Thus, thinks Haji, we have a successful 
counterexample to Rule B. 
 But Haji is mistaken: Hal’s Creation(2) fails as a counterexample to Rule B.  To better 
see why I say this, let’s, again, consider Hal’s Argument(2). 
 Hal’s Argument(2): 
 
 (4H):  NR (Hal-2 creates W1). 
 
 (5H):  NR (Hal-2 creates W1 ⊃ Yasmin donates (at ts in W1)).	 
	 
	 (6H):  Therefore, NR (Yasmin donates (at ts in W1) (Ibid., p. 125). 
 
I think I can challenge both 4H and 5H.  Let’s start with 5H.  5H depends on the truth of E3; for, 
how could it be the case that Yasmin morally ought to have known or believed that YC is 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  23	  More	  curiosity.	  	  In	  his	  (2010),	  Haji	  doesn’t	  mention	  EC2	  (from	  above).	  	  E3	  and	  EC2	  are	  not	  the	  same;	  so,	  does	  
Haji	  think	  that	  E3	  is	  an	  epistemic	  principle	  that’s	  more	  sound	  than	  EC2?	  	  If	  so,	  why	  so?	  	  If	  not,	  why	  the	  change?	  	  
One	  thing	  to	  note,	  however,	  is	  that	  E3	  allows	  for	  culpable	  ignorance.	  	  But,	  if	  (P2)	  is	  false—where	  (P2)	  is	  the	  claim	  
that	  if	  it’s	  wrong	  for	  one	  to	  do	  A,	  then	  one	  can	  do	  A—then	  it’s	  plausible	  that	  Hal-­‐2	  meets	  the	  epistemic	  condition	  
for	  moral	  responsibility	  after	  all.	  	  Hal-­‐2	  might	  meet	  the	  epistemic	  condition	  because,	  plausibly,	  he	  should	  have	  
known	  that	  creating	  W1	  was	  good.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  argument	  that	  Hal’s	  Creation(2)	  generates—Hal’s	  Argument(2),	  
below—fails	  to	  go	  through.	  	  Thanks	  to	  David	  Palmer	  for	  pointing	  this	  out.	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morally good or obligatory?  Indeed it does seem strange that Yasmin morally ought to have 
believed a thing like YC.  But, then, it seems strange to say that anyone morally ought to believe 
anything; for, as Robert Audi points out in his (2001), it’s highly plausible that “neither believing 
nor forming beliefs is a case of action” (Audi, 2001, p. 105).  But if neither believing nor 
forming beliefs is a case of action, and actions are the only things for which anyone could 
plausibly be held morally responsible, then it isn’t the case that anyone morally ought to believe 
anything.24  And if this is right, then there’s a problem with E3: it’s too strict.  If E3 is too strict 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  24	  Two	  objections	  (and	  two	  replies):	  
	  
Objection	  #1:	  There	  is	  a	  false	  hidden	  premise	  in	  your	  argument.	  	  Call	  it:	  
	  
Q:	  S	  morally	  ought	  to	  A	  only	  if	  S	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  A.	  
	  
Here	  is	  why	  the	  hidden	  premise	  is	  false:	  suppose	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’	  is	  false,	  and	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  something	  
that	  you	  cannot	  do.	  	  Since	  you	  cannot	  do	  it,	  you	  obviously	  cannot	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  it.	  	  But	  it’s	  still	  true	  
that	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  it;	  so	  it’s	  false	  that	  S	  ought	  to	  A	  only	  if	  S	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  A.	  
	  
Reply	  #1:	  	  But	  I	  deny	  that	  Q—where	  Q	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  premise	  upon	  which	  my	  argument	  depends—is	  false	  if	  
‘ought	  implies	  can’	  is	  false;	  for,	  this	  objection	  trades	  on	  an	  equivocation	  on	  the	  word	  ‘can’.	  	  As	  I	  understand	  it,	  in	  
the	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’	  thesis,	  ‘can’	  denotes	  an	  ability	  to	  do	  the	  act	  in	  question	  given	  the	  relevant	  agent’s	  actual	  
powers.	  	  For,	  suppose	  someone	  told	  me	  that	  I	  morally	  ought	  to	  end	  world	  hunger.	  	  If	  I’m	  a	  proponent	  of	  the	  ‘ought	  
implies	  can’	  thesis,	  my	  response	  will	  be	  that	  I’m	  under	  no	  such	  obligation	  because	  I	  can’t,	  given	  my	  actual	  powers,	  
do	  any	  such	  thing.	  	  My	  response	  would	  not	  be	  that	  I’m	  under	  no	  such	  obligation	  because	  there	  are	  no	  possible	  
worlds	  in	  which	  I	  have	  the	  power	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Surely	  there	  are	  possible	  worlds	  where	  I	  do	  have	  said	  powers.	  	  But	  the	  
fact	  of	  the	  matter	  is	  that	  I	  do	  not;	  so,	  I	  do	  not—supposing	  that	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’	  is	  true—have	  any	  such	  
obligation.	  	  And	  it	  is	  here	  where	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  objection	  emerges:	  my	  claim	  that	  ‘it	  isn’t	  the	  case	  that	  anyone	  
morally	  ought	  to	  believe	  anything’	  relies	  on	  Q	  only	  if	  ‘can’	  in	  the	  consequent	  is	  read	  in	  this	  logically	  weaker	  way;	  
for,	  the	  only	  things	  for	  which	  anyone	  could	  possibly	  (in	  the	  logical	  sense	  of	  ‘possibility’)	  be	  held	  directly	  morally	  
responsible	  are	  actions.	  	  But,	  in	  the	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’	  thesis,	  ‘can’	  is	  read	  in	  the	  logically	  stronger	  way	  I	  just	  
described.	  	  So,	  I	  deny	  that	  my	  hidden	  premise	  is	  false,	  and	  this	  is	  because	  I	  deny	  that	  the	  falsity	  of	  ‘ought	  implies	  
can’	  implies	  the	  falsity	  of	  my	  hidden	  premise.	  	  (Thanks	  to	  David	  Palmer	  for	  the	  objection.)	  	  
	  
Objection	  #2:	  There	  are	  states	  of	  being	  that	  a	  person	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for.	  	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  I	  
am	  in	  the	  state	  of	  being	  drunk.	  	  It’s	  perfectly	  plausible	  that	  I’m	  morally	  responsible	  for	  my	  being	  in	  such	  a	  state,	  
and	  being	  in	  such	  a	  state	  is	  no	  action.	  	  Thus,	  there	  are	  things	  for	  which	  we	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  that	  aren’t	  
actions	  at	  all.	  
	  
Reply	  #2:	  I’m	  happy	  to	  grant,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument,	  that	  we	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  being	  in	  certain	  
states,	  where	  being	  in	  a	  certain	  state	  is	  not	  an	  action.	  	  So,	  I	  grant	  that	  I	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  my	  being	  in	  a	  
state	  of	  drunkenness.	  	  Even	  if	  this	  is	  right,	  it	  doesn’t	  do	  much	  to	  help	  Haji’s	  case.	  	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  being	  morally	  
responsible	  for	  being	  in	  a	  certain	  state	  is	  really	  just	  a	  derivative	  sort	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Plausibly,	  we	  can	  only	  
be	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  actions.	  	  So,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  my	  being	  morally	  responsible	  for	  being	  drunk,	  what	  
I’m	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  is	  my	  acts	  of	  drinking.	  	  What’s	  important	  about	  this	  is	  that,	  with	  respect	  to	  Rule	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an epistemic requirement on moral responsibility, then Yasmin’s failing to meet E3 with respect 
to YC isn’t yet a problem for her being morally responsible for the fact expressed in 5H.   
Surely, though, there is some epistemic requirement for moral responsibility.  Here, I 
think, is a plausible candidate for such a requirement:  
E4:  S is morally praiseworthy [blameworthy] for seeing to the occurrence of state of 
affairs, a, only if S had epistemic justification to believe that a is morally obligatory 
[morally wrong] or, as some might prefer, morally good [morally bad] (in some specified 
sense of ‘good’ [‘bad’].25 
 
Now, E4 merely requires that Yasmin have (on balance) good reason to believe that YC is 
morally obligatory or morally good.  What reason could Yasmin have to believe such a thing?  
Given that she’s ex hypothesi morally responsible for the consequent of YC, she must meet 
whatever the epistemic requirement is for moral responsibility.  So, Yasmin has good reason to 
believe that the consequent of YC is morally good or obligatory.  But, if she has good reason to 
believe that, then since the consequent of YC (obviously) materially implies YC, itself, Yasmin 
has good reason to believe that YC itself is morally good or obligatory.26  And if so, then, 
                                                                                                                                                       
B—and	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  more	  generally—what’s	  at	  issue	  is	  direct	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  So,	  I	  think	  E3	  must	  
mean	  the	  sort	  of	  moral	  obligation	  that	  one	  can	  be	  directly	  responsible	  for	  following	  (or	  failing	  to	  follow).	  	  
Moreover,	  there’s	  still	  the	  problem	  of	  being	  morally	  obligated	  to	  believe	  (or	  disbelieve,	  I	  suppose)	  certain	  things.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  literature	  devoted	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  ethics	  of	  belief,	  so	  a	  discussion	  about	  this	  topic	  is	  
well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  (as	  Audi	  argues)	  
that	  beliefs	  are	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  for	  which	  we	  can	  be	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  (or	  for	  which	  we	  have	  some	  
moral	  obligation	  to	  hold,	  or	  refrain	  from	  holding).	  	  Such	  doubt,	  I	  think,	  is	  reason	  enough	  to	  doubt	  that	  E3	  is	  the	  
correct	  epistemic	  principle.	  	  I’ll	  offer	  another	  epistemic	  principle	  on	  moral	  responsibility,	  just	  below.	  	  It,	  too,	  might	  
be	  subject	  to	  serious	  doubt.	  	  Even	  so,	  I	  think	  it’s	  a	  plausible	  competitor	  to	  E3.	  	  I’ll	  let	  the	  reader	  decide	  which	  she	  
thinks	  is	  the	  more	  plausible.	  	  But	  the	  point	  is	  that	  Haji’s	  counterexample	  depends	  on	  E3,	  and	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  
doubt	  E3;	  so,	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  the	  counterexample	  is	  successful.	  	  (Thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  
from	  Erkenntnis	  for	  this	  objection.)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  25	  I	  owe	  E4	  to	  E.	  J.	  Coffman.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Objection:	  	  Suppose	  that	  Haji	  supplements	  the	  counterexample	  to	  include	  this	  piece	  of	  information:	  Yasmin	  
has	  no	  conception	  of	  W1.	  	  Doesn’t	  this	  imply	  that	  she’ll	  have	  no	  conception	  of	  YC?	  	  If	  so,	  then	  it	  doesn’t	  seem	  as	  if	  
Yasmin	  could	  have	  ‘good	  reason’	  to	  believe	  anything	  about	  W1	  and	  its	  actualization.	  	  Thus,	  Yasmin	  wouldn’t	  meet	  
E4,	  and	  isn’t	  morally	  responsible	  for	  YC.	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according to E4, it’s plausible that Yasmin is morally responsible for YC.  Thus, we have a 
plausible reason to think that 5H is false. 
 Here, I can think of two potential objections to my claim that Yasmin is morally 
responsible for YC.  Here is the first: 
5H’s conditional is a necessary truth since it’s a fact about what happens in W1 and 
what’s true about W1 is true in all possible worlds.  That is, it’s true in all possible 
worlds, that, in W1, Yasmin donates at ts.  If that’s so, and Yasmin is, as you’ve argued, 
partly morally responsible for the truth of 5H’s conditional, then it looks like you are 
committed to the claim that a human person can be (at least in part) morally responsible 
for a necessary truth.  If this is your argument, then while you may have saved Rule B, 
you’ve undermined Rule A and have, therefore, not saved the Direct Argument more 
generally.  What a curious upshot of your argument! 27 
 
 But I reply that I’ve claimed only that Yasmin is, at least in part, morally responsible for 
the truth of YC.  Notice that YC is not world-indexed; yet, Haji claims that YC is the fact 
expressed in 5H’s conditional.  So, either 5H’s conditional is world-indexed (and, so, a necessary 
truth), or it isn’t.  If it isn’t, then there’s no problem with my argument thus far; Yasmin is, at 
least in part, morally responsible for the truth of YC, and is, thereby, at least in part, morally 
responsible for the truth of 5H’s conditional.  If 5H’s conditional is world-indexed (and, so, a 
necessary truth), then YC is also supposed to be world-indexed.  If that’s right, then I’m forced 
to concede, on pain of giving up Rule A, that Yasmin is not (at least partly) morally responsible 
                                                                                                                                                       
Reply:	  	  Yes,	  Haji	  could	  supplement	  his	  counterexample	  in	  this	  way,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  it	  would	  help	  his	  case.	  	  Notice	  
that	  I	  don’t	  say	  that	  Yasmin	  reasonably	  believes	  anything	  about	  W1.	  	  All	  I	  say	  is	  that	  she	  has	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  
something	  about	  W1	  given	  that	  she	  has	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  something	  about	  YC.	  	  What	  do	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  say	  
she	  ‘has	  good	  reason	  to	  believe’	  that	  YC,	  e.g.,	  is	  morally	  permissible?	  	  All	  I	  mean	  is	  that	  she	  has	  evidence	  that	  YC	  is	  
morally	  permissible,	  whether	  or	  not	  she	  realizes	  she	  has	  this	  evidence	  or	  not.	  	  And	  here	  I’m	  thinking	  of	  what	  Earl	  
Conee	  and	  Richard	  Feldman	  (2004,	  p.	  84)	  call	  ‘scientific	  evidence’,	  where	  ‘scientific	  evidence’	  =df	  E	  is	  scientific	  
evidence	  for	  P	  provided	  that	  E	  is	  publicly	  available	  and	  E	  reliably	  indicates	  the	  truth	  of	  P.	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  suppose	  
that	  I	  am	  running	  a	  criminal	  investigation;	  Jones	  allegedly	  shot	  Smith.	  	  The	  fingerprints	  on	  the	  gun	  Jones	  allegedly	  
used	  to	  shoot	  Smith	  are	  part	  of	  my	  evidence	  even	  if	  I	  never	  consider	  checking	  for	  Jones’s	  fingerprints.	  	  This	  
evidence,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  gives	  me	  good	  reason—even	  if	  I	  never	  consider	  it—to	  believe	  that	  Jones	  used	  the	  gun	  
that	  killed	  Smith.	  	  Something	  similar	  is	  true	  about	  Yasmin	  with	  respect	  to	  W1	  and	  YC.	  
	  	  	  	  	  27	  Thanks	  to	  Thomas	  Reed	  for	  this	  objection.	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for the truth of 5H’s conditional.  But, even if so, my attempt to undermine Haji’s alleged 
counterexample hasn’t yet been shown to be unsuccessful.  For one thing, there’s still the matter 
of 4H and whether or not it’s true (which, I’ll argue just below, it isn’t).  For another, if 5H’s 
conditional is world-indexed (and, so, a necessary truth), then it looks as if the fact under the 
scope of the ‘NR’ operator in 6H is world-indexed, too.  And if so, then contra what Haji says, 
6H is true since the fact under the scope of the ‘NR’ operator is a necessary truth, and Hal’s 
Argument(2) is no counterexample to Rule B.  Thus, unless Haji wishes to attack Rule A—and 
we’re given no reason to think that he does—it’s best to read 5H’s conditional is a non-world-
indexed way.  If I’m right about this, then it looks like my argument against the truth of 5H is 
successful, after all. 
 Here is the second objection: 
W1 is a maximal state of affairs; so, Yasmin’s donating to UNICEF when she does is a 
necessary condition for W1’s being actual. That is, it’s a necessary truth that Hal’s 
creating W1 implies that Yasmin donates to UNICEF when she does.  Thus, if Yasmin is 
in any part directly morally responsible for the truth of YC, then she’s at least partly 
directly morally responsible for a necessary truth.  Thus, either Hal’s Creation(2) is a 
counterexample to Rule B, or Rule A is false.  Either way, the Direct Argument fails.28 
 
 But I reply that this objection, too, says more against Haji’s alleged counterexample than 
it does against my attempt to refute it; for, if YC is a necessary truth, then Hal’s Creation(2) is 
really a deterministic set-up.  I say that Hal’s Creation(2) is a deterministic set-up because, given 
the fact that Yasmin’s donating to UNICEF is a necessary condition on W1, it just follows that if 
Hal-2 creates W1, then this determines that Yasmin will donate to UNICEF when she does.  By 
hypothesis, Yasmin isn’t in any part directly morally responsible for the fact that Hal-2 
actualizes W1; thus, Yasmin has no influence as to whether or not Hal-2 actualizes W1.  But 
according to the set-up, Yasmin’s donating to UNICEF when she does is supposed to be a 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  28	  Thanks	  to	  a	  referee	  from	  Philosophical	  Explorations	  for	  this	  objection.	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libertarian free action, which means, among other things, that her action is supposed to be such 
that it isn’t determined to happen by antecedent conditions over which she has no influence.  So, 
if YC is a necessary truth, and Yasmin has no influence over the antecedent conditions, then 
Hal’s Creation(2) is just an instance of determinism and Yasmin’s act is not a libertarian free 
action.  Thus, if YC is a necessary truth, then Hal’s Creation(2) fails to be motivated the way 
Haji claims that it is; for it simply asserts that someone can be morally responsible for an action 
that is determined by antecedent conditions over which they have no influence.  This envisaged 
objection, then—even if it undermines my argument against 5H’s truth—fails both to save Hal’s 
Creation(2) and undermine the Direct Argument more generally. 
Moreover, the above objection helps motivate a further reason to think that Hal’s 
Argument(2) fails to provides  counterexample to Rule B; for the above objection helps 
illuminate reasons to think that 4H is false.  To see why 4H is plausibly false, let’s take a look at 
that premise in some detail.  Just what does 4H say?  4H says, at least, that Hal-2 creates, or, 
better, actualizes,29 W1.  Now, just what does W1 include?  Well, according to Hal’s 
Creation(2), W1 includes Yasmin’s donating, at ts, to UNICEF (this is one lesson from the 
second objection considered above).  Let’s call Yasmin’s so donating ‘A’.  So, W1, I take it, 
includes A.   
 Before moving on to say just why it is that I think 4H is problematic (indeed, I think 4H 
is false), let’s take a step back for a moment and think about what it means for Hal-2 to 
‘actualize’ W1.  According to Alvin Plantinga, in his well-known The Nature of Necessity, we 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  29	  I	  say	  ‘actualize’	  is	  better	  than	  ‘create’	  because	  I	  assume	  that	  possible	  worlds	  exist	  necessarily,	  but	  aren’t	  
necessarily	  actual.	  	  Thus,	  since	  they	  exist	  necessarily,	  they	  are	  in	  no	  need	  of	  being	  ‘created’.	  	  Rather,	  they	  are	  in	  
need	  of	  being	  made	  actual.	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can think of ‘actualizing’ in, at least, two ways.30  There’s the weak sense of actualization and the 
strong sense of actualization.  What does it mean to strongly actualize some state of affairs (A, 
say)?  To actualize some state of affairs in the strong sense, Plantinga says, is to “cause [A, or 
whatever] to be actual” (Plantinga, 1974a, p. 173).31  So, if Yasmin A’s, she strongly actualizes 
A since she causes it to be the case that A is actual.32  To actualize something, S, in the weak 
sense, is to perform some action A such that, if you were to perform A, S would obtain.33 Here’s 
a way to think about it.  Suppose Jones kills Smith with his revolver, and call this action ‘R’.  
Now, prior to Jones’s killing Smith, there is another man, Black, a revolver salesman, who wants 
Smith dead.  Unfortunately for Black, however, he’s incapable of firing revolvers because he’s a 
quadriplegic.  Even so, Black knows that his friend Jones wants Smith dead, too.  And he knows, 
further, than if he were to sell Jones a revolver, Jones would kill Smith.  So, Black sells Jones a 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  30	  See,	  especially,	  pp.	  169	  –	  174.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  31	  On	  pages	  169	  –	  174	  of	  the	  cited	  volume,	  Plantinga’s	  discussion	  is	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  (possible)	  worlds	  God	  
can	  create	  (or,	  actualize).	  	  His	  argument	  about	  which	  (possible)	  worlds	  God	  can	  create	  hinges	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  
there	  are	  any	  libertarianly	  free	  creatures	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  have	  any	  creative	  function.	  	  If	  they	  do,	  it	  looks	  
like	  which	  (possible)	  worlds	  God	  can	  create	  will	  depend	  heavily	  on	  which	  states	  of	  affairs	  libertarianly	  free	  
creatures	  cause	  to	  be	  actual;	  that	  is,	  which	  states	  of	  affairs	  libertarianly	  free	  creatures	  strongly	  actualize.	  	  Thinking	  
about	  this	  is	  quite	  instructive	  for	  the	  case	  at	  hand.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  32	  Here	  I	  can	  imagine	  an	  objection	  by	  philosophers	  in	  the	  ‘non-­‐causal’	  camp	  (e.g.	  Carl	  Ginet).	  	  The	  non-­‐causalist	  I	  
imagine	  might	  say	  something	  like	  the	  following:	  “Suppose	  non-­‐causalism	  about	  free	  will	  is	  true.	  	  I	  act	  freely	  but	  
don’t	  cause	  my	  action.	  	  Then	  I	  don’t	  strongly	  actualize	  my	  action	  (because	  to	  strongly	  actualize	  something	  is	  to	  
cause	  its	  obtaining).	  	  Do	  I,	  then,	  merely	  weakly	  actualize	  my	  action?”	  	  But	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  question	  should	  worry	  
the	  proponent	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  strong	  and	  weak	  actualization.	  	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  question	  should	  worry	  
the	  proponent	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  strong	  and	  weak	  actualization	  because	  I	  think	  this	  distinction	  can	  be	  
thought	  of—though,	  in	  an	  admittedly	  murky	  way—non-­‐causally.	  	  If	  non-­‐causalism	  about	  free	  will	  is	  true,	  then	  all	  
we’d	  have	  to	  say	  is	  something	  like:	  	  to	  strongly	  actualize	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs,	  S,	  is	  to	  ‘bring	  it	  about’	  that	  S	  is	  the	  case	  
(where	  ‘bring	  it	  about’	  is	  non-­‐causal;	  cf.	  Ginet’s	  (2007),	  e.g.).	  	  To	  weakly	  actualize	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs,	  S,	  is	  to	  ‘bring	  it	  
about’	  that	  one	  performs	  some	  action	  A	  such	  that,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  ‘bring	  it	  about	  that’	  A,	  S	  would	  obtain.	  	  I	  think	  
any	  notion	  of	  actualization	  is	  much	  clearer	  on	  causal	  theories,	  but,	  even	  so,	  if	  any	  sense	  of	  actualizing	  can	  be	  made	  
on	  the	  non-­‐causal	  theories	  of	  free	  will,	  making	  a	  distinction	  between	  strong	  and	  weak	  forms	  of	  actualization	  
provides	  no	  further	  difficulty.	  	  Thanks	  to	  David	  Palmer	  for	  pressing	  me,	  here.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  33	  Here	  is	  how	  Plantinga	  puts	  it.	  	  If	  thinking	  about	  how	  God	  can	  actualize	  certain	  worlds	  with	  creatures	  who	  are	  
free	  to	  act,	  then	  God’s	  weakly	  actualizing	  some	  world	  W	  is	  “(roughly)	  whether	  for	  each	  world	  W	  there	  is	  something	  
he	  [i.e.	  God]	  could	  have	  done—some	  series	  of	  actions	  he	  could	  have	  taken—such	  that,	  if	  he	  had,	  W	  would	  have	  
been	  actual”	  (Plantinga,	  1974a,	  p.	  173.).	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revolver; Jones, then, kills Smith.  Now, does Black strongly actualize R?  No; how could he? 
Black doesn’t cause R to be actual; he’s incapable of doing any such thing.  But what Black does 
do is actualize R in the weak sense.  Black weakly actualizes R by strongly actualizing Jones’s 
being in the circumstances in which Black knew he’d kill Smith.  However, Black does not cause 
it to be the case that R is actual.  Only Smith is responsible for that. 
 Now, what’s all this got to do with Hal-2 and Yasmin?  Quite a lot, I say.  To see why, 
let’s zoom in on A and have a closer look at it.  What do we know about A?  We know at least 
this much:  it is supposed to be libertarian free action, one for which Yasmin is directly morally 
responsible.  Okay; fair enough.  Now, can Hal-2 actualize A?  I guess that depends on what 
Hal’s Creation(2) means by ‘actualize’.  Hal-2 can’t strongly actualize A.  He can’t strongly 
actualize A because, if he did, then Yasmin wouldn’t be directly morally responsible for 
actualizing A.  To be clear, the reason Hal-2 can’t actualize A in the strong sense is because, if 
he did, then he’d be A’s cause.  And if Hal-2 were A’s cause, then Yasmin wouldn’t be directly 
morally responsible for Aing (since she wouldn’t be A’s cause).  So, if Hal-2 causes A to 
become actual, then Yasmin wouldn’t be directly morally responsible for actualizing A since she 
wouldn’t actualize A; Hal-2 would. That is, Hal-2 would actualize A, and not Yasmin, if Hal-2 
actualizes A in the strong sense.  But W1 includes A.  So, if Hal-2 strongly actualizes W1, he 
would strongly actualize A.  And since Yasmin is, ex hypothesi, directly morally responsible for 
A, Hal’s Creation(2) can’t mean that Hal-2 strongly actualizes A; and, if not, then Hal’s 
Creation(2) can’t mean that Hal-2 strongly actualizes W1. 
 So, Hal’s Creation(2) doesn’t mean to assert that Hal-2 strongly actualizes W1.  This 
means, then, that Hal’s Creation(2) asserts that Hal-2 weakly actualizes W1.  Let’s see what 
happens when we read Hal’s Creation(2) in light of Hal-2’s weakly actualizing W1.  Now, we 
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said that W1 includes A, the act whereby Yasmin (libertarianly) freely donates to UNICEF at ts.  
But, again, this means that A is a necessary condition of W1; for, if W1 had lacked A, then W1 
would have been some other possible world, W2, say.  So, A’s occurring is a necessary condition 
for W1’s obtaining, and since Yasmin is directly morally responsible for A, it is Yasmin who 
strongly actualizes A.  This means that it is (we can safely assume) Yasmin who, at least in 
part,34 strongly actualizes W1, too.  And, if so, then, since A is a necessary condition of W1, and 
W1 owes its obtaining (at least in part) to Yasmin’s having strongly actualized A, a necessary 
condition of Hal-2’s weakly actualizing W1 is Yasmin’s having strongly actualized A.   
Moreover, if E4 (or some condition like it) is right, then, since Yasmin has epistemic 
justification to believe that Aing is morally good or permissible, she has epistemic justification 
for believing that actualizing W1, at least in part, is morally good or permissible.  And if so, then 
she has epistemic justification to believe that Hal-2’s weakly actualizing W1 is, at least in part, 
morally good or permissible (for she believes that actualizing A is morally good or permissible).  
The upshot, then, is that when we read 4H as NR(Hal-2 weakly actualizes W1), we have good 
reason to think that 4H is false.  We have good reason to think that 4H is false because Yasmin is 
at least partly directly morally responsible for the fact that Hal-2 weakly actualizes W1.  She’s at 
least partly directly morally responsible for the fact that Hal-2 weakly actualizes W1 because her 
strong actualization of A is a necessary condition for Hal-2’s weakly actualizing W1.  Or, put 
another way, Yasmin is partly directly morally responsible for W1’s actualization because she’s 
directly morally responsible for a part of W1, namely, A.  Indeed, given that Yasmin’s donation 
is a libertarian free action, it must be the case that she has some influence over the factors that 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  34	  I	  say	  ‘at	  least	  in	  part’	  because,	  plausibly,	  there	  are	  other	  free	  agents	  who	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  other	  
actions	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  W1.	  	  Insofar	  as	  these	  other	  agents,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  strongly	  actualize	  
W1	  (by	  Bing,	  or	  Cing,	  or	  whatever),	  then	  these	  agents	  will	  bear	  some	  moral	  burden	  for	  W1’s	  being	  actual.	  	  This	  
conclusion,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  is	  unsurprising	  if	  one	  views	  free	  agents	  as	  world-­‐portion	  actualizers.	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determine or entail her having so donated.  And, given the foregoing argument, it must be the 
case that if Yasmin’s donating is a libertarian free action for which she is directly morally 
responsible, it follows that she bears at least some direct moral responsibility for the conditions 
which necessitate her action, viz., Hal-2’s weakly actualizing W1.   
 Now, my claim that Yasmin is partly directly morally responsible for W1’s actualization 
because she’s morally responsible for a part of W1, commits me to something like the following: 
PR:  If a person, S, bears direct responsibility for a part of the way things are, then S 
bears part of the direct responsibility for the way things are. 
 
But Haji might be able to challenge a principle like PR.  Haji might be able to challenge a 
principle like PR by arguing that in order for a person to be even partly directly morally 
responsible for something (e.g. an act, a state of affairs, etc.), that person would have to at least 
be capable of grasping, or comprehending, that thing.  So, in the given context, for Yasmin to 
bear any part of the direct moral responsibility with respect to the actualization of W1, she’d 
have to at least be capable of grasping, or comprehending, W1.  But W1 is a maximal state of 
affairs; plausibly, no finite mind is capable of grasping, or comprehending, a thing like that.  
And, if not, then Yasmin can’t be in any way morally responsible for W1’s actualization.35 
 But I think this objection to PR doesn’t work; its epistemic requirements are too strict.  
For, suppose that I am a mason, tasked with the making, and laying, of a single brick that’s part 
of the foundation of a beautiful mansion.  And suppose that my creating and laying this brick is, 
other things equal, a morally praiseworthy action.  Now, suppose, also, that all I know how to do, 
at least when it comes to building things, is make and lay bricks; I don’t know anything about 
engineering, blue-prints, or anything else relevant to the task of building a house.  Moreover, I’m 
not so much as capable of knowing such things (for whatever reason).  According to PR, I’m at 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  35	  Thanks	  to	  E.	  J.	  Coffman	  for	  raising	  this	  objection	  and	  pressing	  me	  here.	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least partly directly morally responsible for the building of the house; I’m partly directly morally 
responsible for the fact that things are such that a beautiful mansion is built.   
 Now, suppose that the homeowner, the person who designed the house and 
commissioned me to build and lay the single brick, came to me and thanked me for the fact that 
her house is built.  That is, suppose the homeowner praised me on the basis of her home’s being 
built.  Is the homeowner out of line?  Has she gotten her wires crossed with respect to whom she 
ought to praise for the building of her house?  I don’t see any obvious reason to think the answer 
to either of these questions is ‘yes’.  Indeed, it seems perfectly natural for the homeowner to 
thank me since her home’s being built the way it was (we may assume) wasn’t so much as 
possible without my having constructed the relevant brick.  And this seems true to me regardless 
of whether or not I understood (or could understand) the larger state of affairs of which my 
constructing the brick was a part.  So, this objection to PR rests, I think, on an epistemic 
requirement for moral responsibility that’s too strict; thus, I think this objection to PR fails.   
 But, perhaps there’s a better objection to PR in the offing.  Consider the following 
potential counterexample to PR: 
Sara does cutting edge scientific research. She knows her craft well. She fulfills the 
requisite requirements to be morally responsible for her research, and reports her research 
to her boss, Ted. Unbeknownst to Sara, however, Ted is a mastermind controlling a large 
conglomerate of labs. Ted uses Sara’s work, along with the work of many other scientists 
(whose work we can safely assume Sara would not grasp), to create a virus that, when 
released, turns half of the world into flesh-eating zombies. Sara bears moral responsibility 
for a part of the way things are: namely, that her research took place. But Sara doesn’t 
bear part of the moral responsibility for the way things are. It would be inappropriate to 
blame Sara for the zombie outbreak. Plausibly, Sara is non-culpably ignorant, and so gets 
off the hook.36 
 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  36	  This	  case	  is	  from	  Kyle	  Fritz.	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I’ll call this the ‘Zombie Case’.  I’m not sure whether or not this is a genuine counterexample to 
PR;37 even so, it certainly makes PR seem much less plausible than it did before considering the 
case.  So, allow me to amend PR in a way that, I think, gets around the Zombie Case but still 
allows for Yasmin to have been, at least in part, morally responsible for the truth of 4H.  
Consider: 
PR*:  If a person, S, bears direct responsibility for a part of the way things are and has 
epistemic justification to believe [borrowing from E4, a plausible E-condition on MR] 
that the part of the way things are for which she bears direct responsibility will contribute 
to the relevant larger whole, then S bears part of the direct responsibility for the relevant 
larger whole.   
 
The Zombie Case doesn’t undermine PR* because, according to the case, it is “unbeknownst” to 
Sara that anything untoward will come of her research.  Moreover, I think we can assume, by the 
details of the case, that Sara doesn’t have epistemic justification to believe that anything 
untoward will come of her research, either.  But Yasmin, from the Hal’s Creation(2) case, does 
meet PR*—she has justification to believe that her donating to UNICEF contributes to the fact 
that the actual world is W1 and not some other world.  So, Yasmin is still partly directly morally 
responsible for Hal-2’s having weakly actualized W1.  
 Now someone might object as follows.   
Wait.  You say that Yasmin is, on the basis of PR*, partly morally responsible for the fact 
that the actual world is W1 and not some other world.  But, suppose that the zombie 
outbreak from the Zombie Case is a part of W1.  Doesn’t what you’ve just argued 
commit you to the claim that Yasmin is, at least in part, morally responsible for things 
being such that there’s a zombie outbreak?  
 
My reply to an objection like this is, in a word, ‘No’.  I say that I am not committed to the claim 
that Yasmin is, at least in part, directly morally responsible for things being such that there’s a 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  37	  And	  even	  if	  it	  is	  a	  genuine	  counterexample	  to	  PR,	  notice	  that	  I	  hedge	  a	  bit	  about	  PR.	  	  I	  don’t	  say	  that	  my	  
argument	  against	  4H’s	  truth	  depends	  on	  PR;	  what	  I	  say	  is	  that	  it	  depends	  on	  something	  like	  PR.	  	  So,	  even	  if	  the	  
Zombie	  Case	  is	  a	  genuine	  counterexample	  to	  PR,	  it	  still	  seems	  to	  me	  there’s	  a	  successful	  principle,	  like	  PR,	  in	  the	  
offing,	  upon	  which	  my	  argument	  for	  4H	  rests.	  	  Just	  below,	  I	  try	  to	  give	  such	  an	  account	  of	  an	  amended	  PR.	  	  	  
 
 
 45 
zombie outbreak because things being such that there’s a zombie outbreak isn’t the relevant 
larger whole of which Yasmin’s donating to UNICEF plays a part.  While I grant that Yasmin is, 
at least in part, directly morally responsible for W1’s being actual, I do not grant that she bears 
direct responsibility for every one of the states of affairs that make up W1’s being actual; or that 
W1 includes all of the states of affairs that it, in fact, includes.  So, if we combine both the 
Zombie Case and Hal’s Creation(2), I argue only that both Sara and Yasmin are partly directly 
morally responsible for the fact that W1 is actual (and, so, they’re partly directly morally 
responsible for the fact that Hal-2 weakly actualizes W1).  I do not argue that either person—
Yasmin or Sara—is in any way directly morally responsible for the fact that there’s a zombie 
outbreak.38   
                                                	  	  	  	  	  38	  Readers	  might	  have	  noticed	  that	  the	  Zombie	  Case	  seems	  a	  potential	  counterexample	  to	  TDM.	  	  I	  handle	  this	  
potential	  objection	  to	  TDM	  in	  chapter	  six.	  	  What	  I	  say,	  there,	  in	  defense	  of	  TDM,	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  what	  I	  say,	  here,	  
in	  defense	  of	  PR*.	  	  	  For	  now	  however,	  I’ll	  handle	  the	  following	  objection:	  
	  
Objection:	  	  Your	  criticism	  of	  4H	  appears	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  partial	  responsibility	  for	  a	  whole	  that	  includes	  
these	  features:	  
	  
1. One	  can	  be	  partially	  responsible	  for	  a	  whole	  by	  performing	  an	  action	  that	  is	  part	  of	  that	  whole	  even	  
though	  one	  has	  no	  grasp	  of	  the	  whole.	  
	  
2. One	  can	  be	  partially	  responsible	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  whole	  even	  though	  one	  does	  not	  have	  partial	  
responsibility	  for	  all	  the	  parts	  of	  that	  whole.	  
	  
1	  and	  2	  are	  jointly	  problematic.	  	  1	  seems	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  odd	  result	  that	  by	  doing	  something	  one	  is	  thereby	  partly	  
responsible	  for	  a	  world	  that	  contains	  horrible	  atrocities	  (e.g.	  the	  Zombie	  outbreak),	  even	  though	  one	  has	  no	  
knowledge	  of	  these	  atrocities	  and	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  one’s	  acts	  contribute	  to	  such	  a	  world.	  	  That	  seems	  wrong.	  	  2	  
seems	  to	  be	  employed	  in	  order	  to	  take	  away	  the	  sting	  from	  this	  by	  insisting	  that	  partial	  responsibility	  for	  the	  whole	  
does	  not	  entail	  responsibility	  for	  its	  parts.	  	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  no	  explication	  of	  ‘responsibility	  for	  a	  whole’	  is	  
given	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  how	  one	  can	  be	  responsible	  for	  a	  whole	  without	  being	  responsible	  for	  its	  parts.	  	  
Hence,	  the	  crucial	  notion	  is	  neither	  properly	  explicated	  nor	  motivated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  afford	  a	  compelling	  
critique	  of	  4H.	  
	  
Reply:	  I	  grant	  that	  my	  critique	  of	  4H	  relies	  on	  both	  1	  and	  2,	  but	  I	  find	  neither	  to	  be	  especially	  problematic.	  	  With	  
respect	  to	  the	  alleged	  problem	  with	  1,	  consider	  one	  possible	  world,	  the	  actual	  world.	  	  I	  think	  that	  possible	  worlds	  
are	  maximal	  states	  of	  affairs,	  which	  are,	  themselves,	  extremely	  large	  conjunctions.	  	  So,	  call	  the	  conjunction	  that	  is	  
the	  actual	  world	  ‘(x	  &	  y)’.	  	  Suppose	  that	  I	  am	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  x	  is	  true.	  	  And	  suppose	  that	  y	  
includes,	  among	  other	  things,	  Hitler’s	  having	  slaughtered	  millions	  of	  innocent	  people.	  	  Thus,	  (x	  &y),	  the	  actual	  
world,	  includes	  something	  I’m	  responsible	  for,	  and	  Hitler’s	  having	  slaughtered	  millions	  of	  innocent	  people.	  	  I	  think	  I	  
am	  at	  least	  partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  (x	  &	  y)	  is	  actual,	  that	  it’s	  true	  that	  (x	  &	  y).	  	  Why	  do	  I	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So, it seems to me that PR*, or something like it, is true.  At any rate, PR* is plausibly 
true.  And if PR* is plausibly true, then we have good reason to think it’s at least plausible that 
Yasmin is partly morally responsible for W1’s actualization because she’s morally responsible 
for a part of W1 (namely, A).  But our having good reason to believe this means that we have 
good reason to think it’s plausible that 4H is false.  Thus, I conclude that we have good reason to 
think it’s plausible that 4H is false.   
 We have good reason to think it’s plausible that 4H is false.  And if 4H is false, then, 
even if we grant that 6H is false, Haji has failed to give a successful counterexample to Rule B.  
To have a successful counterexample, we need all true premises and a false conclusion.  But, 
here, we have reason to believe that Hal’s Argument(2) gives us two false premises (both 5H and 
4H), and a false conclusion (6H).  Thus, I conclude that Haji’s Hal’s Creation(2) fails as a 
counterexample to Rule B.   
 
VI.  Shabo’s Attempt to Provide a Counterexample to (Logical Versions of) Rule B 
 
 In his “Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample,” Seth 
Shabo sets out to show that noncausal views of Rule B fail.  Where a ‘noncausal’ view of Rule B 
depends on the claim that non-responsibility transfers over the material conditional as a matter of 
                                                                                                                                                       
think	  this?	  	  I	  think	  this	  because	  the	  truth	  of	  (x	  &	  y)	  depends	  on	  x’s	  being	  true,	  and	  I’m	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  
for	  the	  fact	  that	  x	  is	  true.	  	  And	  I	  think	  that	  if	  I’m	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  something	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  
proposition	  depends	  on,	  then	  I’m	  at	  least	  partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  proposition.	  	  Now,	  
I	  grant	  that	  this	  latter	  claim	  is	  no	  doubt	  contentious.	  	  But	  I	  think	  many	  will	  agree	  that	  it’s	  at	  least	  prima	  facie	  
plausible,	  and	  this	  is	  enough	  to	  motivate	  1.	  	  	  
With	  respect	  to	  2,	  I	  think	  the	  brick-­‐layer	  example	  should	  provide	  sufficient	  explication	  of	  how	  one	  might	  
be	  partially	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  whole,	  but	  not	  all	  of	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  whole.	  	  I’m	  fully	  responsible	  
for	  the	  brick	  that	  I	  make	  and	  partially	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  beautiful	  mansion	  is	  built.	  	  I	  am	  not,	  
however,	  responsible	  for	  the	  brick	  that	  Jones	  makes,	  or	  the	  brick	  that	  Smith	  makes,	  etc.	  	  Or,	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  I	  
am	  (we	  may	  assume)	  fully	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  writing	  of	  this	  dissertation	  and	  partially	  morally	  responsible	  
for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  actual	  world	  is	  actual.	  	  I	  am	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  Hitler	  slaughtered	  millions	  
of	  innocent	  people	  even	  though	  that’s	  a	  fact	  about	  the	  actual	  world,	  a	  world	  I’m	  partially	  morally	  responsible	  for.	  	  
(Thanks,	  again,	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  Erkenntnis.)	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logic, Shabo thinks that he has devised a counterexample that shows noncausal views of Rule B 
fail.  In what follows, I’ll attempt to analyze and, ultimately, undermine Shabo’s alleged 
counterexample to the noncausal view of Rule B.   
 To begin, recall Rule B: 
 
 Rule B:  NR (p ⊃ q), NRp ├ NRq 
 
Now, consider: 
 
Bad Angle [BA]:  Suppose that Jed sees a perfect opportunity to dispatch Kenny, a 
nettlesome business rival.  Jed knows that Kenny regularly hikes on a secluded trail, and 
he plans to dislodge a large boulder from a height of thirty feet when Kenny reaches the 
switchback below.  Unbeknownst to Jed, he and Kenny are both visible to a park ranger, 
who watches intently through high-powered binoculars as Jed swiftly works to dislodge 
the boulder, which comes loose at t1.  As it happens, the ranger’s vantage point is 
skewed, and at t2 he believes—incorrectly, as it happens—that Kenny is not in the 
boulder’s path at t2. (Shabo, 2010a, p. 243) 
 
Let ‘r’ stand for the proposition ‘that, at t2, the ranger forms the false belief that at t2 Kenny is 
not in the boulder’s path’.  Let ‘s’ stand for the proposition ‘that Kenny is in the boulder’s path at 
t2’.  Let ‘q’ stand for the proposition ‘that the boulder hits Kenny at t3’, and ‘L’ stand for ‘a 
complete statement of the laws of nature.  Now, given BA, the conjunction of L and s materially 
implies that the boulder hits Kenny at t3.  Moreover, r implies s.  Thus, the conjunction of L and 
r materially implies q.  More formally, BA gives us:  
 [*]: r ⊃ s, L & s ⊃ q ├ L & r ⊃ q.  
 
Where ‘L & r’ is ‘p’, [*] concludes that p implies q.  Now, consider: 
 4*.  NR p 
 
 5*.  NR (p ⊃ q)   
 
 6*.  NR q 
 
4* - 6*, is supposed to be a substitution instance of Rule B, one that is generated by BA.  
If this a successful substitution instance, then it will follow that Rule B is false, and BA is a 
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successful counterexample to noncausal, or logical, forms of Rule B.  Shabo believes that 4* - 6* 
gives a successful counterexample to Rule B because, clearly, someone is responsible for q.  Jed 
is responsible for q.  This is true, Shabo thinks, because even if nobody is even partly responsible 
for the conjunction the laws of nature and the proposition ‘that, at t2, the ranger forms the false 
belief that, at t2, Kenny is not in the boulder’s path’—that is, p—and nobody is even partly 
morally responsible for the fact that p materially implies q, it surely doesn’t follow that nobody 
is even partly morally responsible for q.  So, Shabo concludes that BA is a counterexample to 
Rule B. 
 I’d like to give three responses to this alleged counterexample.  Here is the first.  
Following Widerker and Schnall (forthcoming), I argue that it’s plausible to think that 4* is 
false.  For, given that van Inwagen understands the notion of someone’s being ‘partly 
responsible’ for something as to include being responsible for a logical part of something,39 
there’s good reason to think that Jed is partly responsible for the fact expressed in 4*.  To see 
why, recall that 4* says that no one is now, or ever has been, even partly morally responsible for 
the fact that (L & r)—that is, p—where ‘L’ stands for the laws of nature, and ‘r’ stands for the 
proposition ‘that, at t2, the ranger forms the false belief that at t2 Kenny is not in the boulder’s 
path’.  So, as Widerker and Schnall note, it’s true that “[(L & r)] partially in virtue of the ranger’s 
mistakenly believing that the boulder will not hit Kenny” (Widerker and Schall, p. 15, their 
emphasis, my insertion).  They continue: 
But mistakenly to believe that the boulder will not hit Kenny means to believe that the 
boulder will not hit Kenny, when in fact the boulder will hit Kenny.  Thus [(L & r)] is 
true partially in virtue of its being the case that the boulder will hit Kenny.  But since Jed 
is responsible for the boulder hitting Kenny, it follows that Jed is partially responsible for 
[(L & r)]. (Ibid., their emphasis, my insertion) 
 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  39	  See	  van	  Inwagen,	  p.	  243	  n.	  28.	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So, the idea is that, since Jed is responsible for a part of r—namely, he’s responsible for the fact 
that there’s a particular event about which the ranger forms a false belief—and r is a part of (L & 
r), it follows that Jed is partially responsible for (L & r).  Thus, they conclude that 4* is false and 
BA is not a counterexample to Rule B.   
 I like this response, but I think Shabo has already provided an attempt to deflect this sort 
of move.  To be clear about how Shabo has anticipated the above sort of objection, notice that 
Jed’s shoving the boulder in Kenny’s path is a logical consequence of the ranger’s forming a 
false belief about the boulder and whether or not it will hit Kenny.  The ranger’s mistaken belief, 
after all, implies that there’s a boulder in Kenny’s path; so, the boulder’s being in Kenny’s path 
is a logical consequence of the ranger’s having a false belief about the about the boulder and 
whether or not it will hit Kenny.  But, Shabo argues that, if it’s in virtue of this fact—the fact that 
Jed’s hitting Kenny with the boulder is a logical consequence of the ranger’s having the relevant 
false belief—that Jed is partially responsible for the r, and so (L & r), then the notion of 
responsibility being invoked “encompasses too much” (Shabo, 2010a, p. 246).   
 Shabo thinks the notion of responsibility being invoked in Widerker and Schnall’s 
response (or, anyway, this type of response) encompasses too much for the following reason.  
For, suppose that determinism is true.  If determinism is true, then, necessarily, (P	 ⊃ (L	 ⊃	 p)).  
And, if this is right, then the move to establish NR (L ⊃ p) from NR P by Rule B is unnecessary.  
To be clear, the idea, here, is that the move from premises 3 and 4 to 5 of the Direct Argument 
via Rule B, is unnecessary.  It’s unnecessary, Shabo claims, because (L ⊃ p) is a logical 
consequence of P, the remote past.  And if it’s unnecessary to establish NR (L ⊃ p) by using 
Rule B, then NR (L ⊃ p) is a mere assertion on the part of the incompatibilist.  This, Shabo 
thinks, is (or would be) an illicit move.  “Whatever else,” Shabo writes, “the argument’s 
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defender is not entitled simply to assert [NR (L ⊃ p)] at this stage in the argument, for that is 
something she is supposed to derive” (Ibid., p. 245, my insertion).  Thus, I think Shabo would 
conclude that Widerker and Schnall’s response doesn’t work. 
  So, Shabo thinks that, whatever else it might mean, being partially responsible for 
something can’t mean being responsible for p or any of p’s logical consequences.  The key, I 
think, is the idea that being responsible for just any of p’s logical consequences says too much.  I 
think we should grant Shabo this point.  For, I think that what Shabo must mean is that, to be at 
least partly responsible for p, a person has to be responsible for p and some relevant logical 
consequence of p.  The tricky part, here, is to figure out what counts as ‘relevant’.  Obvious cases 
of the appropriate sort of ‘relevancy’ aren’t hard to pick out.  For, p, itself, is a relevant logical 
consequence of p.  No problem there.  But what about less obvious cases?  Can we give plausible 
examples of those (whatever they may be)?  It seems to me that we can. 
I think a person is responsible for a conjunction if she’s responsible for one of the 
conjuncts.40  Y, for example, is a logical consequence of (X & Y).  And if someone is 
responsible for Y, it seems plausible to me that she should be at least partly responsible for the 
fact that (X & Y).  So, obviously enough, being responsible for some of p’s consequences is 
sufficient for being at least partly responsible for p.  Even so, it is very difficult to see what all 
counts as a relevant consequence of p, though I do think we have some intuitive notions about 
what counts and what doesn’t. 
 I think it’s fairly intuitive when something is obviously a relevant logical consequence of 
p (though I don’t claim that it’s obvious what counts as a relevant logical consequence of p).  I 
said, just above, that if a person is responsible for Y, and (X & Y) is true, then that person is at 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  40	  And	  I	  think	  something	  similar	  holds,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  for	  responsibility	  with	  respect	  to	  disjunctive	  facts.	  	  
 
 
 51 
least partly responsible for the fact that (X & Y) is true.  I think Y is obviously a relevant logical 
consequence of (X & Y).  To see that this is so, consider a case from van Inwagen (1983).  
Suppose that Smith kills the older of the two Jones twins. And suppose, further, that the younger 
of the two is killed by a random lightning strike.  Let the conjunction expressed by the fact that 
the oldest Jones twin is dead and the youngest Jones twin is dead be expressed as the fact that 
both Jones twins are dead.  Now, it’s a logical consequence of the conjunction expressed as the 
fact that both Jones twins are dead that that the oldest Jones twin is dead.  But since Smith kills 
the oldest of the Jones twins, surely it’s plausible to claim that he’s at least partly responsible for 
the fact that both Jones twins are dead.  In other words, surely it’s at least plausible to claim that 
Smith is at least partly responsible for the relevant conjunction’s being true because he’s 
responsible for the truth of one of its conjuncts. 
 If this is right, then I think we now have reason to side with Widerker and Schnall.  To 
see why, recall  
 [*]: r ⊃ s, L & s ⊃ q ├ L & r ⊃ q. 
[*] says that, among other things, r ⊃ s.  But, given the Bad Angle case, its being true that r ⊃ s 
depends on s’s being true—since, ex hypothesi, r is true.  And since s is a necessary condition for 
r, and Jed is responsible for s, it looks very plausible that he’s at least partly responsible for the 
fact that r obtains.  I say that it’s very plausible that Jed is at least partly responsible for the truth 
of r ⊃ s because I think the principle TDM (from above, p. 21) is true.  Recall: 
Truth DependenceMORAL [TDM]: For all agents, S, and all propositions, p, if S is 
directly morally responsible for that which p’s truth depends on (in the sense of ‘depends 
on’ in which truth depends on the world), then S is at least partly directly morally 
responsible for p’s truth. 
 
If TDM is true, and if Jed is at least partly directly responsible the fact that r obtains, then it 
appears plausible to claim that Jed is at least partly directly responsible for p from premise 4*.  
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To see why, notice what p expresses.  p expresses the conjunction (L & r); and since we’ve 
already said that being directly morally responsible for a conjunct is sufficient for partial direct 
moral responsibility with respect to the conjunction, it follows that Jed is at least partly directly 
morally responsible for (L & r).  Jed is, after all, plausibly partially directly morally responsible 
for r given his direct moral responsibility for s; so, it looks as if Widerker and Schnall are right 
after all: Jed is at least partly directly morally responsible for (L & r), that is, p.  Thus, they’re 
right that 4* is false, and BA is no counterexample to Rule B.   
I think similar reasoning applies to 5*, as well.  That is, I think that premise 5* must be 
false.  I think that 5* is false because, in the Bad Angle case, p ⊃ q’s truth depends on q’s being 
true, since, ex hypothesi, p is true.  Moreover, q’s truth depends on Jed.  And since Jed is, ex 
hypothesi, responsible for the truth of q (that is, Jed is responsible for Kenny’s being hit by the 
boulder), (and given TDM) he’s at least partly responsible for the fact that p ⊃ q.  Therefore, Jed 
is morally responsible for the fact that p ⊃ q is true since he is responsible for the thing upon 
which the truth of the conditional proposition depends.  Thus, I conclude that 5* is false and BA 
is no counterexample to Rule B.   
 There are further reasons to doubt that Bad Angle is a counterexample to Rule B.  To see 
what further reasons there are to doubt that Bad Angle is a counterexample to Rule B, notice that 
following follows trivially from the truth of [*]: 
 [**]:  s ⊃ r, L & r ⊃ q ├ L & s ⊃ q. 
 
Now, let ‘u’ stand for ‘L & s’.  Now, consider: 
 4**.  NR u 
 
 5**.  NR (u ⊃ q)   
 
 6**.  NR q 
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 4** - 6** is supposed to be a substitution instance of Rule B, and, thus, a counterexample 
to Rule B given that Jed is morally responsible for q.  But I think there’s good reason to doubt 
that 4** - 6** is a successful counterexample to Rule B.  To see why, let’s first zoom in on 4**.  
Is 4** really true?  It’s plausible to think that it isn’t; for, it’s plausible to think that it isn’t true 
that nobody is now, or ever has been, even partly morally responsible for the fact that u.  This is 
because ‘u’, we’ll recall, stands for the ‘the conjunction of L and s’.  Now, ‘s’ stands for the 
proposition ‘that Kenny is in the boulder’s path at t2’.  And it’s at least plausibly true that Jed is 
directly morally responsible for the fact that Kenny is in the boulder’s path at t2.  That is, it’s 
plausible that Jed is directly morally responsible for the fact that there’s a boulder-and-Kenny-
containing path at all.  Thus, if Jed is directly morally responsible for this fact, then, given TD, it 
follows that Jed is at least partly directly morally responsible for the conjunction of L and s.  
That is, it follows that Jed is at least partly directly morally responsible for u.  So, plausibly, 4** 
is false.   
I conclude that 4** is plausibly false because it’s plausible that Jed is at least partly 
directly morally responsible for the fact that u.  If I’m right about this, then I think there is good 
reason to doubt the truth of 5**, as well.  To see why, recall that s is such that, when conjoined 
with the laws of nature, it materially implies q, the proposition ‘that the boulder hits Kenny at 
t3’.  But, given that Jed intended for it to be the case that there being a boulder-and-Kenny-
containing path at t2 materially implies that Kenny is hit by the boulder at t3, it’s plausible that 
Jed is at least partly directly morally responsible for the fact that u ⊃ q.  So, plausibly, both 4** 
and 5** are false.  Thus, 4** - 6** fails to provide a counterexample to Rule B. 
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If I’m right that 4** - 6** fails to provide a counterexample to Rule B, we have further 
reason to think that 4* - 6* fails to provide a counterexample to Rule B.  To see why, notice that 
since we get [*] and [**] from BA, we also get:  
 [***]:  s ↔ r, (((L & r) ↔ (L & s)) ⊃ q) ├ (((L & r) ↔ (L & s)) ⊃ q) 
 
What’s crucial to note about [***] is that it shows us that s and r are material equivalents, and, 
so, (L &s) and (L & r) are material equivalents.  Thus, if what I’ve just argued is true, and Jed is 
at least partly directly morally responsible for the conjunction of L and s, then it follows that he’s 
also at least partly directly morally responsible for the conjunction of L and r.  That is, if Jed is at 
least partly directly morally responsible for u, then he’s at least partly directly morally 
responsible for p.  Thus, if 4** is false, then 4* is false (and similar reasoning applies with 
respect to 5** and 5*).  I think that 4** is false, so I conclude that 4* is false.  Thus, Shabo’s 
Bad Angle case fails to provide a successful counterexample to Rule B.   
 
VII.  Schnall and Widerker’s Attempt to Provide a Counterexample to Rule B 
 
 I’d like to discuss one final attempt to give a counterexample to Rule B, this time 
provided by Widerker and Schnall (forthcoming).  Here is the alleged counterexample: 
Molecules:  Suppose that Jones fires a bullet at Smith at T1, a fact which, in the 
circumstances, provides a causally necessary and sufficient condition for the movement 
of some air-molecules at T3 in his vicinity. (Ibid., p. 15). 
 
From Molecules, we get the following substitution instance of Rule B: 
 
 7*.  NR (Some air-molecules move at T3) 
 
 8*.  NR (Some air-molecules move at T3 ⊃ Jones fires a bullet at Smith at T1) 
 
 9*.  Therefore, NR (Jones first fires a bullet at Smith at T1). 
 
If 7* - 9* is invalid, then so is Rule B.  Widerker and Schnall argue that 7* - 9* is invalid, so 
they conclude that Rule B is invalid. 
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 Here is why Widerker and Schnall conclude that 7* - 9* is invalid.  Premise 7* is true, 
they claim, because “(in the circumstances) the fact that some air-molecules are moving at T3 is 
morally neutral, and so is not a fact for which one can be morally responsible” (Ibid., p. 16, their 
emphasis).  Moreover, they claim that premise 8* is true because Jones’s firing a bullet at Smith 
when he does is a necessary causal condition for the morally neutral fact that some air-molecules 
at T3, and this is just a nomological necessity given the setup of the case (and no one is, or can 
be, even partly directly morally responsible for a nomological necessity).  But, they conclude 
that 9* is false since Jones is responsible for the non-morally-neutral fact that he fires a bullet at 
Smith at T1.  Thus, 7* - 9* is invalid, and so is Rule B. 
 As Widerker and Schnall admit, Molecules is a variation on Widerker’s Fate case, from 
above (§III).  The salient differences between the two cases, I think, must be these: the fact that 
falls under the scope of the ‘NR’ operator in premise 7* is morally neutral (whereas, in Fate, all 
of the facts that fall under the scope of the ‘NR’ operator are morally significant), and 8* is a 
nomological necessity.  It is these facts that are supposed to lead us to the conclusion that 7* and 
8* are true (since nobody can be morally responsible for something that’s morally neutral, and 
nobody can be morally responsible for a nomological necessity), but 9* is false (since Jones is 
responsible for the morally significant fact that he fires a bullet at Smith when he does).  Even 
so—that is, even given this apparent difference between the cases—I think they suffer a similar 
fate; that is, they both fail successfully to provide a counterexample to Rule B.  For, I think that, 
as in Fate, Jones is morally responsible for the fact expressed in 7*.  
 To begin my defense of the claim that Molecules fails to provide a counterexample to 
Rule B, recall that Widerker and Schall claim that the proposition that falls under the scope of 
the ‘NR’ operator in 7* is a morally neutral fact.  Here is my first reason for thinking that 
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Molecules fails to provide a counterexample to Rule B: there’s reason to think that 7* is 
plausibly false.   
To see why, note that if we take a very fine-grained view of the fact that falls under the 
scope of the ‘NR’ operator in 7*, we don’t merely get that some air-molecules move at T3.  
Rather, what we get is something more like that some air-molecules move out of the way of a 
bullet intended for Smith at T3.  This more fine-grained view, I think, is less obviously morally 
neutral; for this isn’t just any movement of molecules; it’s a movement of molecules as part of a 
larger causal chain of a morally significant action.  And if this is right, then if Jones is 
responsible for the fact that some air-molecules move out of the way of a bullet intended for 
Smith at T3, then Jones is responsible for (the more fine-grained view of) the fact expressed in 
7*.  Thus, on this view, 7* is false.  So, I think it’s plausible to conclude that 7* is false, and 
Molecules fails to provide a counterexample to Rule B.   
 Here is another reason to think that Molecules fails to provide a counterexample to Rule 
B: it misses the point of its intended target.  The Direct Argument (and so Rule B) is concerned 
with past to future determinism.  That is, the Direct Argument rests on an inference rule (i.e. 
Rule B) about the transfer of non-responsibility for the past to non-responsibility to for the 
future.  But 8* is a premise that has the past determined by the future.41  Perhaps Molecules is a 
counterexample to a transfer principle about non-responsibility for the future to non-
responsibility for the past, but this is irrelevant to the case at hand.  Molecules, thus, fails as a 
counterexample to Rule B. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  41	  I	  get	  this	  style	  of	  objection	  from	  Ted	  A.	  Warfield	  (1996,	  footnote	  2).	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VIII.  Conclusions 
 
 In this chapter I’ve argued that the alleged counterexamples to Rule B considered herein 
are merely that: alleged.  I’ve argued that, in each case, except for Fischer and Ravizza’s Erosion 
case and Haji’s (2008), the moral agent in the story—anyway, the moral agent whose 
responsibility we’re considering—is morally responsible for the truth of the fact expressed in one 
or more of the premises of the given substitution instance of Rule B that each case generates.  If 
the foregoing arguments have been correct on that score, then it follows that those cases have 
failed to provide a counterexample to Rule B.   
 With respect to Fischer and Ravizza’s Erosion case, I argued, following Widerker (2002), 
that the case misses the point of Rule B, to wit, that Rule B deals with direct moral 
responsibility.  And given the Erosion case, it’s plausible to conclude—contra Fischer and 
Ravizza—that no one is even partly directly morally responsible for the fact that there is an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3.  Thus, I concluded that no one—and, in particular, 
not Betty—is directly morally responsible for the fact that there is an avalanche that crushes the 
enemy base at T3.  And since Fisher and Ravizza need it to be true that Betty (or someone) is 
directly morally responsible for this fact, I concluded their Erosion case fails as a 
counterexample to Rule B.   
 With Respect to Haji’s (2008) iteration of Hal’s Creation, I concluded that the case begs 
the question against the incompatibilist.  I concluded that the case is question begging because it 
assumes, at the outset, that someone could be morally responsible for an action done in a 
deterministic universe.  But since this is the very question up for debate, then it follows that the 
case is based on a question begging assumption.  So, I concluded that Haji’s (2008) Hal’s 
Creation case fails to provide a (non-question begging) counterexample to Rule B.   
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 If the foregoing arguments are successful, it follows that Rule B is safe from the 
considered alleged counterexamples.  I don’t know of any stronger attempts to provide a 
counterexample to Rule B than those I’ve so far considered; so, I conclude something stronger, 
namely, that Rule B is safe (for now) from counterexample. 
 Now, given that Rule B is safe from counterexample, we might be tempted to conclude 
that Rule B is safe, full stop.  But this would be too hasty.  Rule B is (or so I say) safe from 
counterexample, but there are other objections to Rule B lurking nearby.  In the next chapter I 
consider these objections, objections that question Rule B’s dialectical propriety.  It is to that 
task I now turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Criticisms of Rule B (II):  Dialectical Objections 
 
 
 In the last chapter I concluded that Rule B is safe (so far) from counterexample.  But this 
is not the end of the story for Rule B; for, even if I’m correct that the counterexamples I took on 
in the last chapter are unsuccessful, there might be other reasons for denying the rule, and so, 
rejecting the Direct Argument.  In this chapter, then, I wish to analyze three recent attempts to 
provide reasons for rejecting the Direct Argument based on the criticism that Rule B is 
dialectically inappropriate.42   
In particular, I’ll focus, in the second section, on John Martin Fischer’s contention that 
Rule B (or, anyway, various of its revisions) lead to a dialectical stalemate.  In the third section, 
I’ll focus on Michael McKenna’s recent attempt to say “good-bye” to the Direct Argument, an 
argument he makes that concludes the Direct Argument is dialectically infelicitous because Rule 
B hasn’t been properly established.  Lastly, I’ll consider Seth Shabo’s recent argument that, 
though McKenna is right about one particular reading of the Direct Argument, there is another 
reading of the Argument that doesn’t succumb to his objections.  But even so, Shabo concludes 
that such findings will reduce the role that the Direct Argument should play in the relevant 
dialectic.  In what follows, I’ll argue that each of these objections to Rule B (and the Direct 
Argument more generally) fails.    
 
 
 
 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  42	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  suggest	  that	  Rule	  B’s	  alleged	  dialectical	  inappropriateness	  is	  claimed	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  reject	  the	  
Direct	  Argument	  because	  such	  inappropriateness	  shows	  that	  Rule	  B	  is	  false.	  	  Rather,	  what’s	  being	  claimed	  in	  the	  
objections	  I	  consider,	  below,	  is	  that	  Rule	  B’s	  dialectical	  inappropriateness	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  reject	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  
as	  being	  of	  any	  use	  for	  the	  relevant	  debate.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  Rule	  B	  is	  inappropriate	  for	  some	  reason	  or	  another,	  
we	  should	  conclude	  that	  the	  Direct	  Argument	  is	  dialectically	  unhelpful.	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II.  Fischer and Dialectical Stalemates 
 
 John Martin Fischer, in his My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, devotes an entire 
chapter (viz., chapter 8) to principles regarding the transfer of non-responsibility.  In particular, 
Fischer is concerned with showing that Rule B is invalid by counterexample, and furthermore, 
that any attempt to revise Rule B in light of successful counterexamples leads to, what he calls, a 
“dialectical stalemate” (Fischer, 2006, p. 164).  Put another way, Fischer argues that Rule B is 
invalid, and no (as yet devised) revision of Rule B is such that it is dialectically helpful to the 
debate concerning the compatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism.  The upshot, 
then, is that the Direct Argument is infected with dialectical impropriety; thus, the Direct 
Argument is of no (or very little) use to the debate about whether or not determinism is 
compatible with moral responsibility.   
 But, I think that Fischer is mistaken; for, I think that despite whatever the case may be for 
revisions of Rule B, Rule B, itself does not lead to dialectical stalemates.  And since, as I argued 
in the previous chapter, Rule B is safe from counterexample43, it follows that there is no need for 
a revision to the Rule, and so no need to think there is any hint of dialectical impropriety within 
the Direct Argument.  So, in this section, I intend to argue that Fischer’s assertion that there is 
dialectical impropriety within the Direct Argument rests on a mistake, viz., that Rule B is invalid 
by counterexample.   
 I begin with a summary of Fischer’s case against Rule B and its revisions.  According to 
Fischer, Rule B (or, as he calls it, ‘Transfer NR’) is invalid; it’s subject to counterexample.  To 
see that this is so, note Fischer’s rendering of Rule B: 
 Transfer NR:  If 
 
1. p obtains and no one is even partly morally responsible for p; and 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  43	  In	  chapter	  six	  I’ll	  argue	  something	  stronger:	  counterexamples	  to	  Rule	  B	  are	  impossible.	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2. if p obtains, then q obtains, and no one is even partly morally 
responsible for the fact that if p obtains, then q obtains; then 
 
3. q obtains, and no one is even partly morally responsible for q. (Ibid., p. 
160) 
 
Thus, Transfer NR.  To see that Transfer NR is invalid, recall Erosion: 
 
Erosion:  Imagine that Betty [a soldier charged with destroying an enemy fortress] plants 
her explosives in the crevices of the glacier and detonates the charge at T1, causing an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at T3.  Unbeknownst to Betty and her 
commanding officers, however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and eroding. 
Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken 
free at T2, starting a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy camp at T3. 
(Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, p. 157) 
 
Erosion is purported to be a counterexample to Transfer NR because while it’s true that no one is 
even partly morally responsible for the fact that the glacier is eroding, and no one is even partly 
morally responsible for the fact that, if the glacier is eroding, then there will be an avalanche that 
crushes the enemy base at T3, it’s not similarly true that no one is even partly morally 
responsible for the fact that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3.  For, Betty is 
thought to be morally responsible for this fact.  Thus, Transfer NR is invalid. 
 But if Transfer NR is invalid, then what is the proponent of the Direct Argument to do?  
One thing she might do is amend Transfer NR as follows: 
 Transfer NR’:  If 
 
1. p obtains and no one is even partly morally responsible for p; and 
 
2. (i) p is part of the actual sequence of events e that gives rise to q at T3, 
(ii) p is a part of e that is causally sufficient for the obtaining of q at 
T3, and 
(iii) no one is or ever has been even partly responsible for (2i and ii); 
then 
 
3. q obtains at T3, and no one is or ever has been even partly morally 
responsible for q. (Fisher, 2006, p. 161) 
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But as Fischer points out, Transfer NR’ won’t do.  Transfer NR’ won’t do because there is a  
 
counterexample in the offing, one that is an almost exact mirror of Erosion.  Consider: 
 
Erosion*:  [The details are the same as Erosion except that, in this case,] the conditions 
of the glacier do actually cause the ice and rocks to break free, triggering an avalanche 
that arrives at the fortress precisely at the same time as the independent avalanche 
triggered freely by Betty.  Each avalanche is sufficient for the destruction of the enemy 
fortress. (Ibid.)44 
 
We can see that Erosion* is a counterexample to Transfer NR’ because, even though no one is 
even partly morally responsible for the fact that the glacier is eroding, and no one is even partly 
morally responsible for the fact that the glacier is eroding and its erosion is, in fact, causally 
sufficient for the fact that an avalanche crushes the enemy base at T3, it does not follow that no 
one is even partly morally responsible for the fact that an avalanche crushes the enemy base at 
T3. This is because Betty is morally responsible for the fact that her free actions are, as a matter 
of fact, causally sufficient for the fact that an avalanche crushes the enemy base at T3.  Thus, 
Transfer NR’ is invalid. 
Next, Fischer considers an ingenious attempt by Michael McKenna (2001) to give yet 
another revision of Transfer NR (i.e. Rule B).  In this revision, McKenna draws special attention 
to the fact that what’s at stake in the incompatibilism/compatibilism debate is not whether or not 
agents are (or can be) morally responsible for states of affairs that come about through 
overdetermination (or counterfactual overdetermination).  These are what McKenna calls ‘two 
path’ cases, and he concedes that determinism does not rule out cases like these, cases of 
overdetermination.  But, as McKenna notes, van Inwagen, when attempting to establish Transfer 
NR (i.e. Rule B), gives examples that proceed along only ‘one path’.  For example, in his An 
Essay on Free Will, van Inwagen gives us the following case.  No one is even partly morally 
responsible for the fact that Plato died in antiquity; no one is even partly morally responsible for 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  44	  	  But,	  originally	  formulated	  in	  Fisher	  and	  Ravizza	  (1998,	  pp.	  160	  –	  161).	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the fact that, if Plato died in antiquity, then Plato never met Hume; therefore, no one is even 
partly morally responsible for the fact that Plato never met Hume.45  Thus, the thought is that 
Transfer NR is prima facie established on the bases of cases like this, cases that go through ‘one 
path’.  And, as McKenna goes on to explain, 
if determinism is true, then the manner in which the facts of the past and the laws of 
nature entail one unique future is not analogous to the manner in which one set of 
independently existing causally sufficient conditions (for example, erosion) ensures a 
subsequent event also ensured by some distinct set of independently sufficient conditions 
(i.e., Betty’s action).  Assuming determinism, the pertinent facts (consisting in the 
deterministic order of things) are not independent of an agent’s reasons for action, they 
constitute them!  Therefore, at a deterministic world involving a typical case regarding a 
judgment of moral responsibility, the case is relevantly like a one-path, not a two path.  
(McKenna, 2001, p. 45)46 
 
Thus, McKenna thinks that the only cases relevant to causal determinism are one-path cases, and 
that two-path cases (i.e. cases like Erosion, and Erosion*) are irrelevant to the debate.   
 So, in order to protect Transfer NR from what he takes to be the relevant sorts of 
potential counterexamples (counterexamples that proceed via one-path cases), McKenna gives 
the following revision to Transfer NR: 
 Transfer NR’’:  If 
1. p obtains and no one is or ever has been even partly morally 
responsible for p; and 
 
2. (i) p is part of the actual sequence of events e that gives rise to q at 
T3; 
(ii) p is causally sufficient for the obtaining of q at T3; and any other 
part of e that is causally sufficient for q either causes or is caused by 
p; and  
(iii) no one is or ever has been even partly responsible for (2i and ii); 
then 
 
3. q obtains, and no one is or ever has been even partly morally   
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  45	  From	  p.	  187	  of	  the	  relevant	  text.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  46	  Also	  quoted	  in	  (Fischer,	  2006,	  p.	  162).	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responsible for the fact that q obtains at T3. (Fischer, p. 163)47 
 
But, for his part, Fischer doesn’t think that Transfer NR’’ fares any better than the other revisions 
to Transfer NR.  For, he thinks that Transfer NR’’ can’t be invoked to establish the 
incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility.  Moreover, there is this 
preliminary worry: 
Note what is happening with Transfer NR’’: the principle entails that when behavior is 
the result of one causally deterministic sequence, there cannot be moral responsibility, 
but when the behavior is the result of two or more such sequences, there maybe moral 
responsibility.  But if one causally deterministic sequence rules out moral responsibility, 
it would seem that two or more would be even worse.  Transfer NR’’, however, gives us 
precisely the opposite result.  Transfer NR’’ seems to entail, for the relevant sorts of 
normative notions, that two wrongs may well make a right. (Fischer, 2006, p. 164) 
 
The idea, here, is that McKenna’s concession that causal determinism does not rule out moral 
responsibility in cases of overdetermination is quite curious.  In cases like Erosion or Erosion*, 
it’s admitted that the moral agent in the story might very well be morally responsible for the 
consequence universal (e.g. that an avalanche crushes the enemy fortress) even though that very 
consequence universal is determined to happen.  Yet, somehow, if Betty alone (i.e. without an 
ensuring condition) were the only potential cause of the relevant consequence universal, then she 
wouldn’t be morally responsible for it.  This seems quite implausible.  Thus, there’s good reason 
to doubt the validity of Transfer NR’’.   
 The main worry for Fischer, however, is that Transfer NR’’ leads to a “dialectical 
stalemate.”  This is, in part, because there are no non-question-begging counterexamples that can 
be marshaled against a principle like Transfer NR’’ (for, any scenario one could describe that 
meets all of the conditions spelled out in Transfer NR’’ could not render a false conclusion if set 
in a deterministic context).  In other words, Transfer NR’’ rules out, just by fiat, 
counterexamples set in a deterministic world.  Moreover, Fischer thinks that there is a similarly 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  47	  Originally	  from	  (McKenna,	  2001,	  p.	  45).	  	  McKenna	  calls	  it	  ‘Transfer	  NR**’.	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plausible principle about the transfer of non-responsibility that is consistent with compatibilism.  
Consider one such principle: 
 Transfer NRC:  If 
 
1. p obtains and no one is even partly morally responsible for p; and 
 
2. if p obtains, then q obtains, and no one is even partly morally 
responsible for the fact that if p obtains, then q obtains; and 
 
3. on the actual path that leads from p’s obtaining to q’s obtaining, 
either this is no factor that at least prima facie could be thought to 
ground moral responsibility, or there is some factor that 
uncontroversially undermines moral responsibility (e.g., a factor that 
distorts or impairs the distinctive process of human practical 
reason); then 
 
4. q obtains, and no one is even partly morally responsible for q. (Ibid., 
p. 169) 
 
Fischer thinks that Transfer NRC is at least as attractive, and plausible, as Transfer NR’’ because 
it, too, is consistent with one-path cases (cases like van Inwagen’s Plato case), but without 
entailing that Betty is not morally responsible for the consequence in cases like Erosion or 
Erosion*.  Moreover, the thought is that Transfer NRC is logically weaker than Transfer NR’’ 
because it doesn’t rule out compatibilism—indeed, it’s perfectly silent on whether or not 
compatibilism is true.  Transfer NR’’, however, is not silent about this; Transfer NR’’ rules out 
compatibilism altogether.  But, if Transfer NRC can just as easily explain the cases that van 
Inwagen uses to establish Transfer NR (and its revisions), then we seem to be at an impasse.  
For, both Transfer NR (and its revisions), and Transfer NRC explain the uncontroversial cases, 
while each pulls in the opposite direction of the other when it comes to the controversial cases.  
And if we have two competing principles, one weaker than the other (say, P and P*), that both 
explain some claim C (that no one is morally responsible for the fact that Plato never met Hume, 
given that no one is morally responsible for Plato’s dying in antiquity, and no one is morally 
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responsible for that fact’s implying that Plato never met Hume), then it will be very difficult to 
establish that P, but not P*, is the principle we should follow without begging the question 
against proponents of P*.  And the same is true the other way around.  Thus, Fischer concludes 
that we have a dialectical stalemate. 
 If Fischer is right that Transfer NR is invalid, and its revisions are either invalid or lead to 
a dialectical stalemate, then this spells doom for the Direct Argument.  For, even if McKenna’s 
principle, Transfer NR’’, is valid, it’s very difficult to see that it establishes incompatibilism 
since Fischer’s competing principle, Transfer NRC, seems to be just as plausible, and is 
consistent with compatibilism.  Thus, if Fischer is right, the Direct Argument is infected with a 
principle that leads to a dialectical stalemate.  And if so, then the argument is of no (or not much) 
use in the relevant dialectical context.   
 But, I say that Fischer is not right.  That is, irrespective of the validity or dialectical 
usefulness of revised versions of Transfer NR, Transfer NR, itself, is valid.  So, since there is no 
need to make adjustments to Transfer NR, there is no need to give a reason to think that Transfer 
NR’’ (or whatever) is more plausible (or whatever) than Transfer NRC.  These questions are 
irrelevant because Transfer NR is, itself, valid.   
 To begin to see why I say this is so, recall what I argued in the previous chapter.  Fischer 
thinks that Erosion is a counterexample to Transfer NR (or, as I’ll now go back to calling it: Rule 
B).  But, I argued in chapter two that this conclusion is mistaken.  So, let me, now, say more 
about why I think such a conclusion is mistaken.  What I say, here, will also help us see why 
Erosion* (a purported counterexample to Rule B I didn’t consider in the last chapter) fails to be a 
counterexample to Rule B, as well. 
 Recall, again, Erosion and Erosion*: 
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Erosion:  Imagine that Betty [a soldier charged with destroying an enemy fortress] plants 
her explosives in the crevices of the glacier and detonates the charge at T1, causing an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at T3.  Unbeknownst to Betty and her 
commanding officers, however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and eroding. 
Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken 
free at T2, starting a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy camp at T3. 
 
Erosion*:  [The details are the same as Erosion except that, in this case,] the conditions 
of the glacier do actually cause the ice and rocks to break free, triggering an avalanche 
that arrives at the fortress precisely at the same time as the independent avalanche 
triggered freely by Betty.  Each avalanche is sufficient for the destruction of the enemy 
fortress. 
 
Now, consider the substitution instance of Rule B that these examples are supposed to generate: 
 
7. NR (The glacier is eroding) 
 
8. NR (If the glacier is eroding, then there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base 
at T3) 
 
9. NR (There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3) 
 
As Fischer has argued, 7 – 9 is supposed to be a counterexample to Rule B because, even though 
7 and 8 are true, it’s false that no one is even partly morally responsible for the fact that there is 
an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3.  I argued in chapter two that this conclusion is 
mistaken, in part, because he’s got Rule B (or Transfer NR) wrong.  Notice that in his rendering 
of Transfer NR, there’s no mention of direct moral responsibility.  But Rule B is about what 
we’re directly morally responsible for.  So, if we think in terms of direct moral responsibility, 
then it’s much less clear that Betty is directly morally responsible for the obtaining of the 
consequence universal in Erosion or Erosion*.  It’s more likely, I claimed, that Betty is morally 
responsible for the fact that she causes there to be an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at 
T3.48 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  48	  And	  even	  more	  likely	  (I	  say)	  that	  what	  Betty	  is	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  is	  her	  intending	  to	  destroy	  the	  
enemy	  base.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  she’s	  not	  directly	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  enemy	  base	  is	  crushed.	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 But I wish to take a different tack, here; for I wish to make it doubly clear that Betty is 
not directly morally responsible for the fact that an avalanche crushes the enemy base at T3, even 
if she’s causally responsible for it (as in Erosion and Erosion*).  I think that in order for a moral 
agent to be even partly directly morally responsible for some fact, that fact’s being true has to 
depend on the agent in the relevant way.  What is the relevant way?  This is difficult to say, 
exactly, but I think the idea I have in mind is fairly intuitive, and has to do, in large measure, 
with what the fact in question is about.  That is, I think what a proposition’s truth depends on is 
closely related to what that proposition is about.  Here’s an example of ‘aboutness’ with respect 
to true propositions.  Suppose that God exists.  If God exists, then it’s true, necessarily, that God 
exists.  In other words, that God exists—this proposition—is necessarily true.  Now, upon what 
does this proposition depend?  I think the answer to this question is pretty simple: its truth 
depends on whether or not God exists.  That is, this proposition is about God, and depends on 
God and whether he exists.   
 Something similar holds for contingent truths, as well.  Take my dog Rylie, a Golden 
Retriever.  The truth of the proposition that Rylie is a Golden Retriever depends on whether or 
not Rylie is a Golden Retriever.  That is, this proposition is about Rylie and whether or not he’s a 
Golden Retriever.  Thus, very trivially, the truth of the proposition that Rylie is a Golden 
Retriever depends on Rylie and what breed of dog he is.49   
 Now, take the proposition that Betty causes an avalanche to destroy the enemy base at 
T3.  Upon what does the truth of this proposition depend?  I think it must be that the truth of this 
proposition depends on Betty and whether or not she causes the relevant avalanche.  That is, I 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  49	  This	  isn’t	  to	  say	  that	  there’s	  nothing	  more	  substantive	  that	  can	  be	  said	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  contingent	  
truths	  ‘depend	  on’	  the	  world.	  	  Rather,	  it’s	  just	  to	  say	  that,	  regardless	  of	  whatever	  else	  might	  be	  said	  about	  how	  
truth	  ‘depends	  on’	  the	  world,	  it’s	  just	  an	  obvious	  fact	  about	  truth	  that	  truth	  ‘depends	  on’	  the	  world	  in	  this	  very	  
trivial	  way.	  	  That	  is,	  truth	  depends	  on	  the	  way	  things	  are;	  the	  way	  things	  are	  doesn’t	  depend	  on	  what’s	  true.	  	  	  For	  
more	  on	  this	  issue,	  see	  Merricks’s	  (2007,	  2009,	  2011a,	  2011b).	  	  Also,	  I	  say	  more	  about	  this	  in	  chapter	  six.	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think that this proposition is about Betty and what she does.  So, Betty is directly morally 
responsible for the truth of that Betty causes an avalanche to destroy the enemy base at T3 
because the truth of the proposition depends, in the right way (i.e. the proposition is about Betty 
and what she does) on Betty and what she does.   
 Can we say the same for the fact expressed in 3, above?  I think that we cannot.  For upon 
what does the truth of that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3 depend?  
Does it depend on Betty?  I don’t see how, since, given Erosion and Erosion*, this proposition 
would have been true even if Betty hadn’t acted as she did.50  Instead, it seems to me that the 
truth of this proposition depends on the avalanche, and whether or not it crushes the enemy base 
at T3.  But, in order for Betty to be directly morally responsible for some fact, I think it must be 
that this fact’s truth depends on Betty and what she does.  Thus, I conclude that Betty is not 
directly morally responsible for the fact that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at 
T3.51  So, Fischer is mistaken: Rule B does not lead to a dialectical stalemate; thus, the Direct 
Argument is not infected with dialectical impropriety (or unhelpfulness). 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  50	  Objection:	  	  You’re	  here	  confusing	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  dependence,	  viz.,	  ontological	  dependence,	  and	  
counterfactual	  dependence.	  	  You	  suggest	  that	  a	  proposition	  P’s	  truth	  ontologically	  depends	  on	  an	  object	  O-­‐
involving	  state	  of	  affairs	  only	  if	  P	  wouldn’t	  have	  been	  true	  had	  the	  O-­‐involving	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  question	  not	  
obtained.	  	  But	  here’s	  a	  potential	  counterexample.	  	  Suppose	  that	  you	  commit	  suicide.	  	  Then	  that	  Roger	  is	  dead	  is	  
true	  and	  you’ll	  want	  to	  say	  that	  this	  proposition’s	  truth	  ontologically	  depends	  on	  you	  and	  your	  behavior.	  	  Now	  we	  
can	  add	  that	  if	  you	  hadn’t	  committed	  suicide	  precisely	  when	  you	  did,	  an	  independent	  process	  would	  have	  killed	  
you	  instead.	  	  But	  then	  that	  Roger	  is	  dead	  isn’t	  counterfactually	  dependent	  on	  your	  relevant	  behavior	  (by	  
stipulation,	  that	  proposition	  would	  be	  true	  even	  if	  you	  hadn’t	  committed	  suicide),	  even	  though	  that	  proposition’s	  
truth	  is	  ontologically	  dependent	  on	  your	  behavior.	  	  If	  all	  of	  this	  is	  correct,	  then	  what	  you’re	  here	  assuming	  about	  
the	  connection	  between	  ontological	  and	  counterfactual	  dependence	  is	  mistaken.	  (Thanks	  to	  EJ	  Coffman	  for	  the	  
objection.)	  
	  
Reply:	  	  But	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  say	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  Roger	  is	  dead	  depends	  on	  me	  and	  my	  behavior;	  rather,	  it	  
depends	  on	  me	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  I’m	  dead	  (but	  not	  how	  I	  got	  that	  way).	  	  In	  this	  particular	  story,	  if	  anything	  
depends	  on	  me	  and	  my	  behavior,	  I	  think	  it	  must	  be	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  Roger	  commits	  suicide.	  	  Surely	  that	  truth	  
ontologically	  depends	  on	  me	  and	  wouldn’t	  have	  been	  true	  had	  I	  not	  killed	  myself.	  	  But,	  if	  we	  replace	  the	  
proposition	  that	  Roger	  is	  dead	  with	  the	  proposition	  that	  Roger	  commits	  suicide	  in	  the	  story	  now	  under	  
consideration,	  then	  it	  doesn’t	  at	  all	  follow	  that	  I’m	  mistaken	  about	  the	  connection	  between	  ontological	  and	  
counterfactual	  dependence.	  	  Rather,	  such	  connection	  is	  confirmed.	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III.  McKenna’s Attempt to Say ‘Good-bye’ to the Direct Argument 
 
In “Saying Good-bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way,” Michael McKenna argues, 
among other things, that Peter van Inwagen’s Direct Argument should never have gotten off the 
ground.  That is, McKenna thinks the Direct Argument is dialectically uncharitable, especially 
“in light of the dialectical context with the compatibilist” (McKenna, 2008, p. 350).  The Direct 
Argument is uncharitable, he thinks, because the cases van Inwagen uses in order to establish the 
incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility rely on incompatibilist presuppositions.  
And this is just to beg the question against the compatibilist.  But I do not think the Direct 
Argument does rely on such presuppositions.  And, further, I deny that the cases to which 
McKenna refers are meant to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral 
responsibility.  Rather, I think the results of these cases are upshots of applying an established 
principle (namely, Rule B) to various thought experiments.  In this section, I’ll argue that if I’m 
right, then McKenna hasn’t said ‘good-bye’ to the Direct Argument at all, much less ‘the right 
way’. 
 To begin, McKenna wants to challenge Rule B in a different way from Fischer and 
Ravizza.  Rather than show that Rule B is false by counterexample, he wants to suggest that it’s 
not properly established in the dialectical context with the compatibilist.   To properly 
understand McKenna’s criticisms, let’s remind ourselves how van Inwagen went about 
establishing Rule B in the first place.  He did this by appealing to two examples, call them 
‘Snakebite’ and ‘Plato’.  They went as follows: 
Snakebite: NR John was bitten by a cobra on his thirtieth birthday,  
 
       NR (John was bitten by a cobra on his thirtieth birthday ⊃ John died on his  
                                                                                                                                                       
	  	  	  	  	  51	  If	  the	  reader	  isn’t	  satisfied	  with	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  in	  chapter	  six	  I	  argue	  that	  even	  if	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  there	  
is	  an	  avalanche	  that	  crushes	  the	  enemy	  base	  at	  T3	  depends	  on	  Betty	  in	  the	  relevant	  way,	  Erosion	  and	  Erosion*	  still	  
fail	  to	  provide	  a	  counterexample	  to	  Rule	  B.	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       thirtieth birthday), hence 
 
           NR John died on his thirtieth birthday. 
 
        Plato: NR Plato died in antiquity, 
 
       NR (Plato died in antiquity ⊃ Plato never met Hume), hence  
 
       NR Plato never met Hume. (van Inwagen, 1983, p. 187) 
 
But McKenna thinks these cases do not establish Rule B’s validity in the way that van Inwagen 
supposes.  These cases fail to establish Rule B’s validity because they do not “pass through any 
normally functioning agent who exercises unimpaired deliberative capacities in the production of 
(allegedly) free action for which he or she is morally responsible” (McKenna, 2008, p. 376).  To 
make the point clearer, McKenna asks us to imagine the following case about former President 
George W. Bush and his deciding to ‘get down’ (that is, dance a jig) on national television, 
something he promised his daughters that he’d do.  Now, if Rule B is valid, then we can get the 
following case: 
Bush Deliberates: NR (Bush deliberates about getting down & L) 
 
NR (Bush deliberates about getting down & L ⊃ Bush gets down),     
hence  
 
NR (Bush gets down). (Ibid.) 
 
Or, put another way (where ‘s’ stands for ‘Bush gets down’): 
 
 NR (P & L) 
  
NR (P & L ⊃ s) 
 
 NR s 
 
Clearly, though, Bush Deliberates cannot be used to establish a principle like Rule B; it’s just a 
matter of controversy whether or not Bush, even if he’s determined to do it, is morally 
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responsible for his getting down.  But, now consider the following propositions about Bush’s 
being determined to deliberate: 
 P = The facts long before George Bush was born were thus and so; 
 g = a causal chain led to the existence of Bush and his deliberative capacities; 
 r = Bush deliberates about getting down; 
 s = Bush gets down at a certain time. 
 
From these propositions we get the following conjunction: 
 
 DBD:    (P & L ⊃ g) &   (g & L ⊃ r) &   (r & L ⊃ s) 
 
And, again, by Rule A we get: 
 
 DBD’:  NR (P & L ⊃ g) & NR (g & L ⊃ r) & NR (r & L ⊃ s).  (Ibid., pp. 374 – 375)  
 
Now, if Rule B is valid, then we get the following argument from DBD’: 
 
 1*.  NR (P & L)  Given 
 
 2*.  NR (P & L ⊃ g)  DBD’ 
 
 3*.  NR g   1*, 2*, and Rule B  
 
 4*.  NR (g & L)  1*, 3* 
 
 5*.  NR (g & L ⊃ r)  DBD’ 
 
 6*.  NR r   4*, 5*, and Rule B 
 
 7*.  NR (r & L)  1*, 6* 
 
 8.  NR (r & L ⊃ s)  DBD’ 
 
 9.  NR s   7*, 8*, and Rule B. (Ibid., p. 375) 
 
It is just here that McKenna thinks there is a problem.  Steps 7* through 9 just are Bush 
Deliberates; and we already said that Bush Deliberates cannot be used to establish a principle 
like Rule B.  We cannot use Bush Deliberates to establish a principle like Rule B because it 
relies on a controversial premise, namely, that if Bush is determined to get down, then he’s not 
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responsible for his getting down.  And this is exactly the sort of thing a compatibilist would 
reject.   
 So, cases like Snakebite and Plato cannot be used to establish a principle like Rule B.  
They can’t be used to establish Rule B, thinks McKenna, because they are uncontroversial cases 
in which it’s obvious that nobody is morally responsible for the consequences that take place.  
Thus, in order for the proponent of the Direct Argument to succeed in establishing a principle 
like Rule B—at any rate, in order for the proponent of the Direct Argument to establish Rule B 
without begging the question against the compatibilist—she will have to give an example that 
includes a causal chain that passes through a normally functioning agent in the right sort of 
way.52   
 And by McKenna’s lights, this just isn’t possible.  Any potential example will have to be 
like the argument from DBD’; and this argument can’t be used to establish Rule B since it makes 
use of Bush Deliberates, a scenario that presupposes that compatibilism is false.  And if this is 
true, then Rule B doesn’t have anything going for it.  What’s more, it is true, so Rule B has 
nothing going for it.  The Direct Argument, therefore, should never have gotten off the ground. 
 I say that the Direct Argument has plenty going for it.  But that’s because I say 
McKenna’s objection to Rule B fails.  In fact I think it is he that begs the question.  Let me 
explain. 
 McKenna argues that, in order to get Rule B off the ground, what’s needed is an example 
that “passes through” the appropriate sort of agent.  But why should we think a thing like that?  
One of the (perceived) strengths of the Direct Argument is that it is supposed to be an appeal to 
intuition.  We see that, if determinism is true, then any event whatever follows necessarily from 
                                                	  	  	  52	  Where	  ‘right	  sort	  of	  way’	  means	  that	  the	  causal	  chain	  passes	  through	  a	  normally	  functioning	  agent	  “who	  
exercises	  unimpaired	  deliberative	  capacities	  in	  the	  production	  of	  an	  (allegedly)	  free	  action	  for	  which	  he	  or	  she	  is	  
morally	  responsible”	  (McKenna,	  2008,	  p.	  376).	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the conjunction of the remote past and the laws of nature.  Suppose that determinism is true, and 
the remote past conjoined with the laws of nature entails that it will rain tomorrow at 5pm.  Since 
you are not responsible for the conjunction of the remote past and the laws of nature, and you are 
not responsible for the fact that this conjunction entails that it will rain tomorrow at 5pm, it 
seems to follow easily that you are not responsible for its raining tomorrow at 5pm.  Now 
suppose that determinism is true, and the conjunction of the remote past and the laws of nature 
entails that you will wash your car tomorrow at noon.  Since you are not responsible for the 
conjunction of the remote past and the laws of nature, and you are not responsible for the fact 
that this conjunction entails that you will wash your car tomorrow at noon, it seems by parity of 
reasoning that you are not responsible for the fact that you will wash your car tomorrow at noon.   
 As we’ve seen, however, McKenna thinks this latter step is question begging.  It’s 
question begging because I’m assuming, in the set-up, that compatibilism is false.  But, am I?  If 
I am, it’s difficult for me to see exactly why I should think I am.  McKenna says that the latter 
argument passes through a normally functioning agent; this is what makes the difference for the 
validity of the argument since it’s precisely at this step where the compatibilist will balk.  But, so 
what?  Isn’t it up to the compatibilist to tell me why the argument’s “passing through” a normally 
functioning agent makes a difference?  It can’t make a difference to the argument merely 
because compatibilists think it’s possible for a person to be responsible for something she’s been 
determined to do.  As we saw with Haji’s (2008) attempt to provide a counterexample to Rule B 
(above, p. 29), this sort of proposal is question begging.   
 McKenna claims that “buried deep inside these seemingly innocuous claims are claims of 
non-responsibility that have it that one is not even partly responsible for the fact that one’s own 
deliberations led to one’s own actions” (Ibid., p. 377).  And it’s this that “the compatibilist 
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should not grant just because the relation is deterministic” (Ibid.).  But here I’m puzzled, and for 
two reasons.  First, it’s not the case that such claims are buried deep inside Rule B; rather, it’s 
that such claims are an upshot of Rule B; they’re a result of Rule B’s having been prima facie 
established by uncontroversial cases like Snakebite and Plato.  Second, why shouldn’t the 
compatibilist grant that one isn’t responsible for one’s own deliberations if they follow 
necessarily from the conjunction of the remote past and the laws of nature (something for which 
no one is even partly directly morally responsible)?  I can’t see what the answer to this question 
might be; but, whatever the answer is, it can’t be anything like “because compatibilism is true.”  
And this, it seems to me, is the answer McKenna gives.  Such an answer begs the question 
against the proponent of the Direct Argument.   
 To put the point another way, following Ira Schnall and David Widerker (2012; 
forthcoming), van Inwagen uses cases like Snakebite and Plato in order to show that Rule B has 
been “prima facie established on the basis of uncontroversial cases” (Schnall and Widerker, 
2012, p. 34), and once it’s been so established, “the burden of proof rests on the person who 
opposes its application to the controversial cases, i.e. the compatibilist” (Ibid.).  Thus, the 
challenge for McKenna is to explain why Rule B doesn’t apply to controversial cases like DBD’.  
But, so far as I can tell—and Schnall and Widerker agree—McKenna hasn’t done any such 
thing; he simply wants to assert that Rule B is not ultima facie valid because an example passing 
through a “normally functioning agent” won’t confirm Rule B without entailing the falsity of 
compatibilism.  But, presumably, at this point, that says more about the truth of compatibilism 
than it does the truth of Rule B. 
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IV.  Shabo and the Fate of the Direct Argument 
 
 Seth Shabo (2010b) tends to agree with McKenna that some versions of Direct Argument 
are dialectically improper.  That is, Shabo thinks that McKenna is right about logical versions of 
the Direct Argument, where the locution ‘logical versions’ is intended to denote versions of the 
argument that “focus on the logical relationship between earlier states and later states of a 
deterministic world” (Shabo, 2010b, p. 406).  This is because Shabo thinks that these logical 
versions of the Direct Argument are the versions that rely on Rule B.  Thus, Shabo thinks that 
van Inwagen’s original formulation—the one I’ve been defending—is a “case in point” (Ibid.).  
And, if so, then the argument I’ve been defending is dialectically improper for the reasons 
McKenna gives.   
 What Shabo thinks is less clear, is that causal versions (that is, versions that focus on the 
causal relationship between the earlier states and later states of a deterministic world) of the 
Direct Argument are dialectically inappropriate.  Indeed, Shabo thinks that causal versions are 
not dialectically inappropriate; and this because causal versions aren’t susceptible to the sorts of 
counterexamples to the Direct Argument that McKenna gives.  Even so, Shabo thinks that the 
Direct Argument—thought of in this causal way—can do only so much work for the 
incompatibilist.  While Shabo thinks that causal versions of the Direct Argument aren’t subject 
to counterexample in the way that logical versions of the argument are, he thinks that causal 
versions are too tendentious to play a “staring role” in the relevant dialectic.53  Thus, while the 
Direct Argument may not win the day for incompatibilism, it ought not be thought irrelevant to 
the dialectic. 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  53	  What	  sort	  of	  role	  can	  causal	  versions	  play	  in	  the	  relevant	  dialectic?	  	  Shabo	  concludes	  that,	  while	  these	  
versions	  can’t	  play	  a	  “starring	  role”,	  they	  can	  play	  a	  serious	  role	  in	  (what	  Shabo	  calls)	  the	  ‘ultimacy	  argument’.	  	  
That	  is,	  they	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  support	  of	  arguments	  that	  purport	  to	  show	  that	  humans	  aren’t	  the	  ultimate	  source	  
of	  their	  actions	  done	  in	  a	  deterministic	  world.	  	  And	  this	  sort	  of	  argument	  might	  undermine	  direct	  moral	  
responsibility.	  	  See,	  especially,	  pp.	  419	  –	  423	  of	  Shabo	  (2010b).	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 But I think that the Direct Argument, however one wants to think about its notion of the 
relationship between the earlier states and the later states of a deterministic world, is not subject 
to counterexample.  And, moreover, I think that the reasons Shabo gives for thinking that causal 
versions of the argument aren’t subject to the same sorts of counterexample that logical versions 
are, are sufficient to show that, after all, logical versions aren’t subject to counterexample either.  
So, in this section, I wish to analyze and challenge Shabo’s claims.  For, I think that the Direct 
Argument remains as powerful as ever and, indeed, should play a starring role in the 
contemporary debate about the compatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism.   
 To begin to see why Shabo thinks that McKenna is right about (at least) logical versions 
of the Direct Argument, recall: 
Bush Deliberates: NR (Bush deliberates about getting down & L) 
 
NR (Bush deliberates about getting down & L ⊃ Bush gets down), 
hence  
 
NR (Bush gets down). 
 
What Bush Deliberates purports to show is that such a substitution instance of Rule B cannot be 
used to establish Rule B.  Thus, when thinking about (at least) the logical versions of the Direct 
Argument (those that rely on Rule B as I’ve been defending it), it’s just a matter of controversy 
as to whether or not Bush is responsible for his getting down in a deterministic world.  Thus, 
Shabo concludes that McKenna is right about logical versions of the direct argument. 
 But causal versions of the argument don’t rely on Rule B; they rely on a variation of Rule 
B.  One plausible variation that Shabo gives is as follows: 
 Rule B-co: (i) NRp, 
          
         (ii-c) NR (it is the q-states that are actually deterministically produced [i.e.  
                               ‘caused’] by the p-states) and  
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       (ii-o) The q-states aren’t overdetermined by distinct causes; therefore, 
 
       (iii) NRq (Ibid., 409. My insertion.).54 
 
Shabo thinks that Rule B-co is better than Rule B because it doesn’t succumb to 
counterexamples as easily as Rule B allegedly does.  For example, Shabo thinks that Fischer and 
Ravizza’s Erosion case is a counterexample to Rule B.  Of course, I’ve already shown (above in 
chapter two, and then again in §II of the present chapter) that such a conclusion is mistaken, but 
we can ignore that for now.  For, even if Erosion doesn’t provide a counterexample to Rule B, 
Shabo thinks that any version of the Direct Argument that relies on Rule B (so, essentially, any 
form of the Direct Argument that is merely logical) is dialectically improper. 
Just as McKenna argues, Shabo thinks that Bush Deliberates helps us to see why logical 
versions of the Direct Argument are dialectically improper.  Recall that Bush Deliberates helps 
generate the following (where ‘P’ stands for ‘the facts long before George Bush was born were 
thus and so’; ‘g’ stands for ‘a causal chain led to the existence of Bush and his deliberative 
capacities; ‘r’ stands for ‘Bush deliberates about whether to get down at t’; and ‘s’ stands for 
‘Bush gets down at t’): 
DBD:    (P & L ⊃ g) &   (g & L ⊃ r) &   (r & L ⊃ s). 
 
And by applying Rule A to DBD, we get: 
 
 DBD’:  NR (P & L ⊃ g) & NR (g & L ⊃ r) & NR (r & L ⊃ s). 
 
Thus, from DBD and DBD’, we get the following: 
 
1*.  NR (P & L)  Given 
 
 2*.  NR (P & L ⊃ g)  DBD’ 
 
 3*.  NR g   1*, 2*, and Rule B  
                                                	  	  	  	  	  54	  As	  with	  Fischer	  and	  McKenna,	  Shabo	  refers	  to	  Rule	  B	  as	  ‘Transfer	  NR’;	  so,	  his	  causal	  rendering	  of	  Transfer	  NR	  
is	  ‘Transfer	  NR-­‐co’.	  	  I’ve	  changed	  it	  to	  ‘Rule	  B-­‐co’	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  expediency.	  	  	  
 
 
 79 
 4*.  NR (g & L)  1*, 3* 
 
 5*.  NR (g & L ⊃ r)  DBD’ 
 
 6*.  NR r   4*, 5*, and Rule B 
 
 7*.  NR (r & L)  1*, 6* 
 
 8.  NR (r & L ⊃ s)  DBD’ 
 
 9.  NR s   7*, 8*, and Rule B. 
 
But, as you will recall, McKenna’s charge is that applying Rule B to steps 7* – 9 is an illicit 
move since 7* – 9 just is Bush Deliberates, and the conclusion was that Bush Deliberates can’t 
be used to establish Rule B.   
 So, Shabo agrees that 1* – 9 is enough to show that Rule B is dialectically improper.  
But, what about Rule B-co?  Shabo thinks that 1* – 9 does not show that Rule B-co is 
dialectically improper.  To see why not, notice that if we change Rule B to Rule B-co, instead of 
getting Bush Deliberates, we get: 
 Bush Deliberates-co: (i) NR (L & Bush deliberates about whether to get down at t); 
 
    (ii-c) NR (It is Bush’s getting down at t that is actually  
deterministically produced by his deliberations about whether to 
get down at t); and  
 
(ii-o) Bush’s getting own at t isn’t overdetermined by distinct 
events; therefore, 
 
(iii) NR (Bush gets down at t). (Ibid., 415) 
 
Now, as with Bush Deliberates, the compatibilist will ask the Direct Argument’s defender to 
justify the appeal to Rule B-co for steps 7* – 9 since the compatibilist will just deny that no one 
is even partly morally responsible for the fact that Bush gets down when he does.  Bush, the 
compatibilist will think, is responsible for that.   
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 But Shabo thinks that if the incompatibilist defends a causal reading of the Direct 
Argument—and, so, relies on Rule B-co—then, she has resources available to her that the 
defender of Rule B doesn’t have.  To see why, Shabo fills in the sub-stages of the causal 
sequence described in 1* – 9.  To wit: 
(a) NR (Bush finds himself in his actual deliberative situation—a situation in which his  
salient choice concerns whether or not to get down at t—shortly before t). 
 
(b) NR (It is the initial stages of Bush’s deliberations that is actually deterministically  
produced by his finding himself in the deliberative situation he does). 
 
(c) NR (The initial stages of Bush’s deliberations are exactly as they are). 
 
(d) NR (It is the subsequent stages of his deliberations that are actually deterministically 
produced by these initial stages).   
 
(e) NR (Bush’s subsequent deliberative states are exactly as they are).   
 
(f) NR (It is his decision, immediately before t, to get down at t that is actually 
deterministically produced by these later deliberate states). 
 
(g) NR (Bush decided immediately before to get down at t). 
 
(h) NR (It is Bush’s act of getting down at t that is actually deterministically produced by 
his decision, immediately before t, to get down at t).   
 
Thus, by applying Rule B-co, we get  
 
(i) Bush isn’t morally responsible for the fact that he gets down at t.  (Ibid., 416) 
 
Now, in order for the compatibilist to deny that (i) is true—that is, that (9) is true—she will have 
to deny the move from (g) and (h) to (i).  But how can she do that?  In order to do such a thing, 
she’ll have to grant that not even Bush is morally responsible for the fact that he decides, before 
t, to get down at t, and that his so deciding is what actually causes him to get down at t.  Thus, 
the compatibilist will have to grant that Bush is responsible for getting down when he does, even 
though he’s not responsible for the fact that he decided to get down, and that it’s this decision 
that causes him to get down.   
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 Of course, if the compatibilist doesn’t like this consequence, then, as Shabo points out, 
the compatibilist can try and reject the move from (e) and (f) to (g).  But, if she tries to do that, 
she’ll run into similar problems as with her attempt to reject the move from (g) and (h) to (i).  
For, if she is to reject the move from (e) and (f) to (g), then she’ll have to grant that Bush is 
morally responsible for the fact that he decides before t to get down at t, while denying both that 
Bush is morally responsible for the fact that his deliberative states are exactly as they are, and 
that these deliberative states actually produce his decision.  But, to quote Shabo, “how can 
[Bush] be morally responsible for making the decision he does if he isn’t morally responsible for 
that decision’s being the one that is actually deterministically produced?” (Ibid., my insertion).  
And similar problems occur when the compatibilist tries to hold the line at (e), and so on.  Thus, 
Shabo concludes that McKenna has failed to show that causal versions of the Direct Argument 
(versions of the argument that rely on Rule B-co, or a principle like it) are dialectically improper. 
 Even so, Shabo thinks that since Rule B-co includes appeals to deterministic causal 
sequences, Rule B-co is too tendentious to win the day for the incompatibilist defender of the 
Direct Argument.  This is because it’s not obvious, or uncontroversial, that deterministic causal 
sequences are even relevant to the issue of moral responsibility.  Thus, Shabo concludes that the 
Direct Argument, by itself, cannot win the day for the incompatibilist. 
 But, I think that Shabo’s reasoning is mistaken.  For one thing, as in the last section, I 
think that concluding that Rule B is dialectically improper because cases like Bush Deliberates 
can’t establish the principle is the wrong way to think about how philosophical principles are 
established (or at least, about the structure of the typical Rule B proponent’s commitment to, or 
endorsement of, Rule B).  As I’ve argued, and following Schnall and Widerker (2012; 
forthcoming), Rule B is prima facie established by uncontroversial cases.  This is why van 
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Inwagen, in his Essay uses cases like Snakebite and Plato: they are meant to illicit in us intuitions 
about a plausible principle.  Now, when we take this very plausible principle—viz., Rule B—and 
apply it to cases where an agent’s action is involved, we get the consequence that the agent isn’t 
directly morally responsible for her action.  This is surely a tough pill for the compatibilist to 
swallow, but that’s why it’s important (if the Direct Argument is to be undermined) for the 
compatibilist to provide a counterexample to Rule B.  She can’t, as McKenna does, presuppose 
that a causal or logical sequence’s passing through an agent makes a difference.  She can’t 
presuppose anything like this because that’s exactly what’s at issue!   
 So, I conclude that Rule B is not dialectically improper; so, no need to think of the 
relationship between (L&P) and ‘p’ in the Direct Argument as merely causal.  And here’s 
another reason I conclude as I do.  Let’s take (a) – (i), from Shabo’s filling in of the causal 
sequence of 1* – 9, and restate them in terms of a logical sequence.  I think if we do this, we’ll 
find that the difficulties incumbent upon the compatibilist to reject certain stages of (a) – (i), 
given a causal story, will remain given a logical story.  Consider: 
(a*) NR (Bush finds himself in his actual deliberative situation—a situation in which his  
 salient choice concerns whether or not to get down at t—shortly before t). 
 
(b*) NR (It is the initial stages of Bush’s deliberations that materially imply his finding  
        himself in the deliberative situation he does). 
 
(c*) NR (The initial stages of Bush’s deliberations are exactly as they are). 
 
(d*) NR (It is the subsequent stages of his deliberations that are materially implied by  
       these initial stages).   
 
(e*) NR (Bush’s subsequent deliberative states are exactly as they are).   
 
(f*) NR (It is his decision, immediately before t, to get down at t that is materially  
       implied by these later deliberate states). 
 
(g*) NR (Bush decided immediately before to get down at t). 
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(h*) NR (It is Bush’s act of getting down at t that is materially implied by his decision,  
        immediately before t, to get down at t).   
 
Thus, by applying Rule B, we get  
 
(i*) Bush isn’t morally responsible for the fact that he gets down at t.  
 
Now, as with (a) – (i), if the compatibilist wishes to reject (i*), then she’ll have to grant that 
Bush is neither morally responsible for the fact that he decided immediately before t to get down 
at t, nor the fact that his getting down at t is implied by his so deciding, all while claiming that 
Bush is morally responsible for the fact that he gets down at t.  But, how can we plausibly 
conclude that Bush is responsible for getting down when he does, if we’re willing to grant that 
he’s neither responsible for the fact that he decides to get down, nor for the fact that his decision 
implies that he does get down?  This seems to me to be the same sort of untoward consequence 
that the compatibilist must accept in the case where the compatibilist denies the move from (g) 
and (h) to (i).  Moreover, the same difficulties remain for the compatibilist if she wishes to hold 
the line at (g*) and so on.   
 Of course, what I say about the implausibility of rejecting the move from (g*) and (h*) to 
(i*) might just rely on the fact that I think Rule B is valid.  But this seems to me to be no problem 
at all, since I’ve defended its validity from what I take to be the most promising counterexamples 
on offer.  And, moreover, since Rule B is prima facie established by non-controversial cases, it 
remains incumbent upon the compatibilist to give reasons why Rule B doesn’t work in 
controversial cases.  I think the only way to do this is to provide a counterexample to Rule B.  
But, none of the counterexamples I’ve examined so far do the trick.55  Thus, I conclude that Rule 
B is valid.  And if so, then rejecting (i*) while granting (g*) and (h*) (and any other similar 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  55	  In	  chapter	  six	  I’ll	  do	  more	  than	  this.	  	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  counterexamples	  to	  Rule	  B	  are	  impossible.	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move) is implausible.  Which conclusion shows us that Bush Deliberates might be able to 
establish a principle like Rule B, after all. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
 In this chapter I have evaluated, and rejected, several arguments that purport to show that 
the Direct Argument is dialectically inappropriate (in, at least, two ways), or that its role in the 
relevant dialectic is one that is merely supplemental.  As we saw, Fischer rejects the Direct 
Argument because he thinks that Rule B is invalid, and any of the various revisions to the Rule 
are such that they lead to a dialectical stalemate.  But I argued that Fischer is right only if Rule B 
is invalid.  And since Rule B isn’t invalid (anyway, we haven’t seen any reason, yet, to think that 
it is), then Fischer is wrong.  Whatever may be the case with respect to the various and sundry 
revisions to Rule B, these revisions are unneeded.  Rule B, itself, is valid.   
 Moreover, we saw that Michael McKenna questions the dialectical appropriateness of the 
Direct Argument because Rule B cannot be established by anything other than non-controversial 
cases.  According to McKenna, in order to establish a principle like Rule B, whatever cases are 
used to do any such thing must be such that they ‘pass through’ a normally functioning agent.  
But, as we saw with Schnall and Widerker, this is not the right way to think about how to 
establish a principle like Rule B.  Often in philosophy, what we do is take a very plausible 
principle, apply it to non-controversial cases, then show that given the principle’s prima facie 
establishment, if we apply the principle to controversial cases, we get such and such an 
outcome.56  Thus, there is no reason—apart from an antecedent commitment to compatibilism—
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  56	  Take	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’,	  for	  instance,	  and	  reconsider	  the	  case	  from	  footnote	  24,	  where	  it’s	  alleged	  that	  I	  
morally	  ought	  to	  end	  world	  hunger.	  	  It	  seems	  fairly	  obvious	  to	  me	  that	  I	  am	  under	  no	  such	  obligation	  (perhaps	  I’m	  
under	  the	  obligation	  to	  help	  end	  world	  hunger;	  but	  I	  am	  not	  obligated	  to	  end	  world	  hunger).	  	  What	  reason	  could	  
there	  be	  for	  the	  seeming	  obviousness	  of	  this	  claim?	  	  One	  thing	  a	  proponent	  of	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’	  might	  say	  is	  that	  
the	  reason	  I	  am	  under	  no	  such	  morally	  obligation	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  because	  I	  can’t	  do	  any	  such	  thing.	  	  And	  since	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to think that non-controversial cases don’t establish Rule B.  All that’s needed in the dialectical 
context is that such a principle be prima facie established.  What the compatibilist must do, then, 
is give reasons for rejecting such a principle that don’t presuppose the falsity of the principle.  I 
argued that, in order to do this, the compatibilist will have to provide a counterexample to Rule 
B.  But, since no such counterexample has been offered, we haven’t any reason for giving up 
Rule B. 
 Lastly, we saw that Seth Shabo is inclined to agree with McKenna about the dialectical 
appropriateness of the Direct Argument on a particular reading of the argument; viz., on a 
logical reading of the argument.  But, he thinks, if we read the relationship between the later 
stages and earlier stages of a deterministic world in a particularly causal way, then it’s less 
obvious that the Direct Argument is dialectically inappropriate.  But I argued that all of this is 
just a mistake.  For one thing, there’s no good reason to reject Rule B in favor of a strictly causal 
reading like Rule B-co, and for two reasons: 1) none of the alleged counterexamples to Rule B 
that are on offer is, in fact, successful, and 2) Rule B is prima facie established through non-
controversial cases.  For another, when we examine Shabo’s reasons for thinking that Rule B-co 
isn’t dialectically improper, these same reasons seem to apply to Rule B just as well.  Such 
conclusion arose from my suggestion that the reasons for thinking that the compatibilist’s denial 
of (i) while granting (g) and (h) is implausible can be extended to her denial of (i*) while 
granting (g*) and (h*).  And this conclusion shows that, in the end, Bush Deliberates does 
establish Rule B.  This conclusion is yet another reason to deny both McKenna’s conclusion that 
                                                                                                                                                       
it’s	  uncontroversial	  (I	  assume)	  that	  I	  am	  under	  no	  moral	  obligation	  to	  end	  world	  hunger,	  if	  that	  obvious	  fact	  is	  
partly	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  inability	  to	  do	  so,	  then	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’	  seems	  to	  be	  prima	  facie	  valid.	  	  Now,	  if	  
we	  consider	  a	  typical	  Frankfurt-­‐style	  case,	  if	  it’s	  really	  true	  that	  the	  agent	  in	  question	  could	  not	  have	  done	  
otherwise	  than	  she	  did,	  ‘ought	  implies	  can’	  implies	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  her	  action.	  	  This,	  it	  
seems	  to	  me,	  is	  another	  well-­‐known	  example	  of	  a	  very	  plausible	  principle	  that	  is	  applied	  to	  non-­‐controversial	  cases	  
in	  order	  to	  infer	  its	  prima	  facie	  establishment.	  	  And	  taken	  as	  prima	  facie	  established,	  the	  principle	  gets	  applied	  
controversial	  cases—like	  Frankfurt	  cases,	  e.g.—and	  the	  results	  are	  fodder	  for	  philosophical	  discussion.	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the Direct Argument ought to be done away with, as well as Shabo’s initial reason to reject 
logical versions of the Direct Argument.  Thus, I conclude that Rule B is valid, and the Direct 
Argument remains as strong as ever. 
 Now, given that Rule B is safe from questions of dialectical impropriety, we might be 
tempted to conclude that the Direct Argument is, itself, safe.  But such a conclusion is too quick.  
For, while it is true both that Rule B is safe from counterexample, and that it is dialectically 
appropriate, there remains a need to defend Rule A, the rule that says no one is, or could be, even 
partly directly morally responsible for a necessary truth.  While this Rule might seem to be a 
trivial truth, there is one recent attempt to reject the principle.  In the next chapter, I turn my 
attention to a defense of Rule A from said objection. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
An Objection to Rule A 
 
 
 
 In chapters two and three, I set out to defend the most controversial of the Direct 
Argument’s inference rules, Rule B, from various objections.  In particular, I argued that the 
alleged counterexamples under consideration failed; they aren’t counterexamples at all.  And, 
moreover, I argued that Rule B is not, contra Fischer, McKenna, and Shabo, dialectically 
improper.  So, summing up the work I’ve done so far, I concluded the last chapter with the 
suggestion that Rule B is safe (so far) from concerns of counterexample or impropriety.   
 Now, one might be tempted to think that, since Rule B hasn’t yet been undermined, that 
the Direct Argument has won the day for incompatibilism.  One might be tempted to think this, 
I’d imagine, because the premises of the Direct Argument are extremely plausible, and the only 
inference rule left to question is Rule A, which says that nobody can be even partly directly 
morally responsible for a necessary truth.  And since Rule A seems to be an uncontroversial 
truth, and given the extremely plausible premises of the Direct Argument and Rule B’s apparent 
validity, it looks as if the Direct Argument is both valid and sound.  Thus, incompatibilism about 
causal determinism and moral responsibility is true (or most likely true). 
 But such a conclusion is too quick.  For one thing, and as we’ll see in the next chapter, 
there is an objection that calls into question whether or not all deterministic worlds have a remote 
past. The upshot of an objection like this, it should be clear, is that it casts doubt on (at least) 
premises 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Direct Argument (for, all of these premises include a reference to 
the remote past).  Discussion of this objection, however, will have to wait until the next chapter.  
What I wish to discuss in the present chapter is the other reason for thinking that it’s too quick to 
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conclude, just on the basis of the preceding chapters, that the Direct Argument has won the day 
for incompatibilism.  What I wish to discuss in this chapter, then, is a recent objection by 
Stephen Kearns (2011) to Rule A.   
 According to Kearns, Rule A is false because there are counterexamples that show that 
people are (or could be) partly directly morally responsible for a necessary truth.  So, in what 
follows, I wish to examine three of Kearns’s attempts to provide a counterexample to Rule A.  
I’ll argue that these examples fail; and since these three alleged counterexamples exhaust the 
types of counterexamples Kearns wishes to give, if I’m right that these counterexamples fail, 
then it will follow that Kearns has not successfully shown that Rule A is false.  Moreover, if this 
chapter’s arguments are successful, then, given the arguments of the previous two chapters, it 
will follow that both of the Direct Argument’s inferences rules are safe from (what I take to be) 
their most daunting and recent critiques.   
 
II.  Kearns’s First Alleged Counterexample to Rule A: Murder! 
 
 To begin to see how Kearns’s objection to Rule A will go, consider the following 
scenario: 
Murder!  Steven murders someone, and it is uncontroversial that he’s responsible for his 
murdering since he does so knowingly and intentionally and could have done otherwise, 
etc.  He is, therefore, responsible for the fact that he actually murders someone.  
However, the fact that he actually murders someone is necessarily true.  It is true in every 
possible world that, in the actual world, Stephen murders someone. (Kearns, 2011, p. 
309)57 
 
 Kearns thinks that, given the set-up of Murder!, it’s necessarily true that Stephen actually 
murders someone.  Why think a thing like that?  Well, Kearns thinks that the actual world is a 
rigid designator for a particular possible world (Ibid., p. 311).  So, call the actual world α.  If the 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  57	  For	  sake	  of	  expediency,	  I’ve	  made	  minor	  changes	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  Kearns’s	  Murder!	  case.	  	  Nothing	  crucial	  
rests	  on	  these	  changes.	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actual world rigidly designates α, and Stephen murders in α, then, necessarily, Stephen murders 
in the actual world.  What Kearns thinks follows from this is that, necessarily, Stephen actually 
murders; and, of course, Stephen is morally responsible for actually murdering.  And even 
though it’s a necessary truth that Stephen actually murders, he is at least partly morally 
responsible for this fact because, as Kearns puts it, “in some sense, Stephen makes it the case that 
he actually murders someone” (Ibid., 309, my emphasis).  The actual world is the way it is, in 
part, because of what Stephen does; and since this is a necessary truth, Stephen is morally 
responsible for a necessary truth.  So, Rule A is false. 
 But I don’t think that Murder! succeeds in showing Rule A to be false.  To see why not, I 
think it prudent to remove some of the (what I think is) obfuscatory language that Kearns uses.  
For example, Kearns asks us to assume that Stephen murders in the actual world, where the 
locution ‘the actual world’ is a rigid designator.  So, as above, I will continue to call ‘the actual 
world’ α, instead.  Here is why I think calling the actual world ‘α’, will help get clear some, at 
least initially, confusing stuff.  Suppose, along with Kearns that, in α, Stephen murders.  I think 
Kearns is right to conclude that if Stephen murders in α, then it’s necessarily true that Stephen 
murders in α.  But I wish to point out that Kearns thinks that it follows from its being necessarily 
true that Stephen murders in α that he actually murders.  This is confusing.  For, does Kearns 
mean to argue that it’s necessarily true that in fact Stephen murders?  Or does he mean simply to 
argue that it’s necessarily true that in the actual world (i.e. α) Stephen murders.  I agree with the 
latter claim, but think that the former claim is obviously false.  If it’s possible for Stephen to 
refrain from murdering (and Kearns grants that it is (Ibid., p. 310)), then it’s possible that 
Stephen refrains from murdering in fact.   So, Kearns must mean to argue for the claim that it’s 
necessarily true that Stephen murders in α.   
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Kearns, then, thinks that ‘actually’ denotes the location of Stephen’s murder.  But, if 
that’s right, then I think that Kearns is mistaken.  For, I think that ‘actually’ acts as an intensifier 
to ‘murders’ (i.e. ‘actually’ acts as a word that adds emotional context to ‘murder’, but nothing 
of propositional significance).  What’s more, I think this reading of ‘actually’ is utterly plausible; 
in fact, I think it’s the correct reading.  Moreover, it seems to me that that using ‘actually’ to 
denote the location of Stephen’s murder is a bit of a rhetorical trick to pull the reader’s intuition 
toward the conclusion that, if Stephen is morally responsible for actually murdering, and 
necessarily that Stephen actually murders is true, then Stephen is morally responsible for a 
necessary truth.  To see better why it is that I say using ‘actually’ to denote a locator of Stephen’s 
murder is a rhetorical trick, allow me to restate the proposition that Stephen actually murders (a 
proposition that is ex hypothesi a necessary truth) using my preferred name for the actual world, 
viz., α.  
 Sα:  That Stephen murders in α 
Sα is necessarily true.  Sα is necessarily true because, if Stephen murders in α, then it’s true in all 
possible worlds that Stephen murders in α.  That is, it is true in all possible worlds that Stephen 
murders in α.  So, Sα is necessarily true.   
 Is Stephen morally responsible for Sα?  I doubt it.  To see why, suppose another possible 
world, β, had obtained instead of α.  And suppose that in β, Stephen refrains from murdering.  
Now, it’s true in β that Stephen murders in α (since that’s necessarily true); but, is Stephen, in β, 
morally responsible for the fact that Stephen murders in α?  α didn’t obtain; and the world that 
obtained, β, is a world in which Stephen doesn’t in fact murder.  Given such a case, I think it’s 
intuitive to conclude that Stephen is not morally responsible for Sα since Stephen’s murdering 
doesn’t obtain.   
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Now, Kearns might respond that there it is still true in some sense that Stephen makes it 
the case that Sα.  And, he might continue, if this is true, then there’s at least some sense in which 
Stephen is morally responsible for the fact that Stephen murders in α.  Thus, Kearns might 
conclude that Stephen is at least partly morally responsible for the fact that Stephen murders in 
α.   
But, in reply, I wish to cast doubt on the claim that Stephen makes it the case that 
Stephen murders in α.  For, I think that in order for it to be true that Stephen makes it the case 
that Stephen murders in α, the fact that Stephen murders in α has to depend, in the relevant way, 
on Stephen and what he does.  So, let’s consider the proposition that Stephen murders in α.  By 
hypothesis, this proposition is necessarily true.  Now, it might help us figure out whether or not 
Stephen makes it the case that Stephen murders in α by thinking about what this proposition is 
about.  I say it’s about Stephen and whether or not he murders in α.  Even so, I claim that 
Stephen is not responsible for the fact that the proposition that Stephen murders in α is about 
him and whether or not he murders in α.  I say Stephen is not responsible for this fact because I 
think that the truth of that Stephen murders in α does not depend on Stephen.   
Following Merricks (2007), I think that some, but not all, truths require truthmakers.  I 
claim that that Stephen murders in α is one of those truths that does not require a truthmaker.  
Or, even if it does, its truthmaker is not Stephen.  Why not?  Because that Stephen murders in 
α’s truth is independent of whether or not Stephen is, in fact, actual (i.e. whether or not Stephen, 
in fact, exists), or whether or not Stephen, in fact, murders.  And I think that in order for it to be 
the case that Stephen makes it the case that Stephen murders in α, it has to be the case that the 
truth of the proposition depends on Stephen (in the sense of ‘depends on’ that truth depends on 
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the world58); that is, it has to be the case that Stephen makes it true that Stephen murders in α.  
But, even though the proposition is about Stephen and what he does, he does not make it true 
that Stephen murders in α; for, this proposition is true regardless of what Stephen does, or 
whether or not he exists (and how can a non-existent thing make something the case?).  So, I 
conclude that Stephen doesn’t make it the case that Stephen murders in α.  And since his making 
it the case that Stephen murders in α was supposed to show that he is at least partly directly 
morally responsible for a necessary truth, I conclude that nothing of the sort has been shown.  
Thus, I conclude Rule A seems safe from Kearns’s argument from Murder!. 
But suppose someone were to object as follows: 
Your argument seems to be assuming something like the following conditional: 
 
If a proposition, P, will be true no matter what an agent, S, does, then S does not 
make it the case that P is true. 
 
But this conditional is not obviously true.  For, don’t Frankfurt-style cases cast some 
doubt on this particular assumption?  Given Black’s presence, plans, and powers, Smith 
is going to be fatally shot no matter what Jones does.  But in fact Jones, himself, freely 
chooses to shoot Smith, subsequently shoots Smith ‘on his own’ without Black’s 
intervention, etc.  By the above assumed conditional, Jones doesn’t make it the case that 
that Smith is fatally shot is true (since, again, that was going to be true no matter what).  
This is not obviously correct, though, given that the contribution that Jones’s free choice 
(etc.) actually made to Smith’s being fatally shot.59 
 
In reply, I argue that Frankfurt cases, such as the one under consideration, do not show that the 
above conditional is false, and here is why.  The truth of that Smith is fatally shot does not 
depend on, in the sense of ‘depends on’ that truth depends on the world, what Jones does.  
Rather, the truth of that Smith is fatally shot depends on Smith and whether or not he is fatally 
shot.  But for Jones to be morally responsible for the fact that Smith is fatally shot, it has to be 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  58	  For	  more	  about	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘depends	  on’	  at	  play,	  here,	  see,	  again,	  chapter	  two,	  footnote	  12.	  	  In	  chapter	  six	  I	  
discuss	  this	  notion	  at	  length.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  59	  Thanks	  to	  E.J.	  Coffman	  for	  the	  objection.	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the case that this fact depends on (in the sense of ‘depends on’ that truth depends on the world) 
what he does.  Since it doesn’t, Jones is not morally responsible for the fact that Smith is fatally 
shot.60   
Before I finish with Murder!, however, I want to offer another reason to doubt that 
Stephen is morally responsible for Sα.  I think that Kearns, in his attempt to argue that Stephen 
makes it the case that Stephen murders in α assumes something like principle ER, from chapter 
two.  Recall: 
ER:  If S is directly morally responsible for p, and p ⊃ q, then S is directly morally 
responsible for q.  
 
Here is why I think that Kearns’s argument that Stephen makes it the case that Stephen murders 
in α relies on something like ER.  Consider another way Kearns might respond to my above 
argument that Stephen does not make it the case that Stephen murders in α: 
By hypothesis, Stephen murders someone; that is, Stephen in fact murders someone.  So, 
Stephen makes it the case that he murders someone.  But this fact implies that Stephen 
murders someone in α.  So, it follows that Stephen makes it the case that Stephen 
murders someone in α.  And since all should agree that Stephen is directly morally 
responsible for the fact that he, in fact, murders someone, and this fact implies that 
Stephen murders someone in α, we should all agree that he is directly morally responsible 
for the fact that Stephen murders someone in α.   
 
But such a response relies on two invalid inferences.  One is ER, from above, and the other is 
something like it that I’ll call: 
 MC: If S makes it the case that p, and p ⊃ q, then S makes it the case that q. 
But, as I argued in chapter two, while ER is superficially plausible, it is false by counterexample.  
And so is MC, for the exact same reasons.  For, again, suppose that Butch Jones is morally 
responsible for his being (or that he makes it the case that he is) a great University of Tennessee 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  60	  If	  Jones	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  anything	  it’s	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  Jones	  fatally	  shoots	  Smith	  since	  this	  fact	  does	  
depend	  on	  Jones	  and	  what	  he	  does.	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football coach.  Butch Jones’s being a great University of Tennessee football coach implies that 
there is such a place as the University of Tennessee.  But surely Butch Jones is not morally 
responsible for (and neither does he make it the case that) there being such a place as the 
University of Tennessee, even if he is (we may assume) morally responsible for being (or made 
it the case that he is) a great football coach at the University.   
So, if Kearns is relying on ER (or MC), then he is erroneously led to believe that Stephen 
is responsible for (or makes it the case that he) actually murdering someone because he thinks 
that Stephen’s actually murdering someone is a consequence of his murdering someone 
(something I am happy to agree that Stephen makes the case).  Thus, he might conclude via 
something like ER, that Stephen is at least partly directly morally responsible for actually 
murdering.  But, since ER (and MC) is false, the envisaged reasoning is unsound.  I conclude, 
then, that Kearns’s argument from Murder! fails to show that Rule A is false.   
 
III.  Kearns’s Second Alleged Counterexample to Rule A: Hey Jude 
 
 In this section, I wish to turn our attention to a second counterexample that Kearns gives, 
a counterexample that is of a different type than the first.  Consider: 
Hey Jude [HJ]:  Paul McCartney composes the melody of Hey Jude and does so 
knowingly and intentionally, etc.  He is morally responsible for various facts concerning 
Hey Jude like the fact that Hey Jude starts the way it does and for the fact that Hey Jude 
has a beautiful melody since he created Hey Jude.  However, these facts that McCartney 
is responsible for are necessary truths.  It is necessarily true that Hey Jude starts in the 
distinct way it does and that it has a beautiful melody. 
 
I say that HJ is a different type of counterexample to Rule A because it’s designed to undermine 
Rule A in a way that doesn’t rely on a person’s being responsible for a world-indexed truth.  
Murder!, you’ll recall, relied on Stephen’s being morally responsible for a world-indexed truth, 
and since world-indexed truths are necessary truths, it was supposed to follow that Stephen is 
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morally responsible for a necessary truth.  But, as Kearns rightly points out, an incompatibilist 
could (though, given my argument from the last section, I don’t think that an incompatibilist 
should) concede that Murder! is a counterexample to Rule A, but that the Direct Argument 
needn’t rely on Rule A.  All the Direct Argument need rely on, the imagined incompatibilist 
might claim, is the following: 
Rule A*:  Necessarily, for any proposition, p, if it is necessary that p (and this necessary 
truth is not world-indexed), then no one is even in part directly morally responsible for 
the fact that p. (Ibid., p. 311) 
 
The argument for Rule A*’s truth, then, can go as follows: 
 
P1.  An agent is in part directly morally responsible for a fact only if the agent makes this 
fact obtain. 
 
 P2.  No agent can make a non-world-indexed necessary fact obtain. 
 
C1.  Therefore, no one is in part directly morally responsible for any non-world-indexed 
necessary fact (i.e. Rule A* is true).  (Ibid., p. 312) 
 
It is this argument to which HJ is supposed to provide a counterexample.  So, since Murder! 
would not have provided a counterexample to P1 – C1, HJ is a different type of counterexample 
to Rule A because it rules out Rule A*, as well.61 
Now, why think that HJ provides a counterexample to Rule A*?  Kearns thinks HJ shows 
that A* is false because McCartney is morally responsible for some necessary truths.  McCartney 
is responsible for, among other things, the melody and beauty of “Hey Jude”.  And, since “Hey 
Jude” has these properties necessarily—that is, “Hey Jude” couldn’t have been any other way—
McCartney is morally responsible for some necessary truths since he’s the one who created “Hey 
Jude”.  So, Rule A* (and Rule A) is false. 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  61	  To	  be	  clear,	  HJ	  (and	  the	  alleged	  counterexample	  that	  I	  consider	  in	  the	  next	  section)	  serves	  to	  perform	  two	  
functions.	  	  The	  first	  is	  to	  show	  that	  P2	  of	  the	  argument	  for	  Rule	  A*	  is	  unsound.	  The	  second	  is	  to	  show	  that	  a	  person	  
can	  be	  at	  least	  partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  a	  necessary	  truth—and,	  insofar	  as	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  Rule	  A*	  
(and	  Rule	  A)	  is	  false.	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But I think that HJ fails to show that Rule A* (and Rule A) is false.  To see why, note, 
first, that Kearns thinks that “it is a necessary truth that Hey Jude starts a certain way, and is 
beautiful”, and that “if Hey Jude had had a different melody, it wouldn’t have been Hey Jude” 
(Ibid., p. 313).  This is just what HJ says:  “Hey Jude” just is a certain way, and McCartney is 
morally responsible for “Hey Jude” because he created it.   
But this seems wrong to me.  Why should we suppose that, if it’s true that “Hey Jude” is 
necessarily a certain way, that McCartney created it?  It seems to me that supposing “Hey Jude” 
just is a certain way is to suppose that “Hey Jude” has some essential properties.  But, if that’s 
right, then “Hey Jude” just seems to be an instantiation of something like Hey Judeness or Hey 
Judaity.  I think it’s dubious whether or not there is such a thing as Hey Judaity, but I think that 
Kearns’s contention that “Hey Jude” just is a certain way (that is, “Hey Jude” is necessarily the 
way it is, whether or not Paul McCartney had ever existed, or if he had existed but never 
actualized it) commits him to such an ontology.   
So, suppose that this is what Kearns thinks, and that his thinking this way about “Hey 
Jude” is right.  Again, I think this means that “Hey Jude” is an instantiation of Hey Judaity.  
And, if that’s right, then McCartney did not create “Hey Jude”; rather, he actualized it, i.e., he 
created an instance of the property Hey Judeness.62  So, what McCartney is morally responsible 
for is not his creating “Hey Jude”—Hey Judaity seems to exist necessarily as an abstract 
object—he’s morally responsible for actualizing it.  And since he needn’t have actualized it, then 
he’s not morally responsible for a necessary truth.  He’s not morally responsible for the fact that, 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  62	  Recall	  Haji’s	  ‘Hal’s	  Creation’	  cases	  from	  chapter	  two.	  	  In	  each	  case	  Hal	  actualizes	  a	  possible	  world.	  	  Why	  is	  it	  
better	  to	  say	  that	  Hal	  actualizes	  a	  possible	  world	  rather	  than	  create	  a	  possible	  world?	  	  I	  assume	  this	  is	  because	  Haji	  
accepts	  an	  ontology	  of	  possible	  worlds	  such	  that	  possible	  worlds	  exist	  necessarily	  as	  abstract	  objects.	  	  Thus,	  if	  Hal	  
want’s	  one	  of	  these	  possible	  worlds	  to	  be	  actual,	  he	  can’t	  create	  it,	  strictly	  speaking;	  it	  already	  exists.	  	  What	  he	  can	  
do	  is	  make	  one	  of	  them	  actual;	  that	  is,	  he	  can	  actualize	  one	  of	  them.	  	  The	  same,	  I	  think,	  must	  be	  truth	  about	  “Hey	  
Jude”	  if	  we’re	  given	  that	  Hey	  Judeness	  or	  Hey	  Judaity	  exists	  necessarily.	  	  Paul	  McCartney	  can’t,	  strictly	  speaking,	  
create	  “Hey	  Jude”;	  what	  he	  can	  do	  is	  actualize	  it.	  	  For	  more	  on	  this,	  see	  Alvin	  Plantinga’s	  (1974).	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necessarily, “Hey Jude” starts a certain way or has a certain melody.  He’s morally responsible 
for the fact that “Hey Jude” is actualized; and that’s not a necessary truth.  So, I conclude that HJ 
fails to show that Rule A* (and Rule A) is false.   
To see another reason to think that HJ fails to show that Rule A* (and Rule A) is false, 
consider the following argument, one that is generated straight from HJ. 
1. Paul McCartney is at least partly directly morally responsible for the fact that 
“Hey Jude” starts the way it does. 
 
2. Necessarily, “Hey Jude” starts the way it does. 
 
3. Therefore, Paul McCartney is at least partly directly morally responsible for a 
necessary truth (i.e. Rule A* (and Rule A) is false) 
 
Given 1 – 3, I think it’s pretty clear that HJ fails as a counterexample to Rule A* (and to Rule 
A); for, I think that premise 2 is clearly false.  To see that this is so, imagine that you and I have 
just come from seeing Paul McCartney play a live music concert.  And suppose, further, that I 
am no fan of McCartney’s, I don’t know anything about his music; but you are a fan, and you do 
know something about his music.  Now, suppose that I ask you something like the following: 
Hey, what was that third song McCartney played? The one that said something about 
taking a sad song and making it better.  I liked that one; what was it called? 
 
I think, obviously, your answer to my question should be that the song in question is called “Hey 
Jude”.  And I think this is true even if Paul McCartney (unbeknownst to me) adlibbed the 
beginning, or played the verse a step up (that is, in a higher key) from the way he normally plays 
it.   
For, suppose that Paul McCartney did these things, that he adlibbed a bit.  Would it be 
plausible for you to respond to my question in something like the following way? 
Well, it’s difficult to say what song McCartney played third.  I know to which song you 
refer, and it sounds an awful lot like this other song of his, “Hey Jude”, but it wasn’t that 
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song; for, he played the beginning a different way (or he played the verse a step up from 
normal).  So, I don’t know what to tell you, but it wasn’t “Hey Jude”. 
 
If you answered me in this way, and I went and listened to the recorded version of “Hey Jude”, I 
think I’d have every right to think you’d not been straightforward with me, or that you’d 
confused my question for some other.  For, I think that “Hey Jude” does not necessarily start a 
certain way.  There are many things about “Hey Jude” that can change, it seems to me, without it 
being the case that “Hey Jude” isn’t being played.  Now, this of course leads to sorities problems 
with respect to the identity of things like songs, etc.; but, that’s another issue entirely.  The point 
is that, unless Kearns is willing to accept a dubious metaphysical claim like that there is such a 
thing as Hey Judaity, then I think he should concede that “Hey Jude” isn’t necessarily a certain 
way, or, anyway, that “Hey Jude” doesn’t necessarily start in a particular way.  And if not, then, 
given that the intro to “Hey Jude” can change without the song’s numerical identity being 
changed, premise 2 is false.  So, I conclude that HJ fails as a counterexample to Rule A* (and 
Rule A). 
But, perhaps Kearns isn’t committed to the existence of Hey Judaity, and that Paul 
McCartney really did create “Hey Jude”.  If so, then I think Kearns is guilty of basing his HJ 
argument on a premise like ER (or MC).  Kearns erroneously believes that Paul McCartney is 
morally responsible for the fact that “Hey Jude” has the melody that it does because he reasons 
that “Hey Jude” has the melody that it does is a consequence of Paul McCartney’s having 
composed it (something that I am happy to agree that McCartney makes the case).  Thus, by ER 
(or MC), Paul McCartney is morally responsible for the fact that “Hey Jude” has the melody that 
it does.  But we saw that ER (and MC) is false.  So, I conclude that Kearns’s argument from HJ 
fails to show that Rule A* (and Rule A) is false. 
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IV.  Kearns’s Third Alleged Counterexample to Rule A: Torturing Babies 
 
 In this section, I’d like to consider another type of alleged counterexample to Rule A* 
(and Rule A), namely: 
Torturing Babies [TB]:  Karen decides to make eating cake immoral by making it the 
case that when someone eats cake, thousands of people are killed.  Moreover, Karen 
decides to make torturing babies for fun immoral.  She does so by making it the case that 
thousands of people are killed when someone tortures a baby for fun. (Ibid., p. 314 – 315) 
 
TB is a different type of counterexample to Rule A* (and Rule A) because it purports to show 
that a person can be partly directly morally responsible for a necessary truth, even when that 
necessary truth’s being true is overdetermined.  To be clear, Kearns thinks TB shows that Rule 
A* (and Rule A) is false because, though torturing babies is necessarily immoral—i.e. it’s 
necessarily true that torturing babies is wrong—Karen is at least partly directly morally 
responsible for the fact that torturing babies is wrong because she, at least in part, makes it the 
case that torturing babies is wrong.  Perhaps she overdetermines its being wrong to torture 
babies, but torturing babies is still at least partly wrong because of what Karen does (viz., 
insuring that thousands of people will die if someone tortures a baby).  So, Rule A* (and Rule A) 
is false because Karen is partly morally responsible for a necessary truth. 
But as with the foregoing alleged counterexamples, I think that TB fails to show that Rule 
A* (and Rule A) is false, as well.  And I think the fact that Karen’s actions overdetermine the 
wrongness of torturing babies helps make it clear why TB fails as a counterexample.  Now, 
before I say why I think that the fact that Karen’s actions overdetermine the wrongness of 
torturing babies helps make it clear why TB fails as a counterexample, it needs to be noted that 
Kearns thinks such overdetermination is not a problem for TB.  He thinks overdetermination 
isn’t a problem because he thinks Fischer and Ravizza’s Erosion* example shows that 
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overdetermination doesn’t rule out moral responsibility.  Recall, from chapters two and three, the 
following: 
Erosion:  Imagine that Betty [a soldier charged with destroying an enemy fortress] plants 
her explosives in the crevices of the glacier and detonates the charge at T1, causing an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at T3.  Unbeknownst to Betty and her 
commanding officers, however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and eroding. 
Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken 
free at T2, starting a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy camp at T3. 
 
Erosion*:  [The details are the same as Erosion except that, in this case,] the conditions 
of the glacier do actually cause the ice and rocks to break free, triggering an avalanche 
that arrives at the fortress precisely at the same time as the independent avalanche 
triggered freely by Betty.  Each avalanche is sufficient for the destruction of the enemy 
fortress.Kearns thinks that, in Erosion*, Betty is clearly morally responsible for the 
destruction of the enemy fortress.   
 
The conclusion of Erosion*, with which Kearns agrees, is that Betty is morally responsible for 
the fact that the enemy base is destroyed, and this is true even though that fact is 
overdeterminied.  Thus, Kearns thinks overdeterimination doesn’t rule out moral responsibility.   
But, as I argued in the previous chapter, this conclusion isn’t at all clear to me.  The 
destruction of the enemy fortress is overdetermined (that much is not up for debate); so, it’s 
being true that the enemy fortress is destroyed doesn’t depend on Betty; for, the fact that the 
enemy base is destroyed isn’t about Betty or what she does.  And I think in order for Betty to be 
morally responsible for some fact or other, it needs to be the case that that fact depends on her in 
the relevant way (i.e. that the fact in question is about Betty and what she does).  Thus, it seems 
to me that Betty isn’t morally responsible for the fact that the enemy base is destroyed.  And the 
same will be true for anyone with respect to an overdetermined fact.  
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Moreover, I think that what Betty plausibly is responsible for is the fact that Betty causes 
an avalanche that destroys the enemy base.63  And the same can be said, mutatis mutandis, for 
Karen and her overdetermining the immorality of torturing babies.  She’s not at all responsible 
for it’s being immoral to torture babies; for it’s being immoral to torture babies (which is ex 
hypothesi necessarily true) doesn’t depend in the relevant way on Karen and what she does.  That 
is, the fact that it’s immoral to torture babies doesn’t depend on Karen because it’s not about 
Karen in any relevant way.  Thus, it seems to me that she is not at all directly morally 
responsible for the fact that torturing babies is immoral.  What she plausibly is responsible for is 
her attempt, or, perhaps, her intention, to make torturing babies immoral.  But this latter bit is not 
a necessary truth, while the former is.  And since Karen is not at all morally responsible for the 
former—but is the latter—she is not at all morally responsible for a necessary truth.  I conclude 
that TB fails to show that Rule A* (and Rule A) is false. 
 But I don’t want to move too hastily here, so here I’ll provide the same argument I ran 
against Kearns’s argument from Murder!, and his argument from HJ.  In his argument from TB, 
Kearns seems to me to erroneously believe that Karen makes it the case that it’s wrong to torture 
babies because Kearns reasons that its being wrong to torture babies is a consequence of Karen’s 
insuring that thousands of people will die if a baby is tortured.  Thus, by MC, Karen makes it the 
case that it’s wrong to torture babies; and if she makes the case that it’s wrong to torture babies, 
then it’s plausible that she’s at least partly directly morally responsible for having done so.  But 
as we’ve seen, MC is false.  So, I conclude that Kearns’s argument from TB fails to show that 
Rule A* (and Rule A) is false. 
 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  63	  I’ll	  repeat,	  here,	  what	  I	  said	  in	  footnote	  48	  of	  chapter	  three:	  	  I	  think	  that	  it’s	  even	  more	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  what	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  directly	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  In	  any	  case,	  she’s	  not	  directly	  
responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  enemy	  base	  is	  destroyed.	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V.  Conclusions 
 
 In this chapter I have considered, and rejected, three alleged counterexamples to Rule A.  
More precisely, I have considered one alleged counterexample to Rule A in particular, namely, 
Murder!, and two alleged counterexamples to Rule A*, a revised version of Rule A.  I argued 
that all of these counterexamples fail, in the first place, because each case fails to show that the 
truth of the fact for which the agent is allegedly morally responsible depends on the agent in the 
relevant way.  After all, necessary truths are true regardless of whether or not the agent in 
question exists.  And if that’s true, then it cannot be the case that the truth of the fact in question 
depends on the agent.  Thus, I conclude that none of the agents in question are even in part 
directly morally responsible for the truth of the facts under consideration.   
 Moreover, I argued that it seems as if Kearns’s argument, in each case, relies on one or 
both of the fallacious inference rules, ER and MC.  I argued that in each alleged counterexample, 
Kearns attempts to show that someone is (or could be) directly morally responsible for a 
necessary truth because the relevant agent in each case makes it the case that some necessary 
truth or other is true by virtue of the fact that the agent makes it the case that some fact that 
implies the necessary fact is true.  But, this reasoning doesn’t follow.  For it’s perfectly possible, 
as my Butch Jones example shows, to make it the case that p, while p implies q, without, 
thereby, making it the case that q.  And if I’m right that Kearns’s alleged counterexamples rely 
on this reasoning, this is all the more reason to conclude that his counterexamples fail.  Thus, I 
conclude that his counterexamples fail.   
 So far as I know, Kearns is the only philosopher to have (in print) questioned the validity 
of Rule A.  I have argued that his attempts to question the Rule by counterexample fail.  Thus, I 
conclude that Rule A is safe; Rule A is valid.  Moreover, given the arguments of the foregoing 
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chapters, it seems that Rule B is safe, too; for, the most recent and prominent attempts to 
undermine the Rule fail.  If my arguments have been so far successful, it follows that both Rules 
A and B are on fairly sturdy footing.  This is good news for proponents of the Direct Argument 
since the Argument’s inference rules are its most controversial parts.   
 Even so, this is not the end of the story for the compatibilist’s fight against the Direct 
Argument.  There is a recent objection to the Direct Argument that grants the truth of the 
Argument’s inference rules.  Moreover, this objection grants that the Direct Argument is 
successful in showing that in deterministic worlds that have a remote past, there is no moral 
responsibility.  But this truth is consistent with its also being true that there are deterministic 
worlds that lack a remote past but are such that include moral responsibility.  Thus, if this 
objection is right, while it concedes that the Direct Argument works, it shows that the Direct 
Argument’s conclusion doesn’t demonstrate that incompatibilism is true.  This is because 
incompatibilism is supposed to be necessarily true, if true at all.  Thus, the so-called No Past 
Objection, if successful, undermines the strength of the Direct Argument.  So, since I think that 
the Direct Argument is a conclusive argument for the truth of incompatibilism, I take up the task 
of considering the No Past Objection in the next chapter.  It is to this task I now turn. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The No Past Objection and a Revised Direct Argument: The Direct Argument* 
 
 
 
 In the foregoing chapters, I dealt with alleged counterexamples to the inference rules 
upon which the Direct Argument rests.  As we’ve seen, none of these alleged counterexamples is 
successful; so, at least for now, it seems to me safe to conclude that both Rules A and B are 
valid.64  And since we’ve now concluded that both Rules A and B are valid, things look pretty 
good for the fate of the Direct Argument, and pretty bad for the fate of compatibilism.  For, if the 
Direct Argument is sound, then it’s supposed to be that incompatibilism about moral 
responsibility and causal determinism follows.  Unfortunately for the proponent of the Direct 
Argument, however, there is a recent objection whose conclusion is that the Direct Argument’s 
soundness is not sufficient for concluding that incompatibilism is true.  It’s exactly this problem I 
intend to deal with in the present chapter.   
To begin, Joseph Campbell (2007, 2008, 2010) has recently presented a novel objection 
to the Consequence Argument—an argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism 
from van Inwagen’s An Essay on Free Will—namely, what Andrew Bailey (2012) calls the No 
Past Objection.  Like the Direct Argument, the Consequence Argument begins with a premise 
that says that ‘determinism’ is a thesis about the fact that if you conjoin any complete statement 
about the facts at any one time in the past with the laws of nature, then this conjunction entails a 
unique future.  The upshot of the No Past Objection, however, is that a remote past—the sort of 
past to which the Consequence Argument (and, for that matter, the Direct Argument) refers—
isn’t a necessary condition of the ‘determinism’ thesis.  And since the premises of the 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  64	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I’ll	  make	  an	  outright	  case	  for	  this	  claim	  with	  respect	  to	  Rule	  B.	  	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  
counterexamples	  to	  Rule	  B	  are	  impossible,	  and	  demonstrably	  so.	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Consequence Argument aren’t necessary truths, the Consequence Argument fails to support 
incompatibilism about free will and determinism since incompatibilism, in this sense, if true, is 
necessarily true.  To be clear, the upshot of the No Past Objection is that if it is successful, at 
best, the Consequence Argument can establish only this: necessarily, no deterministic universe 
with a remote past contains free willed agents.  But that thesis leave open the following thesis:  
possibly, some deterministic universe that lacks a remote past contains free willed agents.  And if 
this last thesis is true, then compatibilism is true.  So, even if the Consequence Argument is 
sound, it does not rule out compatibilism, and so is not a valid argument for incompatibilism 
about free will and determinism. 
Now, I’m not concerned with the Consequence Argument; I’m concerned with the Direct 
Argument.  But a critic could argue that the No Past Objection is also an objection to the Direct 
Argument.  Moreover, it’s an objection that grants the validity of Rules A and B and so it’s an 
objection that avoids the arguments in the foregoing chapters, i.e., the arguments that purport to 
show that neither Rule A nor Rule B have been defeated by counterexample.  With this in mind, 
a full defense of the Direct Argument would need to address the No Past Objection.  In this 
chapter, then, I’d like to suggest how I think proponents of the Direct Argument should respond 
to the No Past Objection.  Now, it seems to me that the No Past Objection does undermine the 
Direct Argument, at least as it’s currently stated.65  But even so, it doesn’t undermine the Direct 
Argument*, the novel version of the Direct Argument I develop which avoids the No Past 
Objection and is consistent with what’s been argued thus far.   
 
 
 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  65	  For	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  the	  No	  Past	  Objection	  fails	  to	  undermine	  the	  Consequence	  Argument	  (or,	  rather,	  a	  
suitably	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  Consequence	  Argument),	  other	  than	  the	  reasons	  I’ll	  offer	  here	  for	  the	  Direct	  
Argument	  (which	  can	  be	  made	  to	  support	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  Consequence	  Argument),	  see	  Alicia	  Finch	  (2013).	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II.  The No Past Objection 
 
 To see why Campbell thinks that the No Past Objection undermines the Consequence 
Argument, consider: 
Consequence Argument [CA]:  If determinism is true, then our acts are the 
consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past.  But it is not up to us 
what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are.  
Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. 
(van Inwagen, 1983, p. 16) 
 
Campbell thinks the Consequence Argument fails because the No Past Objection is successful.  
Here, then, is how Bailey presents the No Past Objection: 
The premises of the Consequence Argument are not necessary truths because there 
needn’t be a past.  The Consequence Argument thus does not support incompatibilism, a 
thesis that is necessarily true if true. (Bailey, 2012, p. 352) 
 
Why think the premises of the Consequence Argument are contingent truths (if they’re true at 
all)?  Because there needn’t be a remote past.  Why needn’t there be a remote past?  Consider the 
following scenario cooked up by Campbell: 
AW:  Consider, for instance, the possible world W.  Suppose that W is a determined 
world such that some adult person exists at every instant.  Thus, W has no remote past.  
At its first moment of existence lived Adam, an adult person with all the knowledge, 
powers, and abilities necessary for moral responsibility.  Shortly after Adam comes Eve, 
and the rest is history. (Campbell, 2007, p. 109) 
 
The upshot of AW is that it’s false that Adam isn’t free with respect to the remote past; for there 
is no remote past for Adam; Adam exists at W’s very first instance.  Moreover, other cases 
successfully show that the determinism thesis needn’t include any notion of a remote past.  
Consider: 
OAW:  Suppose that there is a deterministic world, W*, where time is circular. In that 
world exists oscillating Adam.  Oscillating Adam has always existed and will always 
continue to exist.  He is in the grips of an everlasting, eternal recurrence.  Oscillating 
Adam spends his time growing ‘older’ and getting ‘younger’.  He begins each cycle with 
powers comparable with the average 25 years old and eventually develops powers 
comparable with the average 50 years old. Then he slowly regresses back to the state at 
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which he began, and the cycle starts all over again. (Campbell, 2010, pp. 72 – 73) 
 
And: 
 
IAW:  There is a deterministic world, W**, where time has no beginning and no end.  In 
that world exists Infinite Adam, who exists at every time in W**.  He neither comes into 
existence nor goes out of existence.  Suppose further that at every time he exists, he has 
powers comparable with the average 35-year-old. (Finch, 2013, p. 160) 
 
Of course OAW, and IAW, have a similar upshot to the one that AW has: it’s false that Adam66 
isn’t free with respect to the remote past; for, there is no remote past; Adam exists at every time, 
t, in W* and W**.   
So, since CA depends on a transfer principle about the lack of power over the past to the 
lack of power over the present, CA fails if the No Past Objection is successful.  Since Campbell 
thinks the No Past Objection is successful—because, as AW, OAW, and IAW show, 
‘determinism’ as a thesis doesn’t require a remote past; it merely requires a set of natural laws 
that, once instantiated, entail a unique future—he concludes that the Consequence Argument 
fails.   
But we can extend this criticism to the Direct Argument.  Consider: 
Direct Argument:  If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws 
of nature and events in the remote past.  But we are not responsible for what went on 
before we were born, and neither are we responsible for what the laws of nature are.  
Therefore, we are not responsible for the consequences of these things (including our 
present acts). 
 
Since the Direct Argument depends on a transfer principle about non-responsibility for the past 
to non-responsibility for the present, the Direct Argument fails to show that incompatibilism is 
true if the No Past Objection is successful.  Since Campbell thinks the No Past Objection is 
successful—because, as AW, OAW, and IAW show, ‘determinism’ as a thesis doesn’t require a 
remote past—he should conclude that the Direct Argument fails.	 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  66	  Unless	  otherwise	  indicated,	  the	  name	  ‘Adam’	  will	  be	  used	  to	  denote	  any	  one	  of	  the	  ‘Adams’	  from	  AW,	  OAW,	  
or	  IAW	  (so,	  Adam,	  Oscillating	  Adam,	  or	  Infinite	  Adam).	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This is an interesting criticism as applied to the Direct Argument.  And, as I explained, 
it’s a criticism that grants the validity of both Rules A and B and, so, it’s a criticism that 
sidesteps my defenses of both Rules.  But, even if the No Past Objection successfully 
undermines the Direct Argument, it doesn’t successfully undermine a very similar argument to 
the Direct Argument, an argument I call the Direct Argument*.  To see why not—and before I 
introduce the Direct Argument*—consider some preliminary points.  The upshot of any one of 
AW, OAW, or IAW is that there are possible worlds without a remote past.  It’s possible, after 
all, for Adam to exist at every temporal moment of W’s (or W*’s, or W**’s) existence up until 
his death (or whatever); so, it’s possible that Adam lack a temporal remote past and, thus, it’s 
possible for the Direct Argument to fail to apply to him even though he lives in a deterministic 
world (that is, a world that includes a set of natural laws that, once instantiated, entail a unique 
future).   
I think that cases like AW, OAW, and IAW undermine the Direct Argument as it is 
currently stated.  In the next section, I will introduce a revised version of the Direct Argument—
what I call the Direct Argument*—that successfully avoids cases like AW, OAW, and IAW 
while holding fast to the original Argument’s inference rules, as well as what I take to be the 
metaphysical spirit of the Direct Argument, viz., that if something besides us determines our 
actions, then we are not directly morally responsible for those actions.   
 
III.  The Direct Argument* 
 
Here is the setup for the Direct Argument*.  According to AW, OAW, and IAW, it’s 
possible for a contingently existing thing to lack a remote past.  In particular, Adam doesn’t have 
a remote past and he’s a contingently existing thing.  Let’s grant this.  But even if we grant that 
it’s possible for contingently existing things to lack a remote past, I think we should conclude 
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that, necessarily, all contingently existing things have a remote past*.  Now, what is a remote 
past*?  A remote past* is just the idea that for any thing, x, if some other thing, y, comes in any 
sense before x’s existence (or instantiation, or obtaining) and x has no influence as to whether 
y—that is, if y is prior to x’s existence (or instantiation, or obtaining) in any sense (e.g. 
temporally prior, causally prior, logically prior, etc.), and y is beyond x’s influence—then y is 
remotely past* to x.  I think that, for any contingently existing thing, x, x’s existence is caused; 
thus, x’s existence has a cause.  And if y is the cause of x’s existence, then, since y is at least 
causally prior to x, it follows that any contingently existing thing, x, has a remote past*.  More to 
the point, here is my argument that Adam, qua contingently existing thing, has a remote past*.  
Consider: 
D1.  Whatever contingently exists has a cause.  (Premise) 
 
D2.  Adam is a contingently existing thing.  (Premise) 
 
F1.  So, Adam’s existence has a cause.  (D1 – D2) 
 
D3.  If a thing y comes, in some sense (e.g. ‘causally’, ‘logically’, ‘temporally’, etc.), 
before another thing x’s existence, and x has no influence as to whether y, then y is 
remotely past* to x.  (Premise) 
 
D4. Whatever causes Adam to exist comes, in some sense (e.g. ‘causally’, ‘logically’, 
‘temporally’, etc.), before Adam’s existence, and Adam has no influence as to whether 
something causes his existence. (Premise) 
 
F2.  So, whatever causes Adam to exist is remotely past* to Adam.  (D3 – D4) 
 
Thus, because Adam is a contingently existing thing at all worlds in which he exists, necessarily, 
Adam has a remote past*.   
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But this is true about more than just Adam.  It’s also true about the laws of nature (L).  
It’s also true about L because, even though L exists necessarily (we may assume67), L is only 
contingently true;68 that is, there are possible worlds in which L fails to be true.  So: L is 
contingently true.  If so, then consider the following argument: 
D1*.  Whatever is contingently true has a cause.  (Premise) 
 
D2*.  L is contingently true.  (Premise) 
 
F1*.  So, L’s being true has a cause.  (D1* – D2*) 
 
D3*.  If a thing y comes, in some sense (e.g. ‘causally’, ‘logically’, ‘temporally’, etc.), 
before another thing x’s being true, and x has no influence as to whether y, then y is 
remotely past* to x.  (Premise) 
 
D4*.  Whatever causes L to be true comes, in some sense (e.g. ‘causally’, ‘logically’, 
‘temporally’, etc.), before L’s being true and L has no influence as to whether something 
causes it to be true that L. (Premise) 
 
F2*.  So, whatever causes L to be true is remotely past* to L.  (D3 – D4*) 
 
So, because L is contingently true at all worlds in which L is true, necessarily L has a remote 
past*.  But the thesis, ‘determinism’, includes L; so, necessarily, ‘determinism’ includes a remote 
past*.  So, necessarily, if determinism is true, then there’s a remote past* and some laws of 
nature.  What’s more, any possible world where determinism is true is a world that has a remote 
past*.  So, I conclude that ‘determinism’ is a thesis about the conjunction of the remote past* and 
the laws of nature, and the fact that that conjunction entails any future true fact whatever.  Thus, 
I conclude that the Direct Argument should be, and, I think, intends to be, an argument that 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  67	  I	  think	  we	  should	  assume	  this	  because,	  following	  van	  Inwagen	  (1983,	  pp.	  60-­‐61),	  I	  think	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  
nature	  are	  propositions;	  and	  I	  think	  that	  propositions	  exist	  necessarily.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  these	  
propositions	  obtain	  or	  are	  instantiated	  necessarily,	  as	  I	  suggest	  in	  the	  text.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  68	  I	  take	  it	  that	  this	  is	  the	  majority	  view;	  however,	  it’s	  not	  without	  its	  detractors.	  	  For	  example,	  Brian	  Ellis	  (2001),	  
and	  Ellis	  with	  Caroline	  Lierse	  (1994)	  think	  that	  certain	  laws	  of	  nature	  are	  necessarily	  true.	  	  I	  ignore	  this	  discussion,	  
here,	  but	  note	  that	  there	  is	  a	  debate	  about	  this	  in	  the	  literature.	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purports to show that non-responsibility for the remote past* and the laws of nature implies non-
responsibility for the present. 
 Before I formally present the Direct Argument*, I wish to consider a possible objection 
that might crop up regarding this notion of a ‘remote past*’.  Specifically, the imagined objection 
targets premises D3 and D3* from the foregoing arguments.  Here’s how I imagine such an 
objection might go: 
D3 and D3* are non-sensical.  ‘Past’ is a temporally loaded word.  To be sure, there is 
such a thing as priority; there are, as you suggest, notions such as causal priority, logical 
priority, and the like.  But when you add on the word ‘remote’ to ‘remote past*’ and 
claim that you’re simply using ‘past*’ as a substitute for ‘prior’, your case beings to 
crumble.  For a ‘remote past’ is clearly temporal.  Is this not the case for a ‘remote 
past*’?  How can, for example, something that is logically prior to another thing be at all 
‘remote’ with respect to it?  And the same sort of question applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
the notion of causal priority.  Thus, no sense can be made of a remote past*—no non-
temporal sense, anyway.  So, D3 and D3* are non-sensical. 
 
I concede that I feel the force of an objection like this, but I think that, ultimately, it’s mistaken; 
and for two reasons.  To begin to see the first reason, recall that ‘P’ in the formal version of the 
Direct Argument denotes a ‘remote past’—the very thing that the No Past Objection calls into 
question.  Now, what is a ‘remote past’, exactly?  As the above imagined objection has it, a 
remote past is clearly temporal, not simply because ‘past’ is clearly temporal, but because 
‘remote’ as a qualifier is also temporally loaded.  But I’m not convinced that the imagined 
objector has this right. 
‘P’ in van Inwagen’s original version was labeled as P0 to “denote a proposition that 
expresses the state of the world at T0” (van Inwagen, 1983, p. 70), that is, before any human 
agent was alive.  Thus, ‘the remote past’ is an idea that captures a proposition about the state of 
the world at any time before there were human agents.  Now, what makes the proposition about 
the past as denoted by ‘P0’ remote?  Is it the time of the proposition in question?  Or is it the fact 
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that the proposition is unable to be influenced by any human agents?  I think it must be this latter 
suggestion that makes the remote past ‘remote’; thus, the reason D3 and D3* include clauses 
about x having influence as to whether y.    
If I’m right about this, then this is consistent with there being such a thing as a remote 
past*; that is, this is consistent with its being the case that a remote past* makes sense.  For, 
whatever is logically, causally, etc., prior to Adam’s existence in AW, OAW, or IAW is such 
that it is not something that Adam can influence.  And this is the point of ‘remoteness’ in the idea 
of a ‘remote past’.  So, since whatever causes Adam to exist is not something that Adam can 
influence (for, Adam doesn’t exist yet), whatever causes Adam to exist is remote, in this sense, 
to Adam.  And the same is true with respect to L and what causes L to be true. 
But in case what I’ve just said isn’t all that clear, here’s a second, more straightforward, 
response to the imagined objector.  ‘Remote past*’ is a technical term, a term of art that I 
developed.  And what this term refers to is any thing, y, that comes prior (in any sense) to 
another thing x, such that x has no way of impacting, or influencing y in any way.  And surely 
this is the case for any thing y that causes another thing, x’s, existence, or its being true (as in the 
case of L).  For, how could x, before its having existed (or its having been true), impact or 
influence y in any way?  It couldn’t; and, this is true about the relationship between x and y 
regardless of whether or not there is any temporal gap between them.  Thus, I conclude that a 
good deal of sense can be made of the notion ‘remote past*’.  The idea of a ‘remote past*’ 
captures the notion of both temporal and non-temporal senses of the term ‘prior’ while 
specifically denoting prior conditions that are specifically beyond the influence of any human 
agents.   
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It seems to me, then, that this sort of objection really highlights the point of the Direct 
Argument in the first place—and why I have revised the Direct Argument* as I have, below.  
The point of the Direct Argument (and Direct Argument*), I think, is something like this.  
Human agents are contingent beings that not only need not be here, they are—to borrow a phrase 
from Martin Heidegger—thrown into the world.  We do not (indeed, cannot) bring ourselves into 
the world.  Something else brings us into the world, and this something comes, in some sense, 
before us and is such that we have no influence over it.  Now, if we’re thrown into a 
deterministic world, and the something that comes, in some sense, before us is such that it 
determines our every step, then this is incompatible with our being responsible for those very 
steps.  For, we’re not responsible for what comes, in any sense, before us that is beyond our 
influence; and if we’re not responsible for what comes, in any sense, before us that is beyond our 
influence, and what comes before us, in whatever sense, is such that it is beyond our influence 
and determines our every step, then we’re not responsible for the every step that what comes 
before us, in that sense, determines.  Thus, moral responsibility cannot exist in a deterministic 
world.   
I conclude, then, that the imagined objection fails to undermine premise D3 (and D3*) of 
the argument that Adam has a remote past* (and that L has a remote past*).  If we’re willing to 
grant that D1 (or its variant) is true, and we’re willing to grant that whatever causes (or brings 
about) Adam’s existence (or L’s being true) is beyond Adam’s influence (because Adam isn’t 
around to influence it), then I think we should conclude that whatever goes on prior to Adam’s 
existence (or L’s being true) is remotely past* to Adam (or L).  Thus, whatever causes (or brings 
about) Adam’s existence (or L’s being true) is remotely past* to Adam (or L).  Therefore, D3 
(and D3*) is safe. 
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 Here, then, is the Direct Argument*69: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and the 
remote past*.  But we are not responsible for what is remotely past* to us, and neither are 
we responsible for what the laws of nature are.  Therefore, we are not responsible for the 
consequences of these things (including our present acts). 
 
More formally (where ‘P*’ stands for ‘the remote past*’): 
 
(1) 	 ☐	 (P* & L	 ⊃ p) By definition of ‘determinism’ 	 
	 	 
	 (2) 	 ☐	 (P*	 ⊃ (L	 ⊃	 p)) 1, exportation	 
	 
	 (3)  NR (P*	 ⊃ (L	 ⊃	 p)) 2, Rule A	 
	 
	 (4)  NR P*        NR for what is remotely past* to one 
 
 (5)  NR (L	 ⊃ p)  3, 4, Rule B	 
	 
	 (6)  NR L   NR for the laws of nature 
 
 (7) NRp   5, 6, Rule B. 
 
The No Past Objection fails to undermine the Direct Argument*.  The No Past Objection fails to 
undermine the Direct Argument* because the No Past Objection only addresses temporal senses 
of the word ‘prior’, the sense being invoked in the term ‘remote past’.  Moreover, an important 
upshot of the Direct Argument* is that—as far as I can see—there are no possible No Past* 
Objections that can be raised against it.  This is because necessarily, if determinism is true, then 
there is a remote past* and some laws of nature.  But we aren’t responsible for what is remotely 
past* to us, and neither are we responsible for what the laws of nature are.  So, we aren’t 
responsible for the consequences of these things either.  And this is just what the Direct 
Argument* says.   
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  69	  For	  what	  it’s	  worth,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  there	  is	  a	  Consequence	  Argument*	  that,	  I	  believe,	  also	  gets	  around	  the	  
No	  Past	  Objection.	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 I think that the Direct Argument* is just what the Direct Argument means to argue in the 
first place.  But even if it isn’t, I think it’s a successful version of the same sort of argument.  So, 
I conclude that the Direct Argument* successfully shows that determinism and moral 
responsibility are incompatible. 
 
IV.  Objections, Round 1:  A Potential Counterexample to (1) of the Direct Argument* 
Premise 1 of the Direct Argument* goes like this: 
(1) ☐	 (P* & L	 ⊃ p). 
Here, then, is an objection to (1): 
In the original Direct Argument, the thesis ‘determinism’ says that given a complete 
description of the state of the universe at any given time plus the laws of nature logically 
entails a complete description of the state of the universe at any other time.  But with 
your substitution of ‘remote past’ with ‘remote past*’ you seem to be assuming that any 
deterministic universe must be such that its “ultimate causes” or “first causes” plus the 
laws of nature entail every truth about (for example) our behavior.  But consider the 
following.  Suppose that God is the ultimate first cause of the universe, and that he’s free 
to create a wide range of “first moments” (there are numerous ways the Big Bang could 
happen, and God is free to actualize any of them).  Suppose, further, that God creates a 
universe with a deterministic set of natural laws, L.  In this deterministic world, (1) of the 
Direct Argument* is false: the remote past*, viz. God’s existence, plus the deterministic 
laws, L, doesn’t entail every other truth.  God was, after all, free with respect to what the 
“first moment” was like; had he freely actualized a different Big Bang, some actually true 
proposition might have been false.  Thus, at most what the Direct Argument* gets you is 
the conclusion that in deterministic universes that are such that the “first causes” plus the 
laws jointly entail every other truth, no one is responsible for anything they do.70 
 
This is an interesting objection to (1), but I think that it ultimately fails to provide a successful 
counterexample, and for two reasons.  Here is the first: the objection seems to assume that there 
are deterministic universes without “first causes”.  This seems to me to be an objection to both  
D1.  Whatever contingently exists has a cause, and 
 
D1*.  Whatever is contingently true has a cause. 
 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  70	  I	  owe	  this	  objection	  to	  E.	  J.	  Coffman.	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But, I think that D1 and D1* are fairly unassailable.71  That is, I think that there are no possible 
deterministic universes that lack a “first cause”, that is, something that is remotely past* to it that 
brings about its existence.  So, e.g., if L is true, then it’s true because something remotely past* 
to it caused it to be true.  Moreover, if Adam exists, then he exists because something remotely 
past* to him caused him to exist.  Thus, if this objection is assuming that there are possible 
deterministic universes without “first causes”, then the counterexample fails.  It fails because 
F2* (whatever causes L to be true is remotely past* to L) is true, and D1* (and D1) is true. 
Here is the second reason this counterexample fails.  There are no universes where L is 
true, but are such that there’s nothing remotely past* to L that, when conjoined with L, doesn’t 
entails every other truth.  To be sure, God’s mere existence is remotely past* to L.  And, if God 
exists and created the universe, it was possible—assuming, as we are, that God was free to 
choose to do otherwise—that God could have actualized a different world than the one he in fact 
did.  But, again, L necessarily has a particular remote past*, viz., whatever it is that caused L to 
be true.  (Suppose that God caused L to be true.  Is it God’s mere existence that caused L to be 
true?  No.  Or, anyway, it better not be the case that God’s mere existence caused L to be true 
since we’re assuming that God was free to create (or refrain from creating).)  Moreover, God’s 
mere existence conjoined with the laws, L, doesn’t suffice for the existence of a deterministic 
universe; rather, it must be that God’s existence, plus L, plus God’s willing a particular way, 
suffices for the existence of a deterministic universe.   
Think about it like this.  God is free to create either universe A or universe B, both having 
deterministic laws, but each having a different Big Bang.  Whether or not A or B is the universe 
that exists depends on more than God’s mere existence and his causing L to be true; it depends 
on God’s decision to create A or B.  But God’s decision to create A (or B) plus L entails every 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  71	  Sort	  of.	  	  See	  the	  next	  section	  for	  more	  on	  this.	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further true fact about A or B.  Thus, there are no possible deterministic universes that include a 
remote past* and L, but don’t entail every further true fact.  Thus, (1) is true, and the imagined 
objection fails to provide a successful counterexample to the Direct Argument*. 
 
V.  Objections, Round 2: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit?  
 My revised version of the Direct Argument, the Direct Argument*, depends on its being 
true that there is such a thing as a remote past*, or that it makes sense to talk of a remote past*.  
The way I tried to show that there is such a thing—and that such a thing makes sense—was by 
giving the argument D1 – F2 (and D1* – F2*).  But I can imagine objections to two of the 
argument’s premises, viz., D1 and D3 (and D1* and D3*).  D2 and D4 (and D2* and D4*) I take 
to be uncontroversial, and F1 and F2 (and F1* and F2*) follow deductively from the truth of the 
premises.  So if there’s a flaw in the ointment (to borrow a phrase from Alvin Plantinga72), it’ll 
be with respect to either D1 or D3 (or D1* or D3*).  Thus, in this section and the next, I wish to 
defend D1 and D3  (and D1* and D3*) from some potentially troubling objections.  If I’m 
successful in so doing, I think that will give us good reason to think that there is such a thing as a 
remote past* (and that Adam and L have it).  I’ll start with an objection to D1 (and D1*).    
Recall that the first premise of the argument that Adam has a remote past* says: 
 D1.  Whatever contingently exists has a cause. 
The undergirding thought behind D1 is what I take to be a truism, the idea that ex nihilo nihil 
fit.73  That is, from nothing, nothing comes.  It seems to me that if this is true—and I don’t see 
how it could be false—whatever contingently exists comes from some thing that is not itself.  
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  72	  From,	  e.g.,	  his	  (1974b,	  p.	  106).	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  73	  What	  I	  say	  about	  D1	  applies,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  to	  D1*	  as	  well.	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Call whatever this something is, ‘x’.  And whatever this something, x, is, it can be said to be the 
cause of the thing that only contingently exists.   
 But I can imagine non-causalists about agency, such as Carl Ginet, arguing that the 
undergirding thought behind D1—that ex nihilo nihil fit—is false; so D1 (and its variants) is 
false.  For, they think that agents bring about events (that is, they instantiate events, or make 
events obtain) without causing them when they perform actions freely.  And since agent-
involving events are only contingently instantiated, they are contingently instantiated things that 
are uncaused.  They are things that come from—are caused by—nothing.  Thus, D1 (and its 
variants) is false. 
To be clear about how this line of reasoning works, consider one way in which Ginet 
describes a free action’s being up to an agent at a time (though the action is uncaused): 
What is it for it to have been up to me…whether that event would occur?  More 
specifically, what is it for it to have been up to me at a certain time whether that event 
would occur?...It was up to me at time T whether that even would occur only if I made it 
the case that it occurred and it was open to me at T to keep it from occurring; and it 
cannot have been up to me at T to keep it from occurring if whether it occurred depended 
entirely on facts in place by T; that is, it was up to me at T whether it would occur only if 
whether it would occur did not depend entirely on facts already in being at T. (Ginet, 
2007, p. 245. Italics in the original) 
 
So, if asked “what caused the event of the agent’s doing such and so?”, the response from the 
non-causalists would be something like “nothing caused the event of the agent’s doing such and 
so, if the agent’s doing such and so is freely done,” (or, maybe, “nothing caused the event of the 
agent’s doing such and so…”) even though an agent brought it about that the event obtained, or 
made the event happen.  If the non-causalists are right about this, then there’s at least a prima 
facie reason to reject D1.  For, the event of the agent’s doing such and so is a contingently 
instantiated thing; yet, it comes from—is caused by—nothing.  Thus, if the non-causalists are 
right, then D1 is false. 
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 What is ironic, and not a little troubling, about an objection like this, is that Ginet is the 
father of original Consequence Argument, the argument that says that determinism is 
incompatible with free will!74  What’s important about this is that, if Ginet cannot endorse D1 – 
F2, then he cannot endorse the Direct Argument*.  But since D1 – F2 is an argument purporting 
to show that Adam has a remote past*, it’s an argument that, if successful, saves not only the 
Direct Argument* from the No Past Objection, it also saves the Consequence Argument* from 
the No Past Objection.75  Thus, if Ginet cannot endorse D1 – F2, he cannot endorse the 
Consequence Argument*, a revision of the Consequence Argument that replaces ‘remote past’ in 
the definition of ‘determinism’ with ‘remote past*’.   
 Be that as it may, there are two ways in which I’d like to respond to this sort of objection 
to D1.  The first is as follows.  We should reject non-causalism.  For, if non-causalism is true, 
then D1 is false; but, D1 looks extremely plausible; so, non-causalism seems implausible.  And if 
we have a choice between accepting something plausible versus accepting something 
implausible, I think we should (generally speaking) accept the thing that seems plausible instead 
of the implausible thing where those two things are in conflict.  Thus, we should reject non-
causalism.   
 The second way is this.  Note that non-causal views do not necessarily suggest that the 
truism, ex nihilo nihil fit, is false.  While the non-causalist is happy to grant that contingent 
things can be brought about without having been caused (and so, nothing caused them to be 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  74	  See,	  for	  example,	  his	  (1966).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  75	  What	  is	  the	  Consequence	  Argument*?	  	  It’s	  the	  revised	  version	  of	  the	  Consequence	  Argument	  that	  doesn’t	  
succumb	  to	  the	  No	  Past	  Objection.	  	  Here	  it	  is,	  informally:	  
	  
If	  determinism	  is	  true,	  then	  our	  acts	  are	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  events	  in	  the	  remote	  
past*.	  	  But	  it	  is	  not	  up	  to	  us	  what	  is	  remotely	  past*	  to	  us,	  and	  neither	  is	  it	  up	  to	  us	  what	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  
are.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  things	  (including	  our	  present	  acts)	  are	  not	  up	  to	  us.	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brought about), they do not have to commit themselves to the idea that something can come from 
nothing.  This is because the Ginet-type non-causalist will think that uncaused actions did come 
from something, namely, an agent.76  Thus, the non-causalist can agree with the undergirding 
intuition behind a premise like D1.  Because this is so, I think that D1 can be modified in such a 
way that it’s consistent with non-causal views of agency while saving the conclusion that for any 
contingently instantiated thing, that thing has a remote past*.   
To see how properly to modify D1 in light of the envisaged objection, consider another 
way in which Ginet describes an agent’s bringing it about that she acts a certain way. 
For it seems evident to me that, given that an action was uncaused, all its agent had to do 
to make it the case that she performed that action was to perform it.  If my deciding to 
vote for the motion, for example, was uncaused, then it follows that nothing other than 
me made it the case that I decided to vote for the motion, and it also follows that I made it 
the case that I so decided: I did so simply by so deciding.  If my raising my hand was 
uncaused (that is, nothing other than me determined or made it the case that I raised my 
hand), then I made it the case that I raised my hand simply by raising my hand. (Ibid., p. 
247. My italics.) 
 
So, the idea is that there are some contingently occurring things (namely, actions), that can be 
‘brought about’ or ‘made the case’ by an agent, without having, thereby, been caused by the 
agent.  So, if Ginet (or any other non-causalist) is right, then I think we can modify D1 as follows 
(even if it reads a bit clunky): 
D1**.  Whatever contingently exists is either caused, or brought about (or made the 
case). 
 
Such a revision would make F1 read as follows: 
 
 F1**.  So, Adam’s existence is either caused, or brought about (or made the case),  
 
and F1* read as follows: 
 
 F1***.  So, L’s being true is either caused, or brought about (or made the case). 
 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  76	  Moreover,	  Ginet	  maintains	  that	  uncaused	  actions	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  agent’s	  having	  reasons	  for	  
performing	  said	  actions.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  the	  discussion	  on	  pages	  251	  –	  252	  of	  his	  (2007).	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This would, of course, change D4 thusly: 
 
D4**. Whatever either causes, or brings about (or makes the case) Adam’s existence 
comes, in some sense (e.g. ‘causally’, ‘logically’, ‘temporally’, etc.), before Adam’s 
existence, and Adam has no influence as to whether something either causes, or brings 
about (or makes the case) his existence. 
 
And D4** thusly: 
 
D4***. Whatever either causes, or brings it about (or makes it the case) that L is true 
comes, in some sense (e.g. ‘causally’, ‘logically’, ‘temporally’, etc.), before L’s being 
true and L has no influence as to whether something either causes, or brings it about (or 
makes it the case) that L is true. 
 
F2**.  So, whatever either causes, or brings it about (or makes it the case) that Adam 
exists is remotely past* to Adam, 
 
and F2*: 
 
F2***.  So, whatever either causes, or brings it about (or makes it the case) that L is true 
is remotely past* to L. 
 
 Even so, I think, as we can see in F2** and F2***, such revisions are consistent with the 
conclusion that for any thing, x, if x contingently exists (or, if x is contingently true), then x has a 
remote past*.  And if that’s right, then non-causalists can endorse the Direct Argument* simply 
by making the necessary modifications to the argument D1 – F2 (and D1* – F2*).  Thus, the 
non-causal worries about D1 do not at all undermine the Direct Argument*.    
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
 Having defended the Direct Argument’s inference rules—Rule A and Rule B—from 
alleged counterexamples, the remaining task for a full defense of the Direct Argument was to 
deal with the No Past Objection.  Thus, the point of this chapter was to defend the Direct 
Argument from said objection.  As I argued, however, the No Past Objection seems successful 
against the Direct Argument as it is originally stated; for, the Direct Argument relies on a 
transfer principle about non-responsibility for the remote past to non-responsibility for the 
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present.  So, my defense of the Direct Argument in this chapter resulted in my having given a 
revised version of the Direct Argument, the Direct Argument*. 
 As I’ve shown, the Direct Argument* is the same sort of argument as the Direct 
Argument; the one crucial difference is that instead of relying on a transfer principle about non-
responsibility for the remote past to non-responsibility for the present, the Direct Argument* 
relies on a principle about non-responsibility for the remote past* to non-responsibility for the 
present.  One important advantage of the Direct Argument*’s relying on such a principle, I 
claimed, is that there are no possible No Past* Objections.  I claimed this because, as I’ve shown, 
necessarily, for any contingently existing thing, x, x has a remote past*.  And there are no 
possible deterministic worlds where this is not true.  
This claim, you’ll recall rested (essentially) on two controversial premises.   
 
D1.  Whatever contingently exists has a cause, and 
 
D3.  If a thing y comes, in some sense (e.g. ‘causally’, ‘logically’, ‘temporally’, etc.), 
before another thing x’s existence, and x has no influence as to whether y, then y is 
remotely past* to x. 
 
The envisaged objection to D1 was from a non-causalist perspective about human agency.  That 
is, said objection has in mind the ideas of philosophers like Carl Ginet who think that agents 
perform free actions without having caused them.  So, since free actions are contingently 
instantiated things, if it’s true that agents perform free actions without having caused them—and 
nothing else causes their instantiation—then it follows that free actions are uncaused.  And if so, 
then free actions are a counterexample to D1. 
 I argued, however, that this need not worry the proponent of the Direct Argument*.  For, 
there are two plausible ways to respond to such an objection.  First, since D1 is extremely 
plausible, its denial is implausible.  Thus, since non-causalism leads to the denial of D1—
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something that is implausible—we have good reason to reject non-causalism.  Second, there 
isn’t, after all, a need to reject non-causalism77 simply to save D1.  D1, I argued, can be modified 
to account for non-causal theories of agency.  All D1’s defender would need to do (and as I’ve 
done in D1**) is make D1 an either/or claim.  That is, she’ll need to adjust D1 to read that 
whatever is contingently instantiated is either caused or brought about (or made the case).  This 
is perfectly consistent with the non-causal theory of agency.78  
 The envisaged objection to D3 had to do with the concept of a ‘remote past*’ and 
whether or not such a concept makes any sense.  The objection, you’ll recall, argued that the 
concept ‘remote past*’ is temporally loaded, and thus of no use to the Direct Argument*’s 
defender.  But I argued that this objection is mistaken.  For one thing, the ‘remoteness’ to the 
idea of a ‘remote past’ in the Direct Argument hasn’t anything to do with temporality at all; 
rather, it has to do with the fact that whatever is remote to a person is beyond that person’s 
ability to impact it, or influence it.  This same notion of ‘remoteness’ is captured in the concept 
‘remote past*’.  Moreover, it’s false that ‘past*’ is temporally loaded.  For, ‘past*’ captures the 
idea of priority, non-temporal senses of priority (especially) included.  And since whatever it is 
that causes it to be the case that (or brings it about that, or makes it the case that) some thing, x, 
is instantiated is, itself, prior, or before (in some sense) x, then that thing is past* to x—indeed, 
remotely so.  Thus, I concluded that the concept of a ‘remote past*’ does make sense, and so D3 
is unscathed by the imagined objection.  
 Finally, there was the objection to (1) of the Direct Argument*, the objection claiming 
that there are possible deterministic universes that are such that the remote past* plus the laws of 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  77	  At	  any	  rate,	  there	  isn’t	  a	  need	  to	  reject	  non-­‐causalism	  in	  order	  to	  save	  D1.	  	  There	  might,	  however,	  be	  other	  
reasons	  to	  reject	  non-­‐causalism.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  78	  And,	  of	  course,	  as	  I’ve	  done	  in	  §V,	  the	  remaining	  premises	  of	  the	  argument	  would	  need	  to	  reflect	  said	  changes	  
to	  D1.	  	  But	  these	  changes	  don’t	  do	  any	  violence	  to	  the	  argument,	  itself.	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nature do not entail every further true fact about that universe.  But I argued that this objection 
fails because the counterexample rests on two mistakes.  First, there are no deterministic 
universes where L is true but lack “first causes”.  And, second, there are no deterministic 
universes where L is true but whose remote past*, when conjoined with L, fails to entail every 
further true fact about that universe.   
 This concludes my defense of the Direct Argument.  Or, more strictly, this concludes my 
defense of the Direct Argument*.  As I’ve argued, the Direct Argument*’s inference rules are 
safe (at least so far) from counterexample.  And, moreover, the Direct Argument* is impervious 
to the No Past Objection.  And since there seem to be no other reasons to reject the Direct 
Argument*, I conclude that the Direct Argument* is sound.  But since the Direct Argument*’s 
conclusion entails incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism, I conclude that 
since the Direct Argument* is sound, incompatibilism is true.  Thus, incompatibilism about 
moral responsibility and determinism is true. 
 Such conclusion is important.  For one thing, it solves a centuries old philosophical 
puzzle.  For: if I’m right, we can know that incompatibilism is true.  But I think there are 
additional important upshots to such conclusion in the offing.  In the next chapter I’ll take to a 
discussion of what I think are some important take-aways from the success of the Direct 
Argument*.  Moreover, I’ll strengthen my argument for the soundness of the Direct Argument* 
by showing that counterexamples to Rule B—the Direct Argument*’s most controversial 
inference rule—are impossible.  Importantly, this will show that not only are the alleged 
counterexamples considered in chapter two unsuccessful, they are necessarily unsuccessful since 
no counterexamples to Rule B are possible. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Looking Forward:  Ramifications of a Successful Direct Argument* 
 
 
 
 I have argued that the Direct Argument* is successful.  That is, I have argued that the 
Direct Argument* successfully shows that causal determinism and moral responsibility are 
incompatible.  If I’m right about all of this, then I think there are at least two sufficiently 
interesting, and salient ramifications.  So, in this chapter, I intend to examine them. 
 Here, I think, are the two most important upshots of the Direct Argument*’s success: 1) 
plausibly, we can know that indeterminism is true; and 2) we can know that free will is 
compatible with indeterminism.  This last upshot might seem fairly innocuous, but I think it is 
both important and surprising.  It is surprising because it’s an upshot that comes by way of an 
argument that makes no use whatever of the concept ‘free will’ and what such a concept may or 
may not require.  It’s important because, even though I have nowhere argued about free will, one 
take-away from all I’ve argued so far—or, so I’ll go on to show—is that the Direct Argument*’s 
conclusion will help guide the free will debate going forward. 
 I’ll take to a discussion of these two take-aways in the order that I’ve presented them just 
now.  But, first, I wish to redeem a promissory note that I made back in chapter two.  That is, 
first, I want to discuss, at length, Truth DependenceMORAL (TDM), a principle I introduced in 
chapter two.  This will serve two functions.  The first is that it will strengthen my argument in 
chapter two, the chapter in which I defend Rule B from various recent attempts to provide a 
counterexample.  My discussion of TDM will strengthen chapter two’s argument because if 
TDM is true, then counterexamples to Rule B are impossible.  And, this, of course, is highly 
important to the relevant discussion.  For, I will argue that by reflecting on an obvious fact about 
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truth, we can see that there’s good reason to think that TDM is true.  Thus, it falls right out of my 
overall conclusion—viz., that an obvious fact about truth implies that there can’t be 
counterexamples to Rule B—that compatibilism commits its adherents to denying an obvious 
fact about truth.    
The second function of my discussing TDM is that such a discussion will allow me to 
actively defend TDM, to show that TDM is true.  So, I’ll do this first.  Then, in the sections 
following, I’ll discuss the two important upshots of a successful Direct Argument*. 
 
II.  Counterexamples to Rule B Are Impossible 
 
To begin my defense of the claim that counterexamples to Rule B are impossible, I 
follow Trenton Merricks (2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b) by noting that truth depends (in a very 
trivial way) on the world.  It’s true, for example, that dogs bark because dogs bark; it’s true that 
Turner exists because I exist; that I write this paper at t is true because I write this paper at t, and 
so on.  No one should disagree with this “truism about truth” (Merricks, 2009, p. 31).  That is, no 
one should disagree that truth depends on the world in this trivial way.79   
 And I do not think anyone would disagree with this truism about truth.  But I think that 
reflection on this truism will reveal that any alleged counterexamples to Rule B must fail.  They 
must fail because it’s impossible to give a bona fide counterexample to Rule B given this truism 
about truth. 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  79	  This	  isn’t	  to	  say	  that	  there’s	  nothing	  more	  substantive	  to	  say	  about	  the	  way	  truth	  depends	  on	  the	  world.	  	  One	  
might	  wonder,	  for	  example,	  how	  true	  counterfactuals	  can	  ‘depend	  on	  the	  world’.	  	  But	  I	  leave	  aside	  discussions	  of	  
such	  analyses	  of	  truth—e.g.	  Truthmaker	  theory,	  Correspondence	  theory,	  Truth	  Supervenes	  on	  Being	  (TSB)	  theory,	  
etc.—because	  a	  discussion	  of	  such	  analyses	  not	  only	  takes	  us	  too	  far	  afield,	  it’s	  also	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  present	  
discussion.	  	  What’s	  crucial	  to	  my	  project	  is	  that	  all	  agree	  that	  what’s	  true	  depends	  on	  how	  things	  are;	  how	  things	  
are	  doesn’t	  depend	  on	  what’s	  true.	  	  So,	  e.g.,	  if	  it’s	  true	  that	  if	  Roger	  is	  in	  C,	  then	  he	  would	  A,	  this	  is	  true	  (minimally)	  
because	  I	  would	  A	  if	  I	  was	  in	  C.	  	  Perhaps	  there’s	  more	  that	  can	  be	  said	  about	  how	  this	  (assumed)	  truth	  ‘depends	  
on’	  the	  world,	  but	  it’s	  not	  important	  for	  the	  present	  discussion.	  	  Even	  so,	  for	  a	  thorough	  treatment	  of	  the	  
competing	  theories	  about	  truth,	  see	  Merricks	  (2007).	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 To begin to see why I say this, note that Merricks (2009, 2011a, 2011b) argues that the 
following is a corollary to the truism about truth (what I’ll call): 
Truth DependenceCHOICE [TDC]:  For all agents, S, and all propositions, p, if S has a 
choice about what p’s truth depends on (in the sense of ‘depends on’ in which truth 
depends on the world), then S has a choice about p’s truth. 
 
To see that TDC is a corollary of the truism about truth, imagine that the proposition that Jones 
kills Smith is true.  Given the truism about truth, that Jones kills Smith is true because Jones kills 
Smith; that is, that Jones kills Smith depends on what Jones does.  And if Jones has a choice 
about whether or not he kills Smith, it seems easily to follow that he has a choice about whether 
or not it’s true that Jones kills Smith.  For, suppose that we thought Jones doesn’t have a choice 
about the truth of that Jones kills Smith.  We’d think this because we’d think Jones doesn’t have 
a choice about whether or not he kills Smith.  So, not only do we see that there’s a close 
connection between ‘having a choice about’ and the nature of truth, we can see that the truism 
about truth reveals a principle about ‘having a choice about’ the truth of a proposition, namely, 
TDC.   
 I think that something similar is true about the relationship between moral responsibility 
and the nature of truth.  To see this, suppose it’s true that Jones kills Smith.  It’s true that Jones 
kills Smith because Jones kills Smith; that is, the truth of that Jones kills Smith depends on Jones 
and what he does.  So, given the truism about truth, it follows that that Jones kills Smith would 
not have been true had Jones not acted as he did. 
 Now, if all of that is right, then I think the truism about truth has the following corollary 
in addition to TDC: 
Truth DependenceMORAL [TDM]: For all agents, S, and all propositions, p, if S is 
directly morally responsible for that which p’s truth depends on (in the sense of ‘depends 
on’ in which truth depends on the world), then S is at least partly directly morally 
responsible for p’s truth. 
 
 
 128 
 
And if TDM is a corollary to the truism about truth, then, as I’ll go on to argue, since the truism 
about truth is necessarily true, counterexamples to Rule B are impossible.  To see why I say that 
TDM is a corollary to the truism about truth, notice that given the truism about truth and Jones’s 
moral responsibility for killing Smith, it follows that that Jones kills Smith would not have been 
true had Jones not acted as he did.  Now, suppose that we thought that Jones isn’t directly 
morally responsible for the fact that Jones kills Smith.  I say we’d think this because we’d think 
that Jones isn’t directly morally responsible for the thing upon which the truth of that Jones kills 
Smith depends, viz., Jones’s killing of Smith.  And this generalizes.  Thus, for all S and all p, if S 
is directly morally responsible for the thing upon which the truth of p depends, then S is at least 
partly directly morally responsible for p’s truth. 
If TDM is true, so I’ll go on to show, then it is impossible to give a counterexample to 
Rule B.  So, what I intend to do in this section is the following.  First, I will show how TDM’s 
(assumed) truth reveals a way in which two recent alleged counterexamples to Rule B fail.  But 
these reasons will generalize; so, TDM’s (assumed truth) will reveal how all alleged 
counterexamples fail.  Second, I will defend TDM from two objections, one that purports to 
attack TDM indirectly by attacking a principle that TDM allegedly entails, and another that 
attacks TDM directly.  I’ll conclude that these objections fail to undermine TDM; so if TDM is 
true, its truth undermines all attempts to provide a counterexample to Rule B. 
Such conclusion is important.  For, I think that TDM is intuitively plausible. Moreover, I 
think that if the truism about truth is true, then TDM is true.  That is, I think that the truism about 
truth implies TDM.  Thus, to deny TDM (which any compatibilist must, assuming (i) that Rule B 
implies incompatibilism, and (ii) that there can be counterexamples to Rule B if it’s invalid) will 
come at great cost; for, the objector to TDM will have to deny the truism about truth.    
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I now wish to consider two recent alleged counterexamples to Rule B.  My aim is to show 
that counterexamples to Rule B are in fact impossible; so, I use these two recent purported 
counterexamples in order to illustrate this point.  I begin by revisiting two alleged 
counterexamples from chapter two, viz., John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s ‘Erosion’ case, 
and Ishtiyaque’s Hal’s Creation(2).  As we’ve seen, each case is a different type of alleged 
counterexample.  Fischer and Ravizza’s case is a case of overdetermination, while Haji’s case is 
a case of libertarianly free action—that is, a free action done in a non-deterministic universe—
where there is no overdetermination involved.  Importantly, I’ll show that all of these cases fail 
to provide a counterexample for the same reasons.  Thus, such reasoning will generalize and all 
alleged counterexamples to Rule B will fail. 
I begin by revisiting an alleged counterexample to Rule B, John Martin Fischer and Mark 
Ravizza’s Erosion case.  Recall: 
Erosion:  Imagine that Betty [a soldier charged with destroying an enemy fortress] plants 
her explosives in the crevices of the glacier and detonates the charge at T1, causing an 
avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at T3.  Unbeknownst to Betty and her 
commanding officers, however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and eroding. 
Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken 
free at T2, starting a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy camp at T3. 
(Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, p. 157) 
 
Erosion, you’ll remember, is supposed to generate the following counterexample to Rule B: 
 
1.  NR The glacier is eroding  
 
2.  NR (The glacier is eroding ⊃ there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3) 
 
3.  NR There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3. 
 
But, even apart from my arguments in chapter two, I don’t think that Erosion successfully shows 
that Rule B is invalid; and reflection on the truism about truth will help us to see why.  Recall 
that it’s true that Turner exists because I exist, and it’s true that I write this paper at t because I 
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write this paper at t.  The truism about truth asserts just the notion that truth depends on the 
world in this very trivial way.  And, as I argued above, the truism about truth has TDM as a 
corollary.   
Now, there are objections to TDM (or something like it) in the offing, and I’ll consider 
those in the next section.  For now, however, let’s assume that TDM is true.  Given TDM’s truth, 
does Erosion supply a successful counterexample to Rule B?  I think that it does not. 
 To begin to see why not, let’s assume, with Fischer and Ravizza, that Betty is morally 
responsible for the fact that an avalanche crushes the enemy base when it does.  Now, let’s write 
the equivalent of the conditional in 2 as follows: 
2**.   ~ (The glacier is eroding) v (There is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at 
T3). 
 
Since the first disjunct of 2** is false, we can see that 2** is true just in virtue of the fact that the 
second disjunct is true.  But notice that 2**’s truth depends on the fact that there is an avalanche 
that crushes the enemy base at T3.  Since Betty is, ex hypothesi, morally responsible for the fact 
that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3 because she’s morally responsible 
for the avalanche that crushes the enemy base when it does, we can conclude on the basis of 
TDM that 2* is false.  That is, Betty is morally responsible for the fact expressed in 2** because 
2**’s truth depends on (in the sense of ‘depends on’ in which truth depends on the world) the 
fact that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, something for which Betty is 
ex hypothesi morally responsible.  Therefore, Betty, contra Fischer and Ravizza’s claim, is 
morally responsible for the fact that lies within the scope of the ‘NR’ operator in 2; and so, 2 
itself is false.  Thus, Erosion fails as a counterexample to Rule B. 
 Now, Fischer and Ravizza might respond as follows. 
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You’ve failed to show that Betty is morally responsible for the conditional contained in 2 
because you’ve failed to show that the relevant portion of 2’s truth depends on anything 
that Betty has done.  By hypothesis, that there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy 
base at T3 would have been true no matter what Betty did; there was an ‘ensuring 
condition’—namely, the erosion of the glacier—that would have led to the crushing of 
the enemy base even if Betty had never planted the explosive device.  Thus, you’ve failed 
to show that Betty’s actions are what the truth of 2 depends on; so, you’ve failed to show 
that the truth of 2 depends on Betty.  Erosion hasn’t yet been undermined. 
 
But in reply I ask the following question:  Is Betty morally responsible for the fact that there is 
an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, or not?  If she is responsible for the fact that 
there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy base at T3, and the truth of the conditional that lies 
within the scope of the ‘NR’ operator in 2 depends on this fact, then, given TDM, Betty is 
morally responsible for the truth of the conditional that lies within the scope of the ‘NR’ operator 
in 2.  
Now, if Betty isn’t directly morally responsible for the fact that there is an avalanche 
that crushes the enemy base at T3, then, of course, there is no problem for Rule B.  In such a 
case, Rule B is confirmed rather than refuted.  In any case, equipped with TDM, we can see that 
Erosion fails as a counterexample to Rule B. 
Next, let’s revisit Haji’s Hal’s Creation(2) case.  Recall: 
 
Hal’s Creation(2):  Hal-2 [an essentially omniscient, sempiternal, amoral—that is, lacks 
knowledge of moral right, wrong, or obligatory—being] has the ability to create (or 
actualize) any one of an infinite number of possible worlds…Suppose Hal-2 creates a 
world, W1, in which, after due reflection, Yasmin [in a libertarianly free way] donates a 
large sum of money (at some time, ts) to a credible charity, UNICEF.  Yasmin really 
cares about the plight of the needy children; she donates because she wishes to help the 
kids and not, for instance, because she wants a big tax break. We safely suppose that she 
is morally praiseworthy for her bountiful donation.  Under appropriate circumstances 
normal agents would be deserving of praise for such an act. 
 
Further, recall that Hal’s Creation(2) generates the following substitution instance of Rule B: 
 
Hal’s Argument(2): 
 
  (4H):  NR (Hal-2 creates W1). 
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  (5H):  NR (Hal-2 creates W1	 ⊃	 Yasmin donates (at ts in W1)).	 
	 
	 	 (6H):  Therefore, NR (Yasmin donates (at ts in W1). 
 
But, as we can now see, there’s a further reason to think that Hal’s Creation(2) has failed to 
provide a counterexample to Rule B.  For, equipped with TDM, we can see yet another reason to 
think that 5H is false.   
 For, as we did with the Erosion case, we can see that 5H’s conditional can be written this  
 
way: 
 
 (5H*):  ~ (Hal-2 creates W1) v (Yasmin donates (at ts in W1)). 
 
As with 2** from the Erosion case, we can see that since the first disjunct of 5H* is, ex 
hypothesi, false, 5H* is true just in virtue of the truth of the second disjunct.  That is, 5H* is true 
because Yasmin donates to UNICEF when she, in fact, does.  But Yasmin is responsible for this 
fact.  Thus, given TDM, Yasmin is at least partly directly morally responsible for the truth of 
5H*.  And if Yasmin is at least partly directly morally responsible for the truth of 5H*, then it 
follows that she’s at least partly directly morally responsible for the truth of the conditional 
contained in 5H of Hal’s Argument(2).  So, 5H itself is false, and Hal’s Creation(2) is no 
counterexample to Rule B. 
I’ve shown that Erosion, and Hal’s Creation(2) fail to provide successful 
counterexamples to Rule B if TDM is true.  But it should be clear that I’ve shown more than that.  
For, since every alleged counterexample to Rule B will have to be of the same form, every 
alleged counterexample to Rule B suffers the same affliction.  Namely, in each case, someone is 
(or was, or will be) ex hypothesi directly morally responsible for the thing upon which the truth 
of the consequent contained within the second premise of each substitution instance of Rule B 
depends.  And this means that someone is (or was, or will be) at least partly directly morally 
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responsible for the thing upon which the truth of the conditional contained within the second 
premise of each substitution instance of Rule B depends.  Thus, if TDM is true, counterexamples 
to Rule B are impossible.  
 
III.  Is Truth DependenceMORAL True?: Objections to TDM 
  
I will now consider two potential objections to Truth DependenceMORAL.  The first 
objection I’ll consider is from John Martin Fischer and Eleonore Stump (2000) that casts doubt 
on a principle that TDM seems to entail, and, thus, seems indirectly to attack TDM.  The second 
objection I’ll consider attacks TDM directly. 
In recent work, Fischer and Stump attempt to undermine an argument by Ted Warfield 
(1996).  To begin to see how Fischer and Stump’s potential criticism of TDM will go, consider: 
Erosion*:  [The details are the same as Erosion except that, in this case,] the conditions 
of the glacier do actually cause the ice and rocks to break free, triggering an avalanche 
that arrives at the fortress precisely at the same time as the independent avalanche 
triggered freely by Betty.  Each avalanche is sufficient for the destruction of the enemy 
fortress.80 
 
Fischer and Stump think that Erosion* is a counterexample to Rule B.  Ted Warfield (1996)  
 
seems to agree; so, Warfield constructs the following revision of Rule B, call it: 
 
 Rule Beta ☐:  NRp, ☐ (p ⊃ q)├ NRq 
 
The upshot of Rule Beta ☐ is that it’s supposed to make it much more difficult to construct 
counterexamples like Erosion* because the connection between the eroding glacier at T1 and the 
destruction of the enemy fortress at T3 has to be one of broadly logical necessity.  But, of course 
there is no such connection.   
 Fischer and Stump, however, think that there are counterexamples to Rule Beta ☐ that 
can be constructed, and that don’t presuppose causal determinism.  Consider the following: 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  80	  Initially	  from	  Mark	  Ravizza	  (1994),	  but	  also	  found	  in	  Fischer	  and	  Ravizza	  (1998,	  p.	  160ff).	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Counterexample B:  [Given the set up of a case like Erosion*] let ‘r’ be a conjunction of 
these propositions: 
 
  (r1) the actual laws of nature obtain, and 
 
  (r3) there is an avalanche, which destroys the enemy camp at T3. 
 
Now, without doubt, there is a logically necessary connection between r and q (since q is 
identical to r3), but the question of whether causal determinism of any sort obtains is 
irrelevant.  Here we have: 
 
(1) NRr, and 
 
(2) ☐ (r ⊃ q), but it isn’t the case that 
 
(3) NRq. (Fischer and Stump, 2000, p. 50 – 51) 
 
Now, as Fischer and Stump rightly point out, Warfield anticipates this sort of attempt at a  
 
counterexample.  In so doing, he presents a thesis that Fischer and Stump call 
 
(W1):  If no one is even partly morally responsible for a conjunction, then no one is even 
partly morally responsible for either conjunct of the conjunction. (Ibid., p. 51)81 
 
The idea, here, is that if W1 is true, then (1), from Counterexample B, is false since it’s not the 
case that no one is even partly morally responsible for r3, a conjunct of r.  So, (1) is false. 
 But, Fischer and Stump think that such a conclusion is mistaken, and this because of the 
relation between conjunctions and conditionals.  To begin to see the worry, notice that, according 
to the details of Erosion* and Counterexample B, it’s not the case that if the actual laws of nature 
obtain, then there won’t be an avalanche that destroys the enemy base at the time it does.  That 
is: 
(4) ~ ( L ⊃ ~q) 
 
is true.  Moreover, (4) is trivially equivalent to: 
 
(5) (L & q). 
 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  81	  But	  originally	  from	  Warfield	  (1996,	  p.	  218).	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Now, Fischer and Stump think that it’s counterintuitive to think that anyone is morally 
responsible for the fact expressed in (5) because it’s strange to think that anyone could be 
morally responsible for the fact expressed in (4).  Thus, Fischer and Stump think there’s a 
problem with accepting a principle like W1.  
 And more problems abound, they claim.  For, if W1 is true, then the following is true, 
too: 
(W2):  Given a true antecedent of a conditional, a person is partly morally responsible for 
the conditional’s being false if he is partly responsible for the falsity of the consequent of 
the conditional. (Ibid., p. 52) 
 
Moreover, if W2 is true, then Fischer and Stump think (and I agree) that the following ought to  
 
be true as well: 
 
(W3):  Given a true antecedent of a conditional, a person is partly responsible for the 
conditional’s being true if he is partly responsible for the truth of the consequent of the 
conditional.  (Ibid.)  
 
Thus, if W1 is true, then W3 is true.  This, Fischer and Stump conclude, is an untoward 
consequence of accepting a principle like W1.   
 If W1 entails W3, then one way to show that W1 is false is by showing that W3 is false.  
This is exactly what Stump and Fischer attempt to do.  To see why Fischer and Stump think that 
W3 is false, recall: 
(2): ☐ (r ⊃ q). 
 
Now, by Rule A of the Direct Argument—which says that no one can be even partly directly 
morally responsible for a necessary truth—we get the fact that nobody is even partly directly 
morally responsible for the fact expressed in (2).  (2), after all, is a necessary truth; for it’s just 
trivial that, necessarily, the conjunction of the actual laws of nature and q implies q.  But, if W3 
is right, then it follows that someone is morally responsible for the fact expressed in (2); Betty is 
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responsible for the fact expressed in (2) because she’s responsible for q, and (2)’s truth depends 
on q’s being true.  So, Warfield is left with a dilemma: either Rule A—the Direct Argument’s 
inference rule that says no one is (or could be) even partly directly morally responsible for a 
necessary truth—is false, or W3 is false.  If W3 is false, then W1 is false, and Warfield’s defense 
Rule Beta ☐ fails.  On either horn, the Direct Argument (or, more importantly, the Direct 
Argument*) gets skewered.   
 Moreover, Truth DependenceMORAL appears to entail W3.  For, W3, so the objection 
goes, merely expresses one way in which a person can be responsible for the truth of a 
proposition: if a conditional has a true antecedent, and a person is directly morally responsible 
for the truth of the consequent, then the person is at least partly directly morally responsible for 
the truth of the conditional.  If this is what TDM entails, and if Fischer and Stump’s objections to 
W3 go through, then TDM is defeated. 
 But I think that Fisher and Stump’s argument against W3 does not defeat TDM; for, I 
think that W3 is not entailed by TDM.  In what remains of this section, I will defend TDM from 
the claim that it entails W3.   
 To begin to see how my defense will go, recall: 
 
 (2): ☐ (r ⊃ q). 
 
(2) expresses the following fact: 
 
DEB:  Necessarily, if the actual laws of nature obtain and the enemy base is crushed by 
an avalanche at T3, then the enemy base is crushed by an avalanche at T3. 
 
Fischer and Stump think that, if W3 is true, then it follows that someone—namely, Betty—is 
responsible for DEB.  And, so the objection continues, since TDM entails W3, it follows by 
TDM that Betty is responsible for DEB, a necessary truth.  Thus, if TDM is true, Rule A is false.   
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But, I think that this claim is too hasty; for, DEB’s truth doesn’t depend on Betty.  For, 
DEB is true even if it isn’t the case that the enemy base is crushed when it, in fact, is.  Indeed it’s 
difficult to say just what DEB’s truth does depend on; it’s a trivial truth.  This is important: TDM 
speaks in terms of being responsible for a proposition whose truth depends on what an agent 
does.  But DEB’s truth is not like this; it does not depend on Betty or what she does.   
Why do I say that DEB’s truth (and, so, (2)’s truth) doesn’t depend on Betty?  Well, for 
one thing, DEB is true even if it isn’t the case that the enemy base is crushed when it in fact is.  
Moreover, DEB’s truth doesn’t depend on Betty in the relevant way—the way relevant for moral 
responsibility—because it’s true regardless of how things are.  But, if DEB’s truth is to depend 
on Betty in the relevant way, this can’t be the case; it has to be that DEB’s truth hinges on 
whether or not things are a certain way; viz., that things are such that Betty acts in a particular 
way.  Or another way to put the point is this: some truths require a truthmaker; I think that DEB 
is not one of those, but even if it is, Betty is not its truthmaker.  So, DEB’s truth doesn’t depend 
on Betty.  But, since TDM requires that DEB’s truth depend on Betty (or someone, anyway) in 
order for her (or anyone) to be directly morally responsible for its truth, even if W3 is false, 
TDM is unharmed.    
 Now, I agree that TDM entails a principle similar to W3, but I argue that any such 
principle must have an appeal to the relevant notion of dependence.  For, suppose that it’s true 
that if hobbits don’t exist, then I write this paper.  Given that it’s true that hobbits don’t exist, the 
foregoing conditional is true if and only if I write this paper.  Thus, I’m responsible for the 
conditional’s being true if and only if I write this paper.  Now, suppose that I’m not responsible 
for its being true that if hobbits don’t exist, then I write this paper.  If I’m not responsible for the 
truth of this conditional, then this is because I’m not responsible for writing this paper; that is, 
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I’m not responsible for the thing upon which the truth of the conditional depends.  Thus, I 
conclude that any W3-like principle that TDM entails must include the relevant notion of 
dependence. 
I agree with Charles Hermes (forthcoming) that “any plausible account of moral 
responsibility must make the following disjunction principle true:” 
DPR:  If a disjunction has only one true disjunct, and an agent is responsible for the truth 
of that disjunct, then the agent is responsible for the truth of the disjunction. (Ibid) 
 
Here is Hermes’s justification for thinking that DPR is a required inference for any plausible 
account of moral responsibility: 
[S]uppose that Mary knows that one of her two children broke her favorite vase and 
wants to know who is responsible.  Mary would discover what she wanted to know by 
learning that Johnny is the only person responsible for breaking the vase.  After all, if 
Johnny is the only person responsible for breaking the vase, then Johnny is also 
responsible for the fact that one of her children broke the vase.  It is easy to see how 
Mary can derive this conclusion, if DPR is valid.  If DPR is invalid, Mary’s inference 
appears to be equally problematic. (Ibid.) 
 
Or think of it this way.  Suppose that I murder Jones.  By murdering Jones I am obviously 
morally responsible for the fact that Roger murders Jones; however, I am also morally 
responsible for the fact that one of the people at the University of Tennessee murders Jones.  So, 
I agree that any plausible account of moral responsibility will make DPR true, but this is because 
I think that DPR contains within it an implicit appeal to the relevant notion of dependence to 
which TDM refers.  For suppose it’s true that ~p v q (and p is true).  This disjunction is true just 
because q is true; that is, this disjunction depends on q in the sense of ‘depends on’ in which 
truth depends on the world.  So, DPR contains an implicit appeal to the relevant notion of 
dependence to which TDM refers.  Moreover, if DPR is true, then Rule B is established and with 
it the Direct Argument (or, perhaps, the Direct Argument*).   
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 But W3 is not like DPR in its appeal to the relevant notion of dependence.  Thus, I 
conclude that TDM does not entail W3; it entails a restricted W3, one that appeals to the relevant 
notion of ‘dependence’ to which TDM refers.  Thus, Fischer and Stump’s argument against W3 
fails to show that TDM is false.   
 To see what I take to be a more worrisome objection to TDM, let’s revisit the Zombie 
Case from chapter two.  Recall: 
Sara does cutting edge scientific research. She knows her craft well. She fulfills the 
requisite requirements to be morally responsible for her research, and reports her research 
to her boss, Ted. Unbeknownst to Sara, however, Ted is a mastermind controlling a large 
conglomerate of labs. Ted uses Sara’s work, along with the work of many other scientists 
(whose work we can safely assume Sara would not grasp), to create a virus that, when 
released, turns half of the world into flesh-eating zombies. Sara bears moral responsibility 
for a part of the way things are: namely, that her research took place. But Sara doesn’t 
bear part of the moral responsibility for the way things are. It would be inappropriate to 
blame Sara for the zombie outbreak. Plausibly, Sara is non-culpably ignorant, and so gets 
off the hook. 
 
The Zombie Case is, I think, supposed to show that someone could be morally responsible for 
some fact but lack the epistemic requirements for responsibility with respect the ‘dependent’ 
fact.  So, for example, Sara bears moral responsibility for the fact that her research took place, 
but it’s alleged that she bears no responsibility for the fact that her research took place and 
there’s a zombie outbreak, and this because she doesn’t have any good reason to believe that the 
truth of this second fact—this conjunctive fact—depends on her.   
 But, I think that this objection can be met with the brick-maker story from chapter two.  
Recall: 
Suppose that I am a mason, tasked with the making, and laying, of a single brick that’s 
part of the foundation of a beautiful mansion.  And suppose that my creating and laying 
this brick is, other things equal, a morally praiseworthy action.  Now, suppose, also, that 
all I know how to do, at least when it comes to building things, is make and lay bricks; I 
don’t know anything about engineering, blue-prints, or anything else relevant to the task 
of building a house.  Moreover, I’m not so much as capable of knowing such things (for 
whatever reason). 
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According to TDM, if I’m directly morally responsible for the fact that this particular brick is 
made and the truth of that this particular brick is made and the beautiful mansion is built 
depends on whether or not I make this particular brick, then I’m at least partly directly morally 
responsible for this conjunctive fact; I’m partly directly morally responsible for the fact that 
things are such that that this particular brick is made and the beautiful mansion is built. 
 Back in chapter two, I asked the reader to further suppose that the homeowner thanked 
me (as a type of moral praise) for the fact that her house is built, and then asked whether or not 
we should think the homeowner is out of line in her so thanking.  I said, then, that it wasn’t 
obvious to me that the homeowner is out of line in her thanking me.  But let’s assume that she is.  
Does this show that TDM is false?  I think that it does not.  For, TDM doesn’t imply that I am 
responsible for the fact that her house is built; rather, TDM implies that I am responsible for the 
fact that this particular brick is made and her house is built.  
So, it seems to me that meeting the epistemic conditions for responsibility for the making 
of the brick suffices for meeting the epistemic conditions for responsibility for the whole of 
which the brick plays a part.  Moreover, I think that this objection confuses what’s at issue.  
TDM doesn’t imply that a person is responsible for all of the conjuncts in a conjunction, for 
example.  Nor does it imply that a person is responsible for the antecedent in a conditional.  All it 
implies is that a person is responsible for the truth of the conjunction, or the truth of the 
conditional (or, etc.) given that the truth of those things depends on what they do.  For, suppose 
it’s true that Sara’s research took place.  Now, suppose that Sara isn’t responsible for this fact.  I 
think the only thing to conclude here is that she’s not responsible for this fact because she’s not 
responsible for the thing upon which the truth of the proposition depends, viz., doing her 
research.  But this is just to say that if she’s responsible for the thing upon which the truth of the 
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proposition depends, then she’s responsible for the truth of the proposition.  And given the 
Zombie Case, the truth of the proposition that her research took place and there’s a zombie 
outbreak depends on what Sara does.  Thus, though Sara is responsible for the fact that her 
research took place and there’s a zombie outbreak, it doesn’t follow that she’s at all responsible 
for the fact that there’s a zombie outbreak.82  And it seems to me that this is what the Zombie 
Case is supposed to elicit.   
Thus, I conclude that TDM is safe from these objections.  Moreover, I can’t think of any 
better objections to TDM than what I’ve here considered.  So, I think that TDM is safe from 
objection, full stop.  And if TDM is safe, then counterexamples to Rule B are impossible. 
 
IV.  Incompatibilism is True, and What This Might Say About Our World 
 
 So far I’ve been at pains to defend the Direct Argument* from the most pressing 
objections that have been brought to bear against it.  I’ve concluded that the Direct Argument* is 
safe from these objections.  It’s impossible to give a counterexample to Rule B, for example; so, 
Rule B is true (and necessarily so).  Rule A is true since no one can be even partly morally 
responsible for a necessary truth.  And there are no possible No Past* Objections that can be 
brought against the Direct Argument*.  So far as I can see, there are no other places in the Direct 
Argument* on which to press.  Thus, the Direct Argument* is successful. 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  82	  Objection:	  Doesn’t	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak	  depend	  on	  Sara?	  	  If	  so,	  then,	  by	  TDM,	  isn’t	  
Sara	  at	  least	  partly	  directly	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak?	  	  If	  your	  answer	  is	  yes	  
to	  either	  of	  these,	  then	  the	  Zombie	  Case	  is,	  contrary	  to	  what	  you	  say,	  a	  counterexample	  to	  TDM.	  
	  	  
Reply:	  	  No,	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  what	  Sara	  does.	  	  At	  least,	  it	  does	  not	  
depend	  on	  what	  Sara	  does	  in	  the	  relevant	  way.	  	  Recall	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘dependence’	  at	  issue	  in	  TDM	  is	  the	  very	  
trivial	  sort	  of	  dependence	  in	  which	  truth	  depends	  on	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is.	  	  So:	  is	  it	  true	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  
outbreak	  if	  and	  only	  if	  Sara	  does	  her	  research?	  	  According	  to	  the	  details	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  answer	  must	  be	  no	  (e.g.,	  
Sara’s	  boss’s	  nefarious	  plan	  plays	  a	  part,	  etc.).	  	  There	  are,	  presumably,	  very	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  could	  be	  true	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak.	  	  Thus,	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  there	  is	  a	  zombie	  outbreak	  does	  not	  depend	  
on	  Sara—not,	  anyway,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘dependence’	  at	  issue	  in	  TDM.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Zombie	  Case	  is	  no	  counterexample	  
to	  TDM.	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 But if the Direct Argument* is successful, this means that incompatibilism about moral 
responsibility and causal determinism is true.  Thus, we should conclude that incompatibilism 
about moral responsibility and causal determinism is true.  In this section, then, I wish to gesture 
at what I think are some potentially important take-aways from the conclusion that 
incompatibilism is true.  This conclusion is important; for, as I’ll now go on to suggest, it’s very 
plausible that it tells us some important things about our world.  Moreover, it helps to 
illuminate—and sharpens the focus of—the areas of the free will/moral responsibility debate that 
are in need of further exploration.  What I say in this section deserves a dissertation all its own, 
and what I say, herein, isn’t meant to exhaust everything that might or could be said about the 
issues I’ll raise.  Even so, I’d like to take the time to think about where, and on what, 
philosophers might focus their future philosophical efforts given the success of the Direct 
Argument*.    
 To begin to see where, and on what, philosophers thinking about free will and moral 
responsibility should focus their efforts, I wish to discuss the two upshots of the successful 
Direct Argument* that I mention above (§I).  First, there’s the idea that a successful Direct 
Argument* plausibly reveals to us that indeterminism is true.  Second, there’s the idea that free 
will is compatible with indeterminism.   
With respect to the first, this is a striking revelation; for, ‘indeterminism’ (as well as 
‘determinism’) is, as van Inwagen puts it, “a thesis about the motion of particles of matter in the 
void” (van Inwagen, 1983, p. 210).  That is, indeterminism is a thesis about the physical world, 
and how it operates.  Presumably, theses about the physical world are theses best left 
investigated by the physical sciences (e.g. biology, physics, chemistry).  Yet, I am now claiming 
that we can know the answer to this scientific question by reflection from the armchair.  I claim 
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that we can know that the universe is indeterministic because we can know that we’re morally 
responsible for (at least some of) our actions.   
But such reflection is consistent with what it is that quantum physics seems to suggest 
about our universe; namely, that at the microscopic level, the movement of particles in the void 
is indeterministic; how particles behave is a matter of statistical probability as opposed to 
certainty.83  So, the Direct Argument*’s success is consistent with what empirical scientific 
evidence purports to show.  This is good reason, it seems to me, to conclude that we can know, 
on the basis of the Direct Argument*’s success coupled with our being morally responsible for 
(at least some of) our actions, that indeterminism is true.   
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, some philosophers take a distinctly contradictory approach.  Derk 
Pereboom (2001), and Bruce Waller (1990), for example, think that we don’t know whether or 
not determinism (at the macro-level) is true since our scientific evidence isn’t conclusive; rather, 
what we have good reason to believe is that we lack moral responsibility.  That is, they agree 
with me that incompatibilism is true, but they think our best scientific evidence suggests either 
that determinism is true, or, even if it isn’t, that given our scientific understanding of the 
universe, there are no plausible accounts of human agency that are compatible with 
indeterminism and moral responsibility.  So, what these “hard incompatibilists”84 favor is 
concluding on the basis of scientific evidence—plus some philosophical argumentation, e.g., the 
Direct Argument*—a particular metaphysical thesis; namely, that we aren’t morally responsible 
for anything that we do.   
                                                	  	  	  	  	  83	  Most	  philosophers	  in	  the	  free	  will/moral	  responsibility	  debate	  realize	  this.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  van	  Inwagen’s	  An	  Essay	  
on	  Free	  will,	  and	  Pereboom’s	  Living	  Without	  Free	  Will.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  84	  This	  term	  is	  from	  Pereboom	  (2001,	  p.	  xix).	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 In response, I offer what I take to be van Inwagen’s argument from chapter six of his An 
Essay on Free Will.  As I understand it, the argument goes something like this:  
 P1. We’re morally responsible for our actions only if determinism is false. 
 
 P2.  We’re morally responsible for our actions. 
 
 C1.  Thus, determinism is false.    
 
Given the success of the Direct Argument*, all sides to this disagreement should agree that P1 is 
true; so, the bugbear is at P2.  But, to quote van Inwagen, “surely we cannot doubt the reality of 
moral responsibility?” (van Inwagen, 1983, p. 206).  Yet this is exactly what hard 
incompatibilists do.   
 I think that P2 is just obviously true.  But recently, Stephen Kearns (forthcoming) has 
argued that philosophers, like me, who think that P2 is just obviously true, should consider the 
following.  The above assumption that P2 is obviously true, relies on the assumption that we 
know the following conjunction is false: 
 ~DET:   Determinism is true and incompatibilism is true. (Kearns, forthcoming, p. 3)85 
But Kearns claims that we cannot know that ~DET is false because 
[i]f we can easily work out the falsity of [~DET] based on our commonsense knowledge, 
then were we to find out the truth of one of the conjuncts, we could easily work out the 
falsity of the other conjunct.  But this does not seem to be true.  Finding out that 
incompatibilism is true would not make it easy to work out that [determinism] is false.  
Finding out that [determinism] is true would not make it easy to work out that 
incompatibilism is false.  Thus we do not know that [~DET] is false based on our 
commonsense knowledge. (Ibid., p. 7, my insertions) 
 
So, Kearns’s idea is that, even if I’m right about the success of the Direct Argument*, there’s no 
good way to get from that conclusion to the conclusion that determinism is false.  And this is 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  85	  In	  the	  original,	  Kearns	  title’s	  ~DET	  as	  ‘(A)’,	  and	  labels	  ‘determinism’	  as	  ‘action	  determinism’.	  	  Nothing	  about	  
what	  follows	  depends	  on	  my	  having	  made	  these	  minor	  changes.	  	  Also,	  since	  the	  article	  is	  forthcoming,	  any	  page	  
number	  that	  I	  give	  as	  a	  reference	  is	  given	  as	  if	  the	  first	  page	  of	  the	  article	  is	  p.	  1.	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true even if our belief that we are morally responsible for stuff is part of our commonsense 
knowledge.   
We might be tempted to wonder why we can’t ‘easily work out’ that determinism is false 
even if we find out that incompatibilism is true and couple that with our commonsense 
knowledge that we are morally responsible for some of our actions.  For his part, Kearns thinks 
we cannot easily work out that determinism is false from these considerations because we need 
conclusive scientific evidence—not mere reasoning from the armchair—to figure out the answer 
to questions about how the physical world works.  We cannot, as Kearns puts it, “figure out that 
some of our actions (or their immediate causal antecedents) are undetermined from the armchair, 
even reasoning from knowledge we currently posses” (Ibid., p. 9).    
But this seems wrong to me.  I think that, if I know that (p & q) entails r, and I know that 
(p & q) is true, then by straight-forward modus ponens I know that r is true.  So, suppose that I 
know that incompatibilism is true, and that I know that I’m morally responsible for some of my 
actions.  Suppose, further, that I know that this conjunction of facts entails the falsity of ~DET 
(which it does).  If I know all of these things, then I know that ~DET is false.  This seems to me 
to be a case of easily working out the falsity of ~DET.   
Clearly, I can know that the truth of incompatibilism coupled with the truth of our being 
morally responsible for some of our actions entails the falsity of ~DET.  But can I know that the 
antecedent is true?  That is, can I know that incompatibilism is true and that we are morally 
responsible for some of our actions?  According to John Maier (forthcoming), I cannot.   
Maier begins his argument for the claim that we cannot know that P2 is true (and so, we 
cannot know the truth of the conjunction of P2 and the claim that incompatibilism is true) by 
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introducing the notion of ‘effective ignorance’.  He defines the term this way (where P1, P2, and 
C1 are as above): 
Effective Ignorance: An agent is effectively ignorant of C1 just in case her argument 
would be exactly as epistemically effective as it actually is if she had no evidence for C1 
other than her evidence for P1 and P2. (Maier, p. 5)86 
 
The idea is that the proponent of P1 – C1 who is effectively ignorant of C1 is committed to an 
argument that doesn’t at all benefit from scientific evidence.  For, even if she had evidence 
besides P1 and P2 (e.g. evidence for quantum-level indeterminacy), her argument would be just 
as effective is she hadn’t had that sort of evidence.  Why think that the proponent of P1 – C1 is 
effectively ignorant?  Because the argument’s origin is prior to the discoveries of twentieth-
century physics.  Thus, if the proponent of P1 – C1 knows that C1 is true now, then the 
proponents of P1 – C1 that antedate her knew C1 then.    
Further, Maier claims that “someone who is effectively ignorant of C1 cannot know both 
P1 and P2” (Ibid.).  To see why Maier claims that someone who is effectively ignorant of C1 
cannot know both P1 and P2, he makes, and argues for, three claims.  They go as follows: 
 Particularity: S can know P2 only if she can know some instance of P2. 
Authority: S can know some instance of P2 only if she can know some instance of P2 on 
partly non-testimonial grounds. 
 
Humility: If S knows P1, then she cannot know any instance of P2 on non-testimonial 
grounds. (Ibid.) 
 
These three theses, conjoined, entail that anyone who is effectively ignorant of C1, cannot know 
both P1 and P2.  Thus, we cannot know, on the basis of knowing P1 and P2 that C1 is true. 
 While there might be available objections to either Particularity or Authority, the place to 
press, I think, is Humility.  Before we get to my objection to Humility, however, let us consider 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  86	  As	  with	  Kearns’s	  forthcoming	  paper,	  for	  any	  page	  number	  I	  cite	  for	  Maier’s	  paper,	  the	  page	  number	  will	  be	  
given	  as	  if	  the	  first	  page	  is	  p.	  1.	  	  	  	  
 
 
 147 
the way in which Maier attempts to motivate the thesis.  First, Maier provides the following 
epistemic principle that underlies Humility (where ‘an excusing condition’ is any condition K 
such that, if it obtains, then an agent is not morally responsible for her action (e.g. infancy, 
insanity, etc.)): 
Epistemic Priority of Excuse [EPE]:  If K is an excusing condition for some particular 
action A of some particular agent R, then one cannot know on partly non-testimonial 
grounds that R is morally responsible for A unless one independently knows that K does 
not obtain. (Ibid., p. 10) 
 
To see EPE in action, Maier gives us the following scenario: 
[Jones is a witness in a court case and] is testifying, of Smith, that he is responsible for 
what he has done, and is not purporting to base her claim entirely on the testimony of 
others.  There is something legally inapt about an appeal to determinism in such a case, 
but let us imagine that Jones holds that Smith is responsibly only if it is false that he has a 
certain brain lesion.  It is pointed out, by Smith’s lawyer, that Jones is in no position to 
know whether Smith has that brain lesion.  We can imagine versions of the case where 
Jones response to this point by acknowledging that, on this point at least, she needs to 
defer to someone else.  But let us say that she does not do this.  She rather claims to know 
that agents who have certain brain lesions are not responsible and also, though she is 
ignorant of whether Smith has this brain lesion, that Smith is responsible.  Here we may 
reasonably protest that Jones does not know that Smith is responsible after all. (Ibid.) 
 
The idea is that the Jones case gives us reason to think that EPE is true; for, we’re supposed to 
think that Jones cannot know that Smith is morally responsible for what he has done if Jones 
doesn’t know whether or not Smith has an excusing condition (i.e. whether or not he has a brain 
lesion).  The upshot is that determinism is such an excusing condition if P1 is true.  So, if S 
knows P1, and EPE is true, then S can’t know that P2 is true unless S independently knows that 
determinism is false.  So, if anyone is effectively ignorant as to whether determinism is false, and 
EPE is true, then no one can know that both P1 and P2 are true.   
 My first complaint about Maier’s argument for Humility is that its undergirding epistemic 
principle, EPE, isn’t very well motivated.  Indeed, the Jones case—which is meant to motivate 
the intuitions for EPE—it seems to me, is setup in such a way as to presuppose the truth of EPE.  
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For, why should we think that Jones is ignorant as to whether or not Smith has the relevant brain 
lesion.  If Jones knows that Smith is morally responsible for his actions, and his being morally 
responsible for his actions entails the absence of the relevant brain lesion (and Jones knows this), 
then it follows that Jones knows that Smith doesn’t have the relevant brain lesion. 
 Of course we might wonder if Jones knows that Smith is morally responsible for what he 
has done.  That is, we might wonder whether or not Jones’s belief that Smith is morally 
responsible is true.  But, it seems infelicitous to set up the case in such a way that we’re meant to 
presuppose that she couldn’t know such a thing without first knowing that Smith lacks the 
relevant brain lesion.  We might, just as easily, set up the case in such a way that Jones is not 
ignorant as to whether or not Smith has the relevant brain lesion because she’s not ignorant as to 
whether or not he’s morally responsible for what he did.  
But suppose that the Jones case isn’t unhelpful the way that I claim it is.  Even if so, I 
think that the case fails to show that EPE is true.  What it does show, if anything, is that it is 
difficult to know whether or not someone is morally responsible for something without 
independent knowledge of whether or not there is an excusing condition that obtains.  But notice 
that this says nothing about whether or not we can know that we (i.e. ourselves) are morally 
responsible for our actions.  And P2 is a claim about whether or not we (i.e. ourselves) are 
morally responsible for our actions.  I think that I, for example, can know that I am morally 
responsible for some of my actions, and this is true whether or not I have independent evidence 
that there are no excusing conditions (e.g. determinism) present.  Let me explain. 
My belief that I am morally responsible for some of my actions seems true to me in the 
same way that it seems true to me that the world didn’t just pop into existence five minutes ago.  
It also seems true to me in just the same way that it seems true to me that there exist other people 
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besides myself.  Of course there are arguments entailing the falsity of each of these apparent 
truths; one argument concludes that we should be skeptics about knowledge; the other concludes 
that we should be solipsists.  But, I think that we should not conclude either of these things; and I 
do not think this on the basis of any argument.  Instead, I believe it’s true that the world has been 
around for longer than five minutes, and that there are other people, in a very basic way.  That is, 
I don’t believe these things are true on the basis of any argument or form of reasoning.87  The 
same is true, I think, for my belief that I am morally responsible for some of my actions.88 
Moreover, I think I know that the world didn’t just pop into existence five minutes ago.  
And I think I know that there are other people besides myself.  Thus, if I’m right that my belief 
that I’m morally responsible for some of my actions is like these others, then I think I know that 
I’m morally responsible for some of my actions.  So, in the parlance of EPE, if I know that I’m 
morally responsible for some of my actions, then I know this on partly non-testimonial grounds 
without independently knowing that K does not obtain.  Therefore, if I know that I am morally 
responsible for some of my actions, then EPE is false.  And if EPE is false, then Humility is 
false, and Maier’s argument is defeated. 
Of course one might object that I don’t know that I am morally responsible for some of 
my actions; that is, one might claim that I don’t know that P2 is true.  But, if my belief that I am 
morally responsible for some of my actions (i.e. that P2 is true) is basic in the way that my belief 
in an actual past (and my belief that there are other people) is basic, then any argument against 
my knowing such a thing must mirror the arguments for skepticism and solipsism.  But, I think 
this means that any opponent of the claim to know that P2 is true ought to be a skeptic and a 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  87	  For	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  on	  how	  these	  sorts	  of	  beliefs	  are	  ‘basic’,	  as	  I	  suggest,	  see	  Alvin	  Plantinga’s	  (1969,	  
1993a,	  1993b,	  and	  2000).	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  88	  Similar	  points	  are	  made	  by	  van	  Inwagen	  (1983).	  	  See,	  especially,	  pp.	  204	  –	  214.	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solipsist since the argument against knowing P2 would have to mirror the arguments against 
knowing that there is an external world (and knowing that there exist other people besides 
oneself).  But I think that we should be neither skeptics nor solipsists; so, I think that we should 
not say that we cannot know P2 is true.89    
 We might, however, claim that P2 is false.  Pereboom, for example, thinks that P2 is false 
because “there are good empirical reasons to believe that we do not in fact have [the sort of free 
will required for moral responsibility]” (Pereboom, 2001, p. 132).90  So, what do we do?  I claim 
that my belief that P2 is true is a basic sort of belief, one that I do not believe on the basis of 
evidence or argument; Pereboom claims that we have evidence that P2 is false.  This seems like 
an impasse.   
Even so, I think it’s worth pointing out that most people—philosophers and laymen—
think that we are morally responsible for (at least some of) our actions.  To be sure, there are 
differing accounts of what it means to be ‘morally responsible’ for something.  But the position 
that we are not morally responsible for anything, is a minority position.91  And I think the reason 
for this is that such a position cuts severely against the human experience.  And our experience 
                                                
	  	  	  	  	  89	  For	  an	  engaging	  discussion	  of	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  skeptic	  arguments	  (and	  the	  
free	  will	  skeptic	  arguments)	  and	  the	  external	  world	  skeptic	  arguments,	  see	  Jean-­‐Baptiste	  Guillon	  (forthcoming).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  90	  Pereboom	  thinks	  that	  libertarian	  free	  will	  is	  what’s	  required	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Moreover,	  he	  favors	  so-­‐
called	  ‘agent-­‐causal’	  views	  of	  (libertarian)	  free	  will	  over	  so-­‐called	  ‘event-­‐causal’	  views.	  	  He	  thinks	  that	  event-­‐causal	  
views	  of	  (libertarian)	  free	  will	  are	  undermined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  events	  governed	  by	  the	  physical	  laws	  are	  found	  
on	  a	  continuum	  of	  “alien-­‐deterministic	  events—events	  such	  that	  there	  are	  causal	  factors	  beyond	  our	  control	  by	  
virtue	  of	  which	  hey	  are	  causally	  determined	  or	  truly	  random	  events—those	  that	  are	  not	  produced	  by	  anything	  at	  
all,	  or	  partially	  random	  events—those	  for	  which	  facts	  beyond	  the	  agent’s	  control	  contribute	  to	  their	  production	  
but	  do	  not	  determine	  them,	  while	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  supplements	  the	  contribution	  of	  these	  factors	  to	  produce	  
the	  events”	  (2001,	  p.	  127).	  	  Agent-­‐causal	  views	  place	  our	  actions	  and	  choices	  beyond	  this	  ‘continuum’;	  however,	  
Pereboom	  thinks	  that	  “empirical	  objections	  provide	  good	  (albeit	  not	  conclusive)	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  we	  are	  not	  
agent-­‐causes,”	  and	  that,	  therefore,	  we	  have	  “good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  our	  actions	  and	  choices	  are	  not	  agent-­‐
caused	  events,	  but	  are	  rather	  either	  alien-­‐deterministic,	  or	  partially	  random,	  or	  truly	  random	  events”	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  
128).	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  91	  This	  point	  is	  conceded	  by	  Pereboom	  (2001,	  p.	  xviii).	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  there	  are	  not	  a	  number	  
of	  outstanding	  philosophers	  who	  hold	  (or	  held)	  this	  view.	  	  I’ve	  mentioned	  Pereboom	  and	  Waller,	  but	  there’s	  also	  
Galen	  Strawson,	  C.	  D.	  Broad,	  Spinoza,	  and	  B.	  F.	  Skinner	  to	  name	  a	  few.	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makes such a view seem quite implausible.  Now, unless we have sufficient reason to doubt our 
shared human experience, I think we should conclude that such a position is implausible.  So, 
even if Pereboom is right that we have good empirical reason to think we lack the sort of free 
will required for moral responsibility—and so, good empirical reason to think that we lack moral 
responsibility—we should deny his conclusion.  We should, instead, say that we have overriding 
evidence to the contrary; namely, our human experience as of being morally responsible for our 
actions.   
Moreover, if our belief that we are morally responsible for some of our actions really is a 
basic belief, then we simply must decide which of the following are the more trustworthy: 
science, or our basic beliefs.  I take it as a given that our cognitive faculties are reliable (i.e. that 
our cognitive faculties are such that they, when functioning properly, lead to, and are designed to 
(by God, or evolution, or both), form a preponderance of true beliefs).  If our cognitive faculties 
are such that they reliably form true beliefs, then it seems plausible that our basic beliefs—those 
beliefs that we’re just hard-wired to believe—reliably track the truth.  So, since I take it as a 
given that our cognitive faculties are reliable, I conclude that our basic beliefs reliably track the 
truth.  So, I conclude that I have good reason to think that my basic belief (if it is one) that I am 
morally responsible for some of my actions is true.   
Science, however, has this funny—but completely appropriate—habit of changing its 
mind.  If I had to guess (which I’ll do now), I’d guess that the vast majority of scientific theses 
have been disconfirmed by evidence.  As I understand it, this is one way in which science works: 
come up with a plausible hypothesis H for some remarkable fact F, then try and gather evidence 
E that confirms H.  If, however, there happens to be some evidence E* that disconfirms H, then 
H is thrown out.  Scientific progress is chock-full of this sort of happening, and so much the 
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better for science.  The point, though, is this: if I had to guess which is the more reliable, I’d 
guess that my basic belief is more reliable than our scientific theories (e.g. that determinism is 
true).     
If I’m right that P2 is true, then this leads to our second upshot of the Direct Argument*’s 
success: that free will is compatible with indeterminism.  Though I haven’t discussed free will at 
all in this dissertation, the success of the Direct Argument* is relevant to the free will discussion.  
Here is why.  The Direct Argument* establishes that incompatibilism is true.  We have good 
reason to think that we are morally responsible for (at least some of) our actions.  Moreover, 
there’s good reason to think that moral responsibility requires free will.92  Thus, we have good 
reason to think that we have free will.  Thus, we have good reason to think that free will is 
compatible with indeterminism. 
This conclusion does not establish whether or not free will is compatible with 
determinism.  Nevertheless, the conclusion that free will is compatible with indeterminism is 
important to the free will debate.  Galen Strawson (2003), for example, argues that moral 
responsibility is impossible.  That is, it doesn’t matter whether or not a world is deterministic, 
moral responsibility is incompatible with both, and this I think, is because free will is 
incompatible with both.  Strawson explains his position thusly: 
(1) It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early 
experience, and it is undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be held to be in 
any way responsible (morally or otherwise).  (2) One cannot at any later stage of life 
hope to accede to true moral responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way 
one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience.  For (3) both the particular 
way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one’s success n 
one’s attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity 
                                                	  	  	  	  	  92	  Notably,	  Fischer	  (1995,	  1998,	  2007,	  2010)	  denies	  this	  position	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Frankfurt	  cases.	  	  Frankfurt	  cases,	  
he	  thinks,	  successfully	  show	  that	  freedom	  to	  do	  otherwise	  (i.e.	  the	  sort	  of	  ‘free	  will’	  I	  mention	  in	  the	  text)	  is	  not	  
required	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  His	  ‘semi-­‐compatibilist’	  position	  is	  one	  in	  which	  he	  believes	  we	  are	  morally	  
responsible	  for	  (at	  least	  some	  of)	  our	  actions,	  but	  that	  we	  needn’t	  have	  free	  will	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘two-­‐way’	  or	  
‘regulative’	  control—i.e.	  freedom	  to	  do	  otherwise)	  in	  order	  to	  be	  so	  responsible.	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and previous experience.  And (4) any further changes that one can bring about only after 
one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via initial 
changes, by heredity and previous experience.  (5) This may not be the whole story, for it 
may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable not to heredity and experience 
but to the influence of indeterministic or random factors.  But it is absurd to suppose that 
indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, 
can in themselves contribute in any way to one’s being truly morally responsible for how 
one is. (Strawson, 2003, p. 215) 
 
The idea, I think, is that we do what we do because of the way we are; we (allegedly) have no 
regress stopping account of how we can be said to have control over the way we are; and if our 
regress stopping account is that some part of the way we are happens because of random factors, 
then we don’t have control over this either.  Thus, we’re not morally responsible for anything, 
regardless of whether or not determinism is true.   
 I just explained Strawson’s lengthy quote in terms of ‘control’.  For I think that this must 
be what he’s attempting to show: if we don’t have any control over the way we are, then we’re 
not responsible for the way we are (and, thus, not responsible for what we do).  And this is true 
regardless of whether or not ‘the way we are’ is determined or happens at random, i.e., is 
undetermined.  So, even though Strawson is speaking about moral responsibility, I think his 
conclusion is such that it renders ‘control’—that is, the sort of free will required for moral 
responsibility—impossible.   
 But the Direct Argument*’s conclusion, coupled with our knowledge that P2 is true, 
shows that Strawson (or anyone else who thinks that free will is not compatible with 
indeterminism) is wrong.  Thus, since we’re morally responsible for (at least some of) our 
actions, and moral responsibility plausibly requires free will, we can conclude that free will is 
compatible with indeterminism.  So, the sort of free will required for moral responsibility is 
compatible with indeterminism. 
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 Such conclusion, I think, reveals some important ways in which to advance the 
discussion on free will and moral responsibility.  We are, hereby, given two things: moral 
responsibility is incompatible with determinism, and indeterminism is true.  Now, what needs to 
be answered is this: what account of free will is sufficient to explain the kind of free will 
required for moral responsibility?  Which, in turn, spawns the following questions.  Does free 
will require indeterminism? If not, then is it possible to have free will but not be morally 
responsible for anything?  If free will does require indeterminism, then what is it about the agent 
that must be undetermined in order for her will to be free (e.g. is it events in her brain? Is it the 
agent herself? Etc.)?  Whatever the answers to these question are, I think attempting to answer 
these questions will help philosophers figure out what free will is, and, moreover, it will help 
them advance the relevant debate.  
 
 V.  Conclusions 
 
 The goal of this dissertation has been to defend the Direct Argument for the 
incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility.  In particular, the goal has been 
to defend the Argument’s key inference rules as well as its metaphysical assumptions, which 
undergird the Argument.  In chapters two, three, and six (the present chapter), I defended Rule B, 
the most controversial of the Direct Argument’s inference rules.  In chapter four, I defended Rule 
A from (what I take to be) the only criticism of it on offer in the literature.  In chapter five, I 
defended one of the Direct Arguments most salient metaphysical assumptions, namely, that for 
any contingently existing being in a deterministic universe, it will be such that there’s something 
remote to it that determines its steps.  That is, for any possible deterministic universe, there will 
be a remote past*, even if not a remote past. 
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 To defend Rule B from its interlocutors, I devoted chapter two to a discussion of some 
recent attempts to give a counterexample to the Rule.  Fischer and Ravizza’s well-known 
Erosion case, for example, is considered by very many philosophers to have successfully shown 
that Rule B is invalid.  But I argued that Erosion does not successfully show that Rule B is 
invalid; rather, it reveals a confusion in the setup of the case, namely, that Erosion fails to show 
that Betty is directly morally responsible for the fact that the enemy base is crushed by a glacier.  
It’s important that Erosion doesn’t successfully show that Rule B is invalid because much of the 
literature devoted to the Direct Argument’s inference rules deals with revisions of Rule B, e.g., 
revisions of Rule B that are devised to capture only ‘one path’ cases (McKenna), or Rule B as a 
‘causal rule’ of inference rather than a logical one (Shabo).  And if Rule B hasn’t been 
undermined, then the Rule B defender needn’t take time to consider revisions of Rule B at all; 
for Rule B is valid, so it doesn’t really matter whether or not there are counterexamples to certain 
revisions of the Rule.   
 But even recent attempts to provide a counterexample to Rule B, itself, fail.  For, as we 
saw with various cases from Haji, Widerker, and Schnall with Widerker, these attempts are 
insufficient for a variety of reasons.  Not least of which, though, was defended in the present 
chapter.  For, as we’ve now seen, the principle, Truth DependenceMORAL, is likely true, and any 
plausible theory of moral responsibility will have to say that it is true.  And if so, then 
counterexamples to Rule B are impossible.  For, as any purported counterexample will claim, the 
agent in the case will be responsible for the fact expressed in the conclusion to which the ‘NR’ 
operator is affixed, which means that she is thus responsible for the truth of the consequent of the 
second premise.  But the truth of the conditional in the second premise depends on the truth of 
the consequent which.  According to TDM, this means that the agent is responsible for the truth 
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of the conditional in the second premise.  Thus, there are no possible substitution instances of 
Rule B where the agent is responsible for the conclusion, but isn’t responsible for (at least) the 
truth of the conditional in the second premise.  Thus, counterexamples that purport to undermine 
Rule B, itself (like Haji’s, Widerkers, etc.), are doomed to fail.   
 But even if there are no possible counterexamples to Rule B, it doesn’t follow that such a 
Rule is one that we should give much attention and credence to.  For, as we saw in chapter three, 
some philosophers have argued that the Rule is dialectically inappropriate.  Fischer, for example, 
thinks that Rule B leads to a “dialectical stalemate”, and McKenna, for his part, thinks that Rule 
B should have never been accepted in the first place since it nearly begs the question against the 
compatibilist.  But, as I argued, neither of these worries successfully undercuts the Rule.  For 
example, Fischer is right only if Rule B is false, and we are, instead, thinking of some modified 
version of Rule B.  Some modified version of Rule B might lead to a dialectical stalemate, this 
much I’m happy to agree with.  But it’s not so clear that Rule B itself leads to a dialectical 
stalemate.  And given Rule B’s validity, Fischer will have to show that Rule B—and not one of 
its revisions—leads to a dialectical stalemate.  Moreover, McKenna is right only if there’s some 
non question-begging reason to think that Rule B can be established only by examples that pass 
through a ‘normally functioning’ agent.  But, this seems to be the very question at issue; so, there 
isn’t much reason to think that McKenna is right about Rule B.  Thus, from my discussions of 
Rule B in chapters two, three, and six (the present chapter), I concluded that Rule B is valid.   
 Rule A says that no one is, or could be, even partly directly morally responsible for a 
necessary truth.  Such a rule seems trivially true, and most philosophers agree.  Stephen Kearns, 
however, has tried to give several counterexamples to Rule A (or some variation thereof).  In 
chapter four, I argued that Kearns’s attempts to provide a successful counterexample to Rule A 
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fail.  I gave several reasons for thinking that each of these counterexamples fails; but, I think the 
chief reason for their failing is that each case relies on two invalid rules of inference, what I 
called  
ER:  If S is directly morally responsible for p, and p ⊃ q, then S is directly morally 
responsible for q, and 
 
MC: If S makes it the case that p, and p ⊃ q, then S makes it the case that q. 
 
But ER and MC are clearly invalid.  For example, it’s true that I make it the case (or am directly 
morally responsible for the fact) that I write this dissertation; and it’s true that my writing 
dissertation implies that I was born; but of course it doesn’t follow that I made it the case (or am 
directly morally responsible for the fact) that I was born.  So, Rule A is safe from objection. 
 In chapter five I considered Joseph Campbell’s ‘No Past Objection’, and conceded that 
this objection has some real bite to it.  For, I think that the objection is, strictly speaking, 
successful.  The way the Direct Argument is worded, the fact that there are possible worlds that 
are deterministic but lack a remote past undermines at least premises 1, 2, 3, and 4 as currently 
written.  But I argued that this objection misses the point of the Direct Argument’s key 
metaphysical assumption that for any contingently existing being in a deterministic universe, 
he’ll be such that there’s something remote to him—that is, beyond his influence—that 
determines his steps.  And the same is true of the natural laws in any deterministic universe; 
they’ll be such that something over which they have no influence causes them to be true.  Thus, I 
argued that there are no possible deterministic universes that lack a remote past•.  If I’m right 
about all of this, then we can simply replace the notion of ‘remote past’ in the Direct Argument 
with ‘remote past*’—a notion that I think properly gets at the metaphysical spirit of the 
Argument.  And such revision gives us the Direct Argument*.  This argument, I claimed, is 
successful.  Thus, incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism is true. 
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 In the present chapter I’ve done two things.  First, I argued that a corollary to the truism 
about truth—that is, the idea that truth depends on the world in a very trivial way—is the 
principle, Truth DependenceMORAL (TDM).  And since no one should deny the truism about truth, 
no one should deny TDM.  But if TDM is true, then counterexamples to Rule B are impossible; 
thus, counterexamples to Rule B are impossible.  Second, I gave what I think are two important 
upshots of a successful Direct Argument*.  The first of these was that we can know that 
incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism is true; and the second is that 
we have good reason to think that free will—something not discussed in the dissertation—is 
compatible with determinism’s being false.  This last upshot might seem fairly modest; however, 
I think its importance to the free will debate cannot be overlooked.  For, since we have good 
reason to believe that free will is compatible with indeterminism, and free will is required for 
moral responsibility, we have good reason to think that there’s a cogent explanation of 
indeterministic free will in the offing.  What such a thesis will look like I don’t know.  But 
realizing that there likely is such a thesis helps to advance not just the free will discussion, but 
also metaphysics more generally, and the broader philosophy of mind. 
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